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Abstract
This thesis comprises four essays which study effects of non-random selection from different per-
spectives. Two essays examine the phenomenon of rising inequality of wages in Germany. The first
one analyzes the role of changes in labor force composition for the development of wage inequality
among full-time workers. Of particular interest are the effects of increasingly common episodes of
temporary part-time work and nonemployment among full-time workers. Such episodes, along with
changes in composition with respect to age and education, have contributed substantially to the rise
in wage inequality.
Expanding on these results, the second essay studies the effects of declining unemployment on in-
equality of full-time wages. Selection between unemployment and full-time work is often determined
by unobserved factors. Changing selection over time between those two labor market conditions
could lead to increasingly diverse wages, particularly if sinking unemployment implies an influx of
negatively selected workers into employment. However, results from a selection corrected quantile
regression approach show that changing selection with respect to unobservables is not a contributor
to the rise in wage inequality.
The third essay in this thesis studies non-monotonic selection in regression discontinuity designs
(RDD). When similar numbers of individual select into and out of treatment simultaneously, the
identifying assumption of the RDD can be violated. The essay describes the selection mechanisms and
demonstrates the practical relevance of non-monotonic sorting in RDD applications, using election
data. It then suggests an enhancement to the standard specification tests for RDDs, which can be
used to detect non-monotonic sorting in advance.
Expanding the analysis of electoral results, the fourth essay studies voter’s valuation of candidate
gender. Despite significant improvement over the last decades, women are still heavily underrep-
resented in most countries’ parliaments. This essay examines whether the presence of profession
information coupled with voter preferences for stereotypical male occupations may explain part of
this gap. The analysis is conducted as a field experiment built into an exit-poll of voters in Germany
in 2014. Participants faced different versions of a hypothetical open list of candidates who exoge-
nously varied their gender and profession. Comparing the voting behavior across different treatments
shows a vote share bonus for women in the absence of profession information. Once voters know the
profession of candidates, however, this changes towards a small edge for male candidates.

Zusammenfassung
Diese Dissertation umfasst vier Aufsätze welche die Effekte von nicht-zufälliger Selektion aus un-
terschiedlichen Perspektiven betrachten. Zwei der Aufsätze behandeln das Phänomen gestiegener
Lohnungleichheit in Deutschland. Im ersten davon wird analysiert welche Rolle die geänderte Zu-
sammensetzung der Erwerbsbevölkerung für die Entwicklung der Lohnungleichheit unter Vollzeit-
Beschäftigten spielt. Vollzeit-Erwerbstätige weisen zunehmend Episoden von Teilzeitarbeit und Er-
werbsunterbrechungen in ihren Biographien auf. Zusammen mit Veränderungen in der Alters- und
Bildungsstruktur der Beschäftigten hat dies maßgeblich zum Anstieg der Lohnungleichheit beigetra-
gen.
Aufbauend auf diesen Ergebnissen betrachtet der zweite Aufsatz die Effekte von gesunkener Ar-
beitslosigkeit auf Lohnungleichheit. Selektion in Vollzeit oder Arbeitslosigkeit erfolgt oft auf Basis
unbeobachteter Faktoren. Wenn sich die Selektion in diese zwei Erwerbszustände über die Zeit ändert,
kann dies zu steigender Lohnungleichheit führen. Dies ist insbesondere dann der Fall wenn Personen
neu in Beschäftigung kommen, die eine Negativauswahl der Erwerbsbevölkerung sind. Jedoch zeigt
sich, als Resultat einer Analyse mit selektionskorrigierten Quantilsregressionen, dass die veränderte
Selektion nach unbeobachteten Faktoren nicht zum Anstieg der Lohnungleichheit beigetragen hat.
Im dritten Aufsatz dieser Dissertation geht es um nicht-monotone Selektion bei Regression Disconti-
nuity Designs (RDD). Die Annahmen, auf welchen unverzerrte RDDs beruhen, können verletzt sein
wenn sich sowohl Individuen in die Maßnahmengruppe hinein, als auch aus ihr heraus selektieren. Der
Aufsatz beschreibt diesen Selektionsmechanismus und zeigt seine praktische Relevanz für RDDs auf
Basis von Wahldaten. Weiterhin wird ein Spezifikationstest vorgestellt um nicht-monotone Selektion
im Vorfeld der Analyse zu erkennen.
Als Weiterführung der Analyse von Wahldaten untersucht der vierte Aufsatz Wählerpräferenzen für
das Geschlecht politischer Kandidaten. Trotz erheblicher Fortschritte in den letzten Jahrzehnten sind
Frauen nach wie vor in Parlamenten unterrepräsentiert. In diesem Aufsatz wird analysiert ob das Zu-
sammenspiel von Berufsinformationen und Geschlecht der Kandidaten die geringeren Repräsentation
von Frauen erklären kann. Dazu wurde ein Feldexperiment durchgeführt, bei dem deutsche Wähler
im Jahr 2014 beim Verlassen von Wahlbüros befragt wurden. Die Teilnehmer wählten Kandidaten
aus verschiedenen Versionen einer synthetischen Parteiliste, bei der die Geschlechter und Berufe der
Kandidaten zwischen den Versionen exogen variierten. Beim Vergleich des Wahlverhaltens über die
verschiedenen Versionen zeigt sich dass weibliche Kandidaten einen Stimmvorteil genießen solange
keine Berufsinformationen angegeben sind. Sobald jedoch die Berufe der Kandidaten bekannt sind
kehrt sich dies in einen Stimmvorteil für männliche Kandidaten um.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The study of non-random selection is central to the social sciences and selection issues are a
topic of intensive study in economics. Selection simply means that the units of observation
are non-randomly assigned to groups or categories, and that assignment is determined by a
selection rule. It can be the result of the data collection process, or it can arise when agents
self-select into specific options. For instance, individuals work in occupations in which their
skills are most highly rewarded, workers only enter the labor market if they gain utility
from employment and politicians are voted into office according to voter’s perception of
their quality. In the applied literature in economics, selectivity is an important issue in
any application and has been so for a long time. As early as 1951, Roy notes that “those
persons engaged in a particular occupation tend to be selected in a purposive manner from
the working population as a whole.” This distorted representation of the actual population is
at the core of the selection problem (Heckman 1990b). Issues arise when comparing outcomes
across groups with differing rules governing selection into them. However, the process of
selection itself can be informative of economic conditions and therefore be an outcome of
interest (Heckman and Vytlacil, 2007b). In this dissertation, I highlight selection issues from
different perspectives. I analyze the economic effects of selection on inequality of wages and
I study selective voter preferences for female political candidates. Methodologically, I also
examine the challenges which selection issues present for the application of two different
econometric approaches: quantile regressions and regression discontinuity designs.
Selection issues in economic research can be divided into two main strands. The first cate-
gory is selection with respect to observable characteristics. These might be selective changes
over time in the composition of the sample under analysis, e.g. the labor force, full-time
1
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workers (Lemieux 2006), the urban population (Moretti 2013) or migrants (Borjas 1987).
These changes are responsible for shifts in outcomes over time and have to be taken into
account when analyzing developments. They can also themselves be the object of analysis
(Heckman and Vytlacil 2007a).
In chapter 2, my co-authors and I focus on the effect of changes in the observed composi-
tion of the labor force on the distribution of wages in Germany. Germany has experienced
a dramatic rise in inequality of wages between the early 1990s and 2010 (see for instance
Antonczyk et al. 2018, Fitzenberger 2012). Greater disparity in wages has informed the
political debate and might have contributed to the introduction of a minimum wage in
Germany in 2015 (compare Brenke and Müller 2013). Multiple factors have added to the
increase in inequality: Skill biased technological change (Spitz-Oener 2006), changing labor
market institutions (Antonczyk et al. 2010, Felbermayr et al. 2014b) and assortative match-
ing of firms and workers (Card et al. 2013). The labor force has also been subject to a large
shift towards higher education, aging of the population, rising female labor force participa-
tion (Dustmann et al. 2009). Put differently, selection into the labor force, with respect to
observed individual characteristics, has changed over time. Re-examining the development
of the wage distribution in Germany, we use administrative panel data to investigate the
role of composition changes in education, age, individual labor market histories, occupations
and industry for the rise in inequality. We show that these changes in composition have
contributed substantially to the rise in wage inequality and introduce a novel explanatory
factor: An increase in the in the incidence of employment interruptions and temporary
part-time work among full-time workers has had a large, positive effect on the spread of the
wage distribution. We observe that between 1985 and 2010, full-timer workers have become
more likely to have experienced part-time work or employment interruptions at some pre-
vious point in their labor market history. This change towards “patchwork” labor market
histories can be observed for both males and females.
We decompose the rise in inequality into components due to changes in each character-
istics group, using an inverse probability reweighting approach in the spirit of DiNardo
et al. (1996). Our results show that changes in observables account for a large part of the
rise in wage inequality, and that the growing importance of employment interruptions and
temporary part-time episodes play an important role for wage inequality among full-time
workers. For males, we find that 43 to 53 percent, depending on the baseyear, of the rise in
wage inequality between 1985 and 2010 can be explained by compositional effects of observ-
ables. Of those, 14 to 17 percentage points are due to increasing employment interruptions
and temporary part-time work. For females the importance of composition changes is even
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higher, ranging between 64 and 78 percent, with 17 to 18 percentage points due to changing
labor market histories. These results are also policy relevant because both changes in the
age/education structure and in labor market histories are observable and to a certain extent
predictable. We therefore expect the positive trends in patchwork labor market histories to
directly change the wage distribution in the future.
The second category of selection issues is those of selection with respect to unobservable
factors. In a labor market context, certain individual traits like determination, social skills
or adaptability are hard to measure and are usually not observed, particularly in admin-
istrative data. Additionally, the outcome of interest may only be observed for a selective
sample which differs from the population in terms of unobservables. If selection is not ran-
dom, the observed distribution of the outcome will not be representative of the population.
As a consequence, estimated effects of covariates on the outcome will generally be biased.
This problem has sparked an extensive literature about approaches for selection corrected
models. For use in regression analysis, Heckman (1979) pioneered the use of control func-
tion estimators to correct estimated coefficients for bias due to selection with respect to
unobservables and a range of other approaches have since been established (for instance
Heckman 1990a, Puhani 2000 and Buchinsky 1998).
In chapter 3, my coauthor and I study the wage effect of non-random selection into full-time
work in Germany, taking into account changes in unobservables. The German labor market
has experienced large shifts between full-time work and unemployment since the mid-90s
(Ljungqvist and Sargent 1998). Simultaneously, the wage distribution has widened. Un-
derstanding the influence of changing selection on wage spreads is therefore important for
evaluating the economic effects of rising wage inequality. If falling unemployment draws
people into employment who represent a negative selection of all workers, the rise in in-
equality will be overestimated. In this case, increasing wage inequality can be considered
the sign of a positive development because it implies that individuals who previously did
not have employment are entering work.
We therefore study two aspects of selection into employment. First, we quantify the mag-
nitude of inequality which would be observed if all unemployed were working full time,
using exogenous labor supply shocks as instruments for selection. Second, we consider the
counterfactual development of inequality if the pattern of selective movement between un-
employment and full-time work had not changed since the mid-90s. Hereby we use a large
administrative dataset of west-German male workers and restrict the duration of unemploy-
ment to a maximum of one year. Our econometric approach relies on quantile regressions
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which we correct for selection into full-time work. It is an enhancement of Buchinsky’s (2001)
approach and takes into account the critique by Huber and Melly (2015). It is part of a
small but econometrically advanced literature about correcting estimated distributions for
selection (see Buchinsky 2001, Arellano and Bonhomme 2017, D’Haultfoeuille et al. 2014).
The most striking result from our analysis is that changing selection over time with respect
to unobervables is not driving the increase in wage inequality. For the subgroup of medium
educated workers, changing unobservables did not have a significant influence on within-
group inequality. For the low educated, wage inequality would actually have increased if
selection with respect to unobservables had stayed as it was in 1995. This implies that full-
time workers have become less heterogeneous with respect to unobservable characteristics.
These results have some political relevance, because they show that rising wage inequality
cannot be explained by an influx of previously unemployed individuals into full-time work.
Rising inequality in wages is therefore a sign of greater disparity in observable worker skills
and the returns to those skills. We also find that in a given year there is positive selection
into employment with respect to unobservables, especially in the lower parts of the wage
distribution. Which means that the employed are a positive selection of the labor force,
even after conditioning on education and labor market history.
Selection is not just an issue in labor market research and a challenge for the application
of quantile regression methods. In the context of field experiments, non-random selection
into treatment or control groups will lead to bias in estimated treatment effects. Selection,
sometimes also in the form of noncompliance or attrition, is a common feature of both field
and social experiments (Heckman and Smith 1995). Any experimental analysis therefore
has to take into account the potential for selection issues (Heckman and Vytlacil 2007a;
2007b).
In chapter 4, I highlight a specific kind of selection issues with respect to unobservables in
regression discontinuity designs (RDD). These research designs are a type of natural experi-
ment which exploits variation in treatment status caused by a discontinuity in a continuous
individual variable. Although first proposed by Thistlethwaite and Campbell in 1960, the
approach has only seen widespread application starting in the early 2000s (compare Lee
2001, Hahn et al. 2001, Dinardo and Lee 2004, among others). If the running variable
passes a specific threshold, treatment status changes. As long as individuals can’t exert
perfect control over their realization of the running variable, treatment assignment close to
the threshold is as good as randomized. This allows for the estimation of local average treat-
ment effects (LATE) by fitting a flexible model on both sides of the threshold. If, however,
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individuals can precisely manipulate their value of the running variable and sort themselves
just above or below the threshold, the identifying assumption of the design is violated and
the LATE is biased. This is a special case of selection, which can be driven by either ob-
servable or unobservable characteristics of the individuals. In the literature it is standard
practice to detect sorting issues by checking for continuity of control variables across the
threshold (compare Imbens and Lemieux 2008). Thus, selection with respect to observable
characteristics in the RDD setting can be detected. However, selection with respect to un-
observables will remain hidden. A different specification test, proposed byMcCrary (2008),
is based on the idea that sorting at the threshold should create a discontinuity in the density
of observations at this point. In chapter 4, I point out that, while the McCrary-test is very
good at detecting monotonic sorting, it can’t detect non-monotonic sorting issues. Mono-
tonic sorting takes place if all individuals have homogeneous preferences with respect to
treatment status. Non-monotonic sorting occurs when some individuals non-randomly sort
into treatment while others sort out of treatment, which can also invalidate the identifying
assumption of the RDD.
I show that this kind of sorting is a practical concern for RDD applications, using data from
the analysis of incumbency advantages in U.S. House elections by Lee (2001). The appli-
cation exploits the supposedly random outcomes of extremely close elections to provide a
causal estimate of the vote share advantage for incumbent candidates. There is however sub-
stantial evidence that close elections are not as random as assumed and that non-monotonic
sorting takes place in them (Alvarez and Hall 2006, Caro 1990 and Caughey and Sekhon
2011). I demonstrate that the McCrary test cannot detect sorting issues in this application,
and suggest a modification to the test, based on subsample-testing of groups with mono-
tonic selection preferences. Using this approach, I provide evidence that significant sorting
takes place in this application. Some candidates in U.S. house races are able to precisely
sort themselves above the vote share threshold needed for winning, while simultaneously
sorting their competitor slightly below this threshold. Because candidates of both parties
are equally capable of sorting, voluntary selection into treatment is masked by involuntary
selection out of treatment.
While chapters 2-4 cover issues which arise under selective movement into treatment or labor
market status, in chapter 5, the process of selection itself stands at the core of the analysis.
Using data from an election experiment built into an exit-poll of voters in Germany in 2014,
my co-author and I examine voter demand for female political candidates.
By performing an experiment which randomly assigns treatment to individuals, we avoid
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many types of selection issues typical of non-experimental data and are able to precisely
identify the causal effects of candidate gender. One caveat of this approach is that we cannot
entirely rule out self-selection into the experiment. However, we minimize selection issues
with regards to voting participation by drawing respondents only from those individuals
who actually went to the polls. This also ensures that our respondents are in the right set
of mind to cast their vote as they would do in real elections.
Despite significant improvement over the last decades, women are still heavily underrepre-
sented in most countries’ parliaments (CAWP 2018, IPU 2018). And while there is ample
evidence that supply decisions of female candidates contributes to this disparity, the litera-
ture has not reached a conclusion about the effects of voter demand for female candidates
(compare Esteve-Volart and Bagues 2012, Black and Erickson 2003 Giger et al. 2014, among
others). Our results suggest that voter demand for female candidates depends strongly on
the availability of information about the profession of the candidate. This might also help
explain the wide range of results, found in the literature, regarding voter demand for female
candidates.
In our experiment, participants faced different versions of a hypothetical open list of candi-
dates who exogenously varied their gender and profession. We also included a ballot version
without profession information, in order to separate the effects of gender from those of
profession. Each candidate appears on different ballot versions with a male-dominated, a
female-dominated and a gender-neutral profession, respectively.
Comparing the voting behavior across different treatments, we do not find direct discrim-
ination against women in the absence of profession information. Female candidates even
enjoy a substantial electoral advantage, driven by female voters. Female candidates are ~33
percent more likely to receive the vote than their male counterparts. Once voters know
the profession of candidates, however, this vote share advantage vanishes and would even
change towards a small edge for male candidates if professions were realistically distributed.
This effect is caused by the fact that voter preferences for female candidates are replaced by
voter preferences for candidates with stereotypical combinations of gender and profession.
Men working in a male-dominated professions enjoy a larger vote share bonus than that of
any other group, while women working in female-dominated professions gain a smaller vote
share bonus.
Our results are policy relevant for local or list elections, in which professions are important
for characterizing candidates. Since we find no evidence that voters are generally biased
against women as candidates, our results imply that policy measures which aim to improve
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female representation in parliaments can align with voter preferences. Gender stereotypes
play an important role in determining vote share and carry some relevance for electoral cam-
paigns. Candidates in gender-typical professions might want to emphasize their occupation,
while candidates with atypical combinations of gender and profession might focus on other
characteristics.

Chapter 2
The Role of Employment Interruptions
and Part-time Work for the Rise in Wage
Inequality
2.1 Introduction
The incidence of employment interruptions and temporary part-time work has grown strongly,
raising concerns about the stability of employment and low wages among part-time workers
(OECD 2010). Less known is that the incidence of previous part-time work and employment
interruptions has also grown among full-time workers. However, employment interruptions
and part-time experience may be associated with lower future wages due to lower human
capital accumulation, negative signalling effects, or lower labor force attachment (Arulam-
palam 2001, Blundell et al. 2016, Heckman 1981, Paul 2016). The literature on the rise in
wage inequality among full-time workers has so far not taken this into account. This is the
first study to examine the impact of changes in recent labor market histories on the rise in
wage inequality. Re-examining the development of the wage distribution in Germany, we
use administrative panel data to investigate the role of composition changes, in particular
changes in recent labor market experience, for the rise in wage inequality.1 As the key
novel aspects, our study accounts explicitly for previous part-time work and employment
interruptions among full-time employees, and we extend the analysis to total employment.
1There is a large literature on the rise of wage inequality in Germany, see e.g. Dustmann et al. 2009
Dustmann et al. 2009, Antonczyk et al. 2010, Card et al. 2013 as well as the literature review in section 2.2.
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Figure 2.1: Part-time employment and Nonemployment during previous five
years in different parts of the full-time wage distribution
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Note: Average number of days in part-time employment/nonemployment during the years 1980-1984
and 2005-2009, respectively, by decile of the full-time wage distribution in the years 1985 and 2010.
Motivating our analysis, figure 2.1 shows for the years 1985 and 2010 the number of days
in part-time employment and nonemployment, respectively, during the previous five years
by decile of the wage distribution. For full-timers both the incidence of previous part-
time and nonemployment experience increased considerably between 1985 and 2010. Put
differently, full-timers have over time become more likely to have experienced part-time work
or employment interruptions in the past. The prevalence of previous part-time experience
and nonemployment increases in the lower part of the full-time wage distribution, implying
that among workers with particular low wages the share of workers, who have recently
worked part-time or who have experienced nonemployment in the recent past, has grown over
time. Figure 2.1 shows that nonemployment experience is more important than part-time
experience, with male (female) full-timers in 2010 in the lowest decile having experienced
an average of more than 600 (500) days of nonemployment and more than 40 (110) days
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of part-time employment during the time period 2005 to 2009. The evidence for part-time
employment is consistent with studies showing that part-time work has increased strongly
and that transitions between part-time and full-time work and employment interruptions
have become more frequent (Tisch and Tophoven (2012) , Potrafke (2012), Tamm et al.
(2017)). Below, we will also show evidence that the dispersion of nonemployment and part-
time experience among full-timers has grown over time. There was a secular increase of
unemployment in Germany from the 1980s until the mid 2000s. Afterwards, unemployment
fell almost continuously until 2010 (SVR 2014). Our analysis will focus on long-term changes
abstracting form cyclical variation in nonemployment and part-time experience among full-
timers.2
There is ample evidence suggesting that episodes of part-time work or nonemployment have
negative long-term impacts on the career path and therefore on future wages.3 First, human
capital accumulation slows down or there is even depreciation when workers interrupt their
career or temporarily downgrade to part-time employment. Second, employment interrup-
tions or part-time experience may lead to scarring effects leading to lower wage offers and
poorer career possibilities upon re-employment. A third point is that lagged employment
outcomes are indicators of permanent characteristics which drive employment and wages.
Accordingly, periods of nonemployment or part-time employment in the past may indicate
a lower labor force attachment - in addition to being a negative productivity signal. Lagged
employment outcomes are unobserved in the cross-sectional data sets, typically used in the
literature on wage inequality for most countries (see e.g. Acemoglu and Autor 2011 and the
literature discussion in section 2.2).
For the aforementioned reasons, our paper investigates the role of employment interruptions
and part-time employment in a statistical decomposition of the rise in wage inequality among
full-time working employees. In light of the evidence in figure 2.1, the growing importance
of part-time employment and nonemployment is likely to play an important role for the
increase of lower tail wage inequality. The literature review in section 2.2 reveals that the
studies on the rise of wage inequality have so far not taken into account the rise in previous
2There is a cyclical component in transitions from nonemployment and part-time employment to full-time
employment. During an upswing (downturn), one would expect these to increase (fall). In a recent study,
Borowczyk-Martins and Lalé (2016) show that for the UK and the U.S. transitions from part-time to full-
time employment at the same employer are a major driver of the cyclical changes in part-time employment,
growing (declining) during an upswing (downturn). Our analysis focuses on the long-term rise in the share
of full-timers with nonemployment and part-time experience. As our empirical results show, this long-term
rise dominates the cyclical variation.
3See e.g. Arulampalam (2001), Burda and Mertens (2001), Beblo et al. (2002), Manning and Petrongolo
(2008), Edin and Gustavsson (2008), Schmieder et al. (2010), Edler et al. (2015), or Paul (2016).
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nonemployment and part-time employment among full-timers. Furthermore, little attention
has been paid to gender differences in the rise in wage inequality. For instance, negative long-
term career effects of transition from full-time to part-time work for women after childbirth
have been studied by Connolly and Gregory (2009) and Paul (2016). Fitzenberger et al.
(2016) document that women in Germany, who had been working full-time before birth,
take fairly long spells of maternity leave after child birth and often then return to part-time
work.
Our paper makes the following contributions. First, in our decomposition of the rise in
wage inequality among full-timers, we add the previous labor market history involving part-
time and nonemployment experience. This plays an important role in explaining the rise in
wage inequality both among males and females. At the same time, adding previous labor
market history accounts for unobserved heterogeneity in employment decisions. As such,
our analysis is of interest for all countries experiencing similiar labor market trends, because
ours is the first study investigating the role of the rise in nonemployment and part-time
employment in explaining the rise in wage inequality among full-time employees. As a related
second contribution we estimate the effect of further observable characteristics to the increase
in male and female wage inequality in Germany over the recent decades. Such a parallel
analysis for Germany does not exist. Compositional changes in observable characteristics
explain over 50 percent of the increase in male wage inequality and up to 80 percent of
the increase in female wage inequality. To the best of our knowledge, the extremely strong
role of composition effects for the rise of female wage inequality has not been recognized so
far. Third, we estimate composition effects with regard to the counterfactual distribution
of full-time wages for all employees, which confirms the robustness of our main findings.
Furthermore, this shows that part-timers (especially female part-timers) represent a negative
selection with respect to observable characteristics. Including part-timers into the analysis
also speaks to the role of increasingly heterogeneous labor market histories for the rise in
German wage inequality.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the literature on
the rise of wage inequality. Section 2.3 discusses the data used and presents first descriptive
evidence. Section 2.4 discusses our findings. Section 2.5 concludes. The appendix provides
more details and supplementary empirical results.
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2.2 Literature review
Wage inequality has been increasing in many industrialized countries between the 1980s
and the 2000s (see the comprehensive survey in Acemoglu and Autor 2011, or the litera-
ture discussion in Lemieux 2006, Autor et al. 2008, Dustmann et al. 2009). Many studies
focus on the U.S, but the same mechanisms operating in the U.S. are also at play in other
industrialized countries, including Germany. Skill-biased technical change (SBTC) is the
most prominent explanation for the rise in wage inequality, predicting rising wage inequal-
ity across the entire wage distribution. This is consistent with the evidence for the U.S. for
the 1980s but not for the 1990s, as in the 1990s inequality stopped to grow at the bottom
of the wage distribution (Autor et al., 2008). Acemoglu and Autor (2011) take the latter
as evidence for the task-based approach (see Autor et al. 2003) implying a falling demand
for occupations with medium skill requirements (which are relatively more routine intensive
and thus easier to substitute by technology) relative to both occupations with high or with
low skill requirements, resulting in polarization of employment across occupations. The
evidence regarding a polarization of wages across the wage distribution in the U.S. seems to
be limited to the 1990s and a polarization of wages is not an unambiguous prediction of the
task based approach (Autor, 2013). Some studies for the U.S. emphasize the role of changing
labor market institutions such as de-unionization and falling real minimum wages (see also
the discussion in Autor et al. 2003). DiNardo et al. (1996) show that the fall in unionization
levels explains an important part of the rise in wage inequality during the 1980s.
In related work, Lemieux (2006) shows that changes in the composition of the workforce
regarding education and experience explain a major part of the rise in wage inequality in
the U.S. Also, Autor et al. (2008) find strong composition effects, especially for females, but
focus on other explanations for the rise in wage inequality. Composition effects also affect
residual wage inequality, i.e. the wage differences among employees with the same observable
characteristics (DiNardo et al. 1996, Lemieux 2006). Altogether, this evidence motivated us
to scrutinize the role of composition effects for the rise of wage inequality in Germany.
Wage inequality has been rising in West Germany [henceforth Germany] since the 1980s
(Dustmann et al., 2009).4 Until the mid 1990s the increase in wage dispersion among full-
4See also (in chronological order) Kohn 2006, Gernandt and Pfeiffer 2007, Antonczyk et al. 2010, Fitzen-
berger 2012, Card et al. 2013, Felbermayr et al. 2014a, Dustmann et al. 2014, Riphahn and Schnitzlein 2016,
Möller 2016, and Antonczyk et al. 2018. Most recent studies are based on administrative employment records
in the Sample of Integrated Employment Biographies (SIAB) – or on earlier versions of the same data source
- as provided by the Research Data Center of the IAB and the Federal Employment Agency. Some studies
use of the cross-sectional wage surveys in the German Structure of Earnings Survey (GSES) provided by the
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timers was restricted to the top of the wage distribution, whereas wage inequality increased
from mid 1990s onwards until 2004 across the entire distribution (Dustmann et al., 2009).
The evidence until the mid 1990s is consistent with skill biased technological change and the
hypothesis that labor market institutions such as unions and minimum wages prevented an
rise in wage inequality at the bottom of the wage distribution before the mid 1990s, which re-
sulted in rising unemployment among the low-skilled (Fitzenberger, 1999). Dustmann et al.
(2009) show that changes in the composition of workers regarding age and education and
the sizeable decline in coverage by collective bargaining both explain major components of
the rise in wage inequality. At the same time, the study provides evidence for a polarization
of employment as found previously for the U.S. (see also Antonczyk et al. 2018).
Antonczyk et al. (2009) and Antonczyk et al. (2010) find a strong increase of wage in-
equality between 1999/2001 and 2006. Changes in task assignments cannot explain this
rise (Antonczyk et al., 2009). Accounting for coverage by collective bargaining, firm level
characteristics, and personal characteristics, Antonczyk et al. (2010) show that the decline
in coverage by collective bargaining does not explain the rise in wage inequality in the lower
part of the wage distribution, when firm level characteristics are held constant. Most im-
portant are changes in the quantile regression coefficients of firm level variables (firm size,
region, industry), which reflect a growing heterogeneity in firm level wage policies. The two
studies differ regarding the contribution of changes in personal characteristics. Biewen and
Seckler (2017) find that changes in union coverage and personal characteristics are most im-
portant for the rise in wage inequality between 1995 and 2010. Card et al. (2013) estimate
person and firm fixed effects in wages. The study finds a growing heterogeneity of these fixed
effects over time and increasing sorting of workers with high personal fixed effects into firms
with high firm fixed effects. Both effects contribute strongly to the rise in wage inequality.
Felbermayr et al. (2014a) find that the decline in coverage by collective bargaining is the
most important explanation for the rise in wage inequality, while there is no important role
for international trade. Our short survey of the literature shows that the literature has not
yet reached a consensus on the mechanisms behind the rise in wage inequality in Germany
Research Data Center of the Statistical Offices, the Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) provided by DIW or
the BIBB-IAB/Bibb-BAuA Labor Force Surveys (BLFS). While the SIAB data only involves earnings, the
GSES, the GSOEP, and the BLFS allow for an analysis of hourly wages. Researchers using the SIAB data
typically focus on full-time working employees. While the SIAB and the GSOEP provide panel data, the
GSES data and the BLFS only involve repeated cross-sections every four to six years and the GSES surveys
before 2010 only involve a subset of all industries and they lack very small firms. Compared to the GSOEP
and the BLFS, the GSES and the SIAB provide much larger cross-sections on employees and wages. All
four data sets document the rise in wage inequality since the mid 1990s, see Dustmann et al. (2009, SIAB),
Fitzenberger (2012, SIAB and GSES), Antonczyk et al. (2009, BFLS), and Gernandt and Pfeiffer (2007,
GSOEP).
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until 2010.5
None of the aforementioned studies investigates to what extent the rise in interruptions of
full-time work is driving the increase in wage inequality, although there is ample evidence
of a negative effect of previous nonemployment and part-time experience on wages in full-
time employment. Several mechanism may be at work. First, human capital accumulation
slows down or there is even depreciation when workers stop working full-time (Beblo et al.
2002, Manning and Petrongolo 2008, Edin and Gustavsson 2008, Paul 2016). Employment
interruptions due to displacement have been shown to negatively affect wages (Burda and
Mertens 2001, Schmieder et al. 2010, Edler et al. 2015). After maternity leave, females often
return to part-time employment, but may return to full-time work later on (Fitzenberger
et al. 2016, Paul 2016). When a transition from nonemployment or part-time work back into
full-time work involves a job change (no recall), this also implies a loss of job-specific human
capital. Second, employment interruptions or part-time experience may lead to scarring
effects, i.e. employers (rightly or wrongly) interpret previous non-fulltime employment as
signal of low productivity or low labor force attachment leading to lower wage offers and
poorer career possibilities upon re-employment (Ruhm 1991, Arulampalam 2001, Gregory
and Jukes 2001). A third potential mechanism, similar to the second, is that lagged em-
ployment outcomes are indicators of permanent characteristics which drive employment and
wages (Heckman, 1981). Accordingly, periods of nonemployment or part-time employment
in the past may indicate a lower labor force attachment - in addition to being a negative
productivity signal.
The literature on wage effects of temporary part-time work focuses primarily on women
and maternal part-time. For females in the UK, Connolly and Gregory (2009) and Blundell
et al. (2016) demonstrate that part-time employment in the past results in lower earnings
trajectories, even when returning to full-time work. Connolly and Gregory (2009) also show
that this holds for part-time episodes at the same employer. They point out that part-time
work is often related to downgrading to less skilled tasks that persists if the individual
later returns to full-time work. Controlling for selection on unobservables, Paul (2016)
finds for Germany a substantial negative impact of part-time work and nonemployment
episodes on future earnings of females in full-time work, with the effect being even stronger
for nonemployment. While there is no detailed analysis of part-time effects among males
5The recent study by Möller (2016) shows that the rise in wage inequality stopped in 2010 based on a
new release of the SIAB data. However, the comparison of the years before and after 2011 is plagued by a
structural break in 2011 regarding the distinction between part-timers and full-timers. For both reasons, we
abstain from analyzing the SIAB data after 2010 since our focus is on analyzing the rise in wage inequality.
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available, the mechanisms of human capital depreciation and lack of further training which
underly the wage effects of part-time work for female workers are likely to affect male workers
in a similar way.
2.3 Data and descriptive evidence
Our analysis uses SIAB data involving a 2% sample of all dependent employees who are
subject to social security contributions, i.e. excluding the self-employed and civil servants.6
We study the period 1985 to 2010. Even though SIAB data are available for earlier years,
we do not include them in our analysis because the rise of wage inequality across the entire
distribution is only observed after the 1980s (Dustmann et al. 2009, Fitzenberger 2012).
Since we may observe several employment spells of various lengths per individual in a given
year, all observations are weighted with the share of days worked in a job in the respective
year. The sampling weights calculated in this way reflect the relative importance of each
wage observation.
We account for an individual’s labor market history using four measures. The first two
involve the number of days spent in full-time and in part-time employment during the last
five years. The residual category is the number of days spent in nonemployment during
the last five years, which may be times of unemployment, education, or any other type of
nonemployment. In addition, we use two dummy variables, indicating whether a person
had a full-time or a part-time spell at any point during the previous year. This information
captures individual short-term employment dynamics. Wages are daily wages in Euros
deflated by the CPI to 1990. Since we use administrative data on employment spells, the
measures are very precise. Because the SIAB data do not involve hours worked, we follow
the literature on wage inequality for Germany and use daily wages, representing an earnings
measure. Our sample also includes individuals with part-time employment, but the wage
data for part-timers are much more confounded by differences in hours of work than for
full-timers.7 Below, we also estimate the counterfactual distribution of full-time wages for
total employment also including part-timers.
6This study uses the factually anonymous Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies (version 1975
– 2010). Data access was provided via a Scientific Use File supplied by the Research Data Centre (FDZ) of
the German Federal Employment Agency (BA) at the Institute for Employment Research (IAB), see vom
Berge et al. (2013) for a data documentation.
7We have calculated the standard deviation of hours of work for the years 1985 and 2010 based on the
German Socioeconomic Panel (detailed results are available upon request). For part-timers, the standard
deviation is two to three times higher than for full-timers.
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Table 2.1: Variable Classification
Variable Short Variable list
group
Education Ed 3 categories (ed): University, Upper secondary High-School
and/or Vocational Training, No/Other Degree
Experience Ex Potential experience (age - years of schooling - 6) (ex)
Labor market
history
Hist Number of days in full-time (ft5), or part-time (pt5) over
the last 5 years. Indicators for: full-time job in previous
year (ft), part-time job in previous year (pt)
Occupation Occ Job classification by KldB 2-digit levels (occ, 63 categories)
Industry Ind Industry classification by WZ93 (sec, 14 categories)
All wages above the contribution threshold are top-coded in the SIAB. The censoring thresh-
old lies above the 85% wage quantile in every year. Therefore, we compare the 85/15, the
85/50 and the 50/15 quantile gaps in the wage distribution. In those cases, where we cannot
restrict our analysis to values below the 85% quantile (in particular when analyzing devel-
opments in wage residuals), we impute wages above the threshold according to individual
characteristics. Details of the imputation procedure can be found in the appendix, section
2.6.3. Unless noted otherwise, we restrict our analysis to individuals aged 20 to 60 years, in
order to focus on the working age population.
Table 2.1 lists the covariates used and Table A2.1 provides descriptive statistics for two
sample years. We distinguish three education levels: University degree (including Universi-
ties of Applied Sciences), degree from Upper secondary school and/or Vocational Training,
No/Other degree. We use 14 aggregated industries (German Industry Classification [WZ]
1993) and 63 aggregated occupations (2-digit level of the KldB [’Klassifikation der Berufe’]
1988). For interactions between industry and occupation, we aggregate occupations to the
1-digit level in order to avoid problems with empty cells in our logit regressions. The edu-
cation variable is cleaned and interrupted measurements are imputed for consistency based
on Fitzenberger et al. (2006).
2.3.1 Wage inequality
Figure 2.2 shows the development of log wage quantiles (cumulative changes) from 1985
onwards. Our primary measures of wage inequality are the gaps between the 85th, 50th and
15th percentiles of log wages. Until about 1991 the different wage quantiles move upward
and largely in parallel. After 1991 median wages of male full-timers stagnate (recall that we
analyze real wages). For female full-timers there is a continuous but decelerating rise until
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2003 and a subsequent decline until 2008. For both genders we observe a widening of the
wage distribution beginning just at the time when median wages start stagnating. Wages
at the 85th percentile continue to increase, while wages at the 15th percentile decline. For
males this decline is moderate until the early 2000s but accelerates afterwards. By 2010
male wages at the 15th percentile even lie below their 1985 level. For females we observe
different developments of the three quantiles already in the late 1980s. However, inequality
only increases in a more substantial way in the late 1990s, several years later than for
males. After 1998 female median wages stagnate, while the 85th percentile rises and the
15th percentile declines rapidly. The corresponding trends in inequality as measured by the
85/50 and 50/15 gaps are depicted by the solid lines in figures A2.9 to A2.12.
Figure 2.2: Wage quantiles relative to levels of 1985
−
0.
1
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
Wage quantiles, indexed to 1985, male workers
Time
C
ha
ng
e 
re
la
tiv
e 
to
 1
98
5
1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
85% quantile
Median
15% quantile
−
0.
1
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
Wage quantiles, indexed to 1985, female workers
Time
C
ha
ng
e 
re
la
tiv
e 
to
 1
98
5
1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
85% quantile
Median
15% quantile
Note: Wage quantiles among full-time workers in West-Germany, normalized to the levels of 1985. Source:
SIAB, own calculations.
2.3.2 Labor market histories
Part-time work in Germany has grown substantially over the last decades (figure A2.1).
While this may reflect secular trends in labor market participation, part of the increase
is linked to political reforms promoting part-time work. Over our observation period sev-
eral changes in legislation focus on part-time work. In 1985 the German government en-
acted a law (’Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz’) which granted part-timers the same level of
job protection as full-timers. This law increased the acceptance of part-time work on the
side of trade unions and in the general population. In 2001 a law followed which made it
easier for employees to enter voluntary part-time work (’Teilzeit- und Befristungsgesetz’).
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These changes in legislation had the effect of formally easing the transition between full-
time, part-time and nonemployment. We observe that not only the yearly stock of part-
time employees increased for both genders, but that the frequency of temporary part-time
episodes for individuals currently working full-time increased as well (figure A2.3). Parallel
to the rise of part-time work two changes in legislation between 1985 and 1998 (’Beschäf-
tigungsförderungsgesetz’, ’Arbeitsförderungs-Reformgesetz’) facilitated fixed-term contracts
and temporary agency work.
Both the intensive and the extensive margin of labor market histories matter for current
wages (Burda and Mertens 2001, Arulampalam 2001, Beblo et al. 2002, Manning and Petron-
golo 2008, Edin and Gustavsson 2008, Schmieder et al. 2010, Edler et al. 2015, Paul 2016,
Blundell et al. 2016). Returns to labor market experience are not uniform across jobs and
type of work. Not only is experience in part-time work valued lower than that in full-time
work, but part-time and nonemployment episodes slow down career progression and wage
growth, see literature review in section 2.2.
Figure A2.3 shows increasing average lengths and also increasing variability of previous
part-time episodes for men and females, both above and below the median of the respective
wage distribution.8 The mean and variance of number of days spent in part-time work
during the last five years increases over time for those individuals who are in full-time
jobs at the time of observation. Male full-timers experience a noticeable increase in past
part-time episodes, although the total amount of the time previously spent in part-time is
lower than for females. While the increase in prevalence of previous part-time for males
is only slightly higher below than above the median, the increase in variability of previous
part-time experience is considerably stronger below the median. This means that previous
part-time episodes are increasingly concentrated on low-wage full-timers which may lead
to rising lower-tail wage inequality.9 For female full-timers we observe an increase in the
length and variability of previous part-time work both above and below the median, and the
overall levels are considerably higher than for males. Incidentally, the part-time experience
of full-time females above the median of the distribution shows stronger cyclical variation
compared to females below the median, whose part-time experience follows more of a secular
upward trend. Note that the labor supply of females is known to be more elastic than that
8In order to clearly separate previous part-time and nonemployment during educational spells from those
after having completed education, we also include the evidence for full-timers aged at 30 to 60 years old, see
figures A2.15 and A2.16 in the appendix. For part-time experience, the trends are very similar for the 25 to
60 years old and the 30 to 60 years old.
9In table A2.8 in the appendix, we show that differences in means and variances below and above the
median are highly statistically significant.
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of men and that the part-time experience of females is often related to career interruptions
after child birth (Blundell et al., 2016).
There are two further issues concerning temporary part-time episodes to be discussed. The
first involves working time accounts which provided a buffer against the negative labor
demand shock in Germany during the Great recession 2008/2009 (Burda and Hunt, 2011).
The SIAB data do not record a variation in hours worked over a year in case of continuous
employment at the same employer. In the case of working time accounts, the part-time/full-
time classification is based upon agreed (contractual) hours of work. Furthermore, the data
involve daily wages defined as total earnings over an employment spell (typically one year,
when the worker is employed by the same employer for one calendar year) divided by the
length of the employment spell in days. Specifically, working time accounts allow to vary the
actual hours of work over a year but there is no variation in monthly earnings. Furthermore,
on average over the employment spell the actual hours of work should correspond to the
contractual ones. Note further that working time accounts did not play an important role
before 2008 and that they show a strong cyclical variation. By contrast, our results below
suggest an earlier timing of the distributional effects of previous part-time episodes, reflecting
a long-term continuous trends which dominates the cyclical variation. The second issue
concerns whether the part-time episodes in our data are with the same employer or with
different employers. A recent study shows that a major part of the cyclical variation in
part-time employment in the UK and the U.S. is accounted for by changes in transitions
rates between part-time and full-time work at the same employer (Borowczyk-Martins and
Lalé, 2016). We would expect wage penalties associated with previous part-time episodes
to be larger if they occur across employers. Our data show that the vast majority (about
75-80%) of transitions from part-time to full-time employment involve a change of employers
(see figure A2.2). We observe only a minor cyclical variation in the division of the part-time
to full-time transitions within and between employers, which is unlikely to be of importance
in explaining the continuous long-term rise in wage inequality (see decomposition results in
section 2.4).
We now turn to the descriptive discussion of previous nonemployment episodes. Just as
previous part-time experience, nonemployment has a sizeable negative impact on wages.
Nonemployment may include all alternative activities such as education or child care or it
may be due to involuntary displacement, unemployment or voluntary absence from the labor
market. Such events may lead to human capital obsolescence, with the possible exception of
educational spells, and therefore to a decline in wages (Burda and Mertens 2001, Schmieder
et al. 2010, Edler et al. 2015). Figure A2.4 shows the average length and variability of time
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spent in nonemployment over the past 5 years. Both above and below the median, males and
females exhibit increasing previous nonemployment experience. Cross-sectional variability
only increases below the median, and there is a cyclical variation, which is stronger below
the median. To investigate whether educational spells are driving our results, we reduce the
sample to individuals age 30 years or above, for whom we assume that educational spells
play a negligible role among nonemployment episodes, see figure A2.16 in the appendix.
Above the median wage, the upward trend now disappears. By contrast, males and females
below the median wage still exhibit increasing previous nonemployment experience together
with increasing cross-sectional variability. Thus, previous nonemployment episodes are in-
creasingly concentrated on individuals in the lower part of the wage distribution, a trend
which may have a strong impact on lower-tail wage inequality. The differences between
figures A2.4 and A2.16 reveals that educational spells are an important part of previous
nonemployment episodes among younger workers.10
Irrespective of the type of previous nonemployment episodes, their incidence is higher than
previous part-time employment, especially for males but also for females. Moreover, the
associated wage losses are likely to be larger than those from part-time episodes (except
for educational spells among younger workers, which may, however, be captured in our
subsequent analysis by a higher education level). We therefore expect previous nonemploy-
ment episodes to have sizeable negative effects on wages, most likely raising lower-tail wage
inequality.
2.3.3 Education, experience, industry, and occupation
In addition to the changes in recent labor market history, there have been strong changes in
the distribution of education, work experience and industry structure. Figure A2.5 shows
the percentage of workers in each education category. The share of workers without an
educational degree has declined since the 1980s. This holds in particular for female workers,
among whom the percentage of unskilled workers decreases from 32% in 1985 to 18% in
2010. We also observe an increase in the share of university graduates. Again, this is
most pronounced for females, as the initial percentage of female university graduates is
very small in 1985 but catches up to the male share by 2010. For the medium-skilled, i.e.
workers with an upper secondary degree or a vocational degree, we observe a hump-shaped
development. The share of medium-skilled increases during the late 1980s and the 1990s,
10Unfortunately, the SIAB data do not record whether a nonemployment episode is due to an educational
spell. However, the data involve the educational degree as possible outcome of a previous nonemployment
episode.
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reaches its peak in the late 1990s, and declines in the 2000s, giving way to a rising share of
university graduates.
The corresponding trends for the distribution of worker’s potential experience are shown
in figure A2.6. Between 1985 and 2010 the percentage of highly experienced workers with
27 or more years of potential experience increases, reflecting the aging of the population.
The share of workers with medium levels of potential experience (between 14 and 26 years)
follows a hump shaped trend. The percentage of older workers with 40 or more years of
experience did not undergo major changes in our sample, even though the overall population
aged considerably. The only major gender difference in potential work experience concerns
the share of workers with low experience. Among males this share is never higher than 20%
and it drops to 10% in the late 1990s. Starting at 30% in 1985, the initial share of young
female workers is very high but converges to the low level for males in the late 1990s. After
the catching-up process among females, the experience composition by gender has became
very similar by 2010. Note that our experience measure is potential work experience which
mainly reflects both workers’ age and educational periods. In this way, we more clearly
separate long-term trends in experience (population aging and educational periods) from
the factors we intend to capture in our recent labor market histories (recent part-time and
nonemployment episodes).
Figure A2.8 shows the development of industry shares for eight aggregated sectors. We
observe some sectors with an almost constant share since the 1980s (i.e. transportation and
trade), while others experiences strong changes. For males the largest changes are observed
for the construction industry, the manufacturing sector for consumer goods, and the banking
and insurance sector. The first two experience a massive decline, while the latter more than
doubles its share between 1985 and 2010. Transport and communication as well as health
and social services, show small increases, whereas the manufacturing sectors for vehicles and
for machinery shrink slightly. The initial sector composition differs strongly by gender, but
the dynamics of the different sectors are quite similar. In particular, manufacturing declines
strongly, while banking and health services grows. The construction sector, which plays no
important role for females, does not change in any substantial way.
Shifts between occupations are smaller than those between industries. Table A2.2 reports
the five most frequent occupations in 1985 and 2010. Figure A2.7 in the appendix shows a
continuous shift in the aggregate from manufacturing to service sector occupations. At the
same time, there are fairly small changes in the distribution of the 63 two-digit occupations.
Among males four out of five occupations are present in the top 5 in both years and their
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shares are similar. For females three out of five occupations remain in the top 5 in both
years. Furthermore, the correlation coefficient between employment shares for the 63 two-
digit occupations in 1985 and 2010 is .91 for males and .96 for females.
2.4 Empirical analysis
2.4.1 Estimation of counterfactuals
First, we analyze the impact of composition changes on wage inequality among full-timers
accounting for the selection into full-time work based on observed worker characteristics. For
the counterfactual analysis keeping characteristics constant over time we use the reweighting
methodology introduced by DiNardo et al. (1996).11 Then, we repeat the analysis for wage
inequality for total employment in a similar way. We now provide a brief overview of what
we do, full formal details can be found in the appendix.
We start to estimate the distribution of full-time wages which would result if the distribution
of worker characteristics had not changed over time while the conditional wage distribution
given worker characteristics changed over time as observed.12 For example, we hold fixed the
composition with respect to education and estimate as counterfactual by how much inequal-
ity would have risen if workers’ education had not changed. We sequentially add groups of
covariates in order to determine the incremental effect of a particular set of covariates. For
example, in the situation in which we already leave education constant, we also fix workers’
potential work experience in order to determine the incremental effect of experience to rising
wage inequality. Our sequential conditioning scheme is such that we move from exogenous
and predetermined characteristics towards characteristics that are the likely consequence of
endogenous decisions of the individual. Altogether, we start with workers’ education and
sequentially add the factors potential work experience, recent labor market history as well
as workers’ occupation and industry (see table 2.1). As in Lemieux (2006), we also carry
out our decomposition for residual wage inequality, i.e. wage inequality within groups of
workers with identical observed characteristics.
In the second part of our analysis, we take the distribution of full-time wage earners, but
reweight their characteristics to replicate the distribution of observed characteristics for
11This method has been applied, among others, by Lemieux (2006) and Dustmann et al. (2009). For an
overview of alternative decomposition techniques, see Fortin et al. 2011
12Such an analysis ignores general equilibrium effects, i.e. changes in the conditional wage structure are
assumed to be independent of changes in the work force composition.
2. The Role of Employment Interruptions and Part-time Work 24
total employment, i.e. including part-time workers. This estimates the counterfactual wage
distribution that would result if all employed workers worked full-time. Contrasting this
distribution with the wage distribution among full-timers allows one to gauge to which
extent part-timers represent a positive or negative selection compared to full-timers. We
repeat our sequential analysis of adding different groups of covariates for the reweighted
sample representing total employment.
2.4.2 Wage inequality among full-timers
Starting with male full-timers we first analyze the effect of educational upgrading on male
wage inequality. Figure A2.9 (left panel) shows the evolution of the quantile gaps in male
wages between 1985 and 2010 under the assumption that the 1985 distribution of education
is held fixed over time. It turns out that fixing education considerably reduces the increase
in inequality, i.e. the observed educational upgrading contributes strongly to the observed
rise in wage inequality. Table A2.4 shows that a share of 17.1% of the increase in overall
inequality (as measured by the 85/15 quantile ratio) and 37.5% of the increase in the upper
half of the distribution (as measured by the 50/15 quantile ratio) can be explained by changes
in education, while these changes did not contribute to rising inequality at the bottom of the
distribution (as measured by the 50/15 quantile ratio, see lower part of figure A2.9). This
means that the compositional effects of the educational expansion mostly affected the upper
part but not the lower part of the male wage distribution. The contribution of changes in
education on residual wage inequality amounts to a moderate 7.1%, i.e. there is no strong
shift towards groups of workers with above-average levels of within-group inequality. As
a next step, figure A2.10 extends the reweighting procedure to include changes in work
experience (in addition to changes in education). Based on the evidence shown in figure
A2.10 (left panel) and table A2.4 (columns 4 to 6) the incremental contribution of work
experience is very small.
In figure A2.11 we add changes in recent labor market histories to our reweighting procedure.
This considerably changes the results, affecting in particular the bottom of the distribution.
The incremental contribution amounts to 16.9% for overall wage inequality and to 19.2% for
lower tail inequality (column 10 of table A2.4). This means that increasingly discontinuous
labor market histories are important to explain the rise in lower-tail wage inequality. There
was also a sizeable contribution to changes in residual wage inequality (10.7%), suggesting
that changes in recent labor market histories were associated with shifts towards worker
groups with higher levels of within-group inequality. Finally, figure A2.12 adds changes in
occupations and industry structure. This also contributes to the general rise in male wage
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inequality (13.0% for overall wage inequality, 22.2% to inequality at the bottom, and 13.6%
to residual wage inequality, see columns 11 to 13 of table A2.4).
Note that adding the stage (Occ+Ind) results in the cumulative effect of changing the
joint distribution of all our covariates (Ed+Ex+Hist+Occ+Ind). As shown in column 12
of table A2.4, compositional changes explain more than half of the increase in male wage
inequality over the period 1985 to 2010 (53.0% of overall wage inequality, 54.6%/51.5% at
the top/bottom, 34.0% of residual wage inequality). Our results confirm the importance of
compositional effects for male wage inequality changes also found by Dustmann et al. (2009)
and Felbermayr et al. (2014a), but establish the contribution of the additional factor of
changes in recent labor market histories. Note that the explanatory power of compositional
changes is particularly high between 1985 and 1995 (holding characteristics fixed there
is no increase in inequality at all, see left panel of figure A2.12), but became somewhat
weaker from 1996 onwards. Similar to the findings for the U.S. (Lemieux, 2006), the total
contribution of the compositional changes considered lies above 50%, which is quite high.
Next, we turn to results for female full-timers, see the right hand panels of figures A2.9 to
A2.12. By contrast to the findings for males, figure A2.9 shows that the increase in female
wage inequality remains largely unchanged, when holding constant the 1985 distribution of
education.13 Adding changes in potential work experience (which are mainly driven by age)
yields a strong incremental contribution (35.1% to overall inequality, 30.4% to upper half
inequality, and 38.2% to lower half inequality, see figure A2.10 and columns 5 to 7 of table
A2.5). This also differs from the findings for males. In light of figure A2.6, the findings
for females reflect that younger cohorts are much smaller compared to older ones (e.g. the
share of females with 0 to 13 years of potential work experience dropped from 30% in 1985
to 10% in 2010). This leads to a rising share of older female full-timers with different wage
levels and higher within-group inequality.
Adding recent labor market histories again explains a considerable, incremental share (18.6%
for overall inequality and 17.1% for residual inequality, columnns 8 to 10 in table A2.5, see
also figure A2.11 to the right). Thus, the impact of part-time episodes and labor market
interruptions is similar for males and females. Finally, changes in occupations and industry
structure have negligible effects on rising female wage inequality (columns 11 to 13 of table
13However, there is a slight difference with regard to the effect of female education when we take as the
base year 2010 instead of 1985. This points to interaction effects. We carry out this reverse analysis in
section section 2.6.4 in the appendix.
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A2.5).14
Altogether, we find that compositional changes can account for an even larger share of the
rise in female wage inequality than for males. Column 12 of table A2.5 shows that 63.6%
of the increase in overall inequality, 61.9% of the increase in the upper part, and 64.8% of
the increase in the lower part of the distribution can be accounted for by the compositional
changes considered. The graph to the right in figure A2.12 implies that, during the period
1991 to 2001, female wage inequality would have fallen even in the absence of compositional
changes. An important component has worked through composition changes regarding
residual wages, i.e. shifts between groups of workers with different levels of within-group
inequality (51.6% of the changes are accounted for by composition changes, see column 12
of table A2.5).
In the appendix, we carry out a robustness check of our analysis that reverses the roles of
the base and target years (1985 vs. 2010). With few exceptions all our findings are robust
to the choice of the base year (see appendix for details).
2.4.3 Counterfactual full-time wages for total employment
This section extends the analysis of full-wage wages to total employment, including those
working part-time in the year of observation. As explained above, part-time wages are not
comparable because we lack detailed information on hours worked in our data set. However,
we do observe the personal characteristics of part-timers, which our analysis of composition
effects includes. We consider the distribution of characteristics in the combined sample of
full-timers and part-timers (‘total employment’), thereby estimating inequality of full-time
wages among individuals who are currently employed.
This excercise will be informative in four ways. First, comparing the actual wage distribution
of full-timers with the counterfactual wage distribution that assumes that both part-time
and full-timers are paid full-time wages will be informative about whether part-timers are a
positive or negative selection with respect to their characteristics (compared to full-timers).
Second, examining the development of the counterfactual wage distribution for the total
employment sample over time may serve as an estimate for composition effects on wage
inequality in a wider population of part-time and full-timers, which we cannot examine
14It is not an error that quantile gaps for the overall distribution are unchanged up to the third digit in
row 13 of table A2.5 when adding occupation and industry characteristics. This is due to the fact that daily
wages are rounded to full Euros and quantiles only change if the change in counterfactual weights is large
enough to move the quantile value to a different Euro integer.
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directly given that comparable wage information for part-timers is missing. This also serves
as a robustness checks of our above findings for full-timers. Third, the effect of selection into
full-time work versus part-time work is mostly accounted for by controlling for the recent
employment history. Fourth, we net out selective transitions between part-time and full-
time work in our analysis of composition effects, in the sense that we measure composition
effects net of such (often temporary) movements between part-time and full-time work.
We start with the estimated counterfactual trends in inequality of full-time wages in a sample
sharing the composition of total employment (for a more detailed explanation, see section
2.6.4 in the appendix). Figure A2.13 shows the trend in wage inequality if full-timers shared
the education composition of total employment. For male workers the differences between
both distributions is very small in 1985. After 2000 we see a slight decline in the 15%
quantile of the total employment distribution relative to the full-time distribution, which
leads to slightly wider 50/15 and 85/15 quantile gaps. This suggests a negative selection into
part-time work for men. However, the part-time share of male workers already starts rising
in the early 1990s, while we only observe negative effects of selection into part-time a decade
later. This implies that there is no negative selection associated with the initial expansion of
part-time work. Also, for females the initial full-time and total employment distributions for
females are quite similar, especially regarding the upper tail. However, the quantiles diverge
quickly and by 1990 we see lower wages for the total employment sample over the entire
distribution. This means that characteristics that were prevalent among part-time workers
involve lower wage returns than those of full-timers, implying negative selection into part-
time work. After 1990 the distributional gap between the full-time and the counterfactual
total employment sample was almost constant, implying a stable positive selection into
full-time work. The differences of the observed female full-time wage distribution in 2010
and the wage distribution for the counterfactual total emloyment sample are also shown in
the right panel of figure A2.14 (bold vs. dashed line). Considering the total employment
sample shifts the distribution to the left, i.e. the full-time sample is positively selected. The
dotted lines in figure A2.14 represent the wage distributions that result when one further
changes the characteristics to those of the total employment sample in 1985. This results
in a considerable compression of the wage distribution. Again, changing characteristics
contribute to rising inequality. Table A2.6 shows the contribution of composition changes
for trends in full-time wage inequality in the total employment sample, which are broadly
similar to the results for the male full-timers in table A2.4. In particular, there is an
important role for composition changes regarding education (especially at the top) and
labor market histories (especially at the bottom). Including part-timers into the analysis
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makes the contribution of labor market histories to rising inequality much more pronounced
at the bottom of the distribution (38.6% in table A2.6 vs. 22.2% in A2.4). There is only
a limited role for changes in occupations and industries. These conclusions are robust to
reversing the base year, see tables A2.6 and A2.10 in the appendix. Table A2.7 shows the
results for the female total employment sample. Despite the much higher part-time share in
the female sample the results in table A2.7 are again quite similar to table A2.5 for female
full-timers. There is a role for shifts in experience and recent labor market histories, while
changes in education and occupations and industries do not contribute much. In table A2.11
in the appendix we reverse the base year. As in the female full-time sample this boosts the
role of education changes (particularly at the top of the distribution) and leads to a number
of smaller unsystematic changes that point to complex interaction effects of compositional
and wage structure effects. Similar to males, extending the analysis to total employment for
females also amplifies the importance of recent labor market histories for increasing wage
inequality at the bottom of the distribution (20.5% vs. 28.6% in table A2.5 vs. table A2.7,
and 11.9% vs. 22.7% in table A2.13 vs. table A2.11, column 10).
2.5 Conclusions
This paper scrutinizes the contribution of composition changes in education, potential work
experience, labor market history, industry structure, and occupation on the rise in inequality
of full-time wages in Germany from 1985 until 2010. We account explicitly for the growing
importance of employment interruptions and temporary part-time episodes among full-time
workers, and we estimate the counterfactual full-time wage distribution for all employees.
Our results imply that changes in observables account for a large part of the rise in wage
inequality, and that the the growing importance of employment interruptions and tempo-
rary part-time episodes play an important role for wage inequality among full-time workers.
For males we find that (depending on the base year) 43 to 53 percent of the rise in wage
inequality between 1985 and 2010 can be explained by compositional effects of the observ-
ables considered. For females the importance of composition changes is even higher, ranging
between 64 and 78 percent. To the best of our knowledge the literature has so far not rec-
ognized the strong role of composition effects for the rise of female wage inequality. For
males composition changes in education (especially in the upper part of the distribution)
and changes in recent labor market histories (especially in the lower part of the distribution)
are the main contributors to compositional change. The compositional effects of male labor
market histories to rising overall wage inequality range from 14 to 17 percent, and from 18
2. The Role of Employment Interruptions and Part-time Work 29
to 23 percent in the lower half of the distribution. For females we find strong composition
effects of changes in age/experience and in recent labor market histories. The latter con-
tribute 17 to 18 percent to the overall increase in female wage inequality over the period
1985 to 2010. When including part-timers the role of recent labor market histories becomes
even stronger. Our results are policy relevant because both changes in the age/education
structure and in labor market histories are observable and to a certain extent predictable.
One might wonder to what extent the contribution of increasing heterogeneity in recent
labor market histories is causal or to what extent these are just proxies for unobservables.
Still, while we are not in a position to separate between these two explanations, account-
ing for labor market history in fact also proxies for remaining unobservable differences in
employment outcomes. Furthermore, the observed trends in previous part-time work and
employment interruptions are very strong, which suggests that observed changes in labor
market history are mostly the intended consequences of policy changes (section 2.3.2). It is
well documented in the literature that part-time work and previous nonemployment have
effects on subsequent wages, even when controlling for unobservables (Arulampalam 2001,
Schmieder et al. 2010, Paul 2016, Blundell et al. 2016). We therefore expect trends in these
variables to directly change the wage distribution in subsequent periods. We also note that
our base and target years (1985 and 2010) represent similar points in the business-cycle
so that our analysis is unlikely to be affected by huge differences with respect to this as-
pect. Finally, we note that even if the observed changes in previous part-time work and
nonemployment involve increased sorting in terms of unobservables across individuals with
differing labor market histories, this would still make histories very relevant factors as their
direct effect would be enhanced by changes in unobservables.
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2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Figures
Figure A2.1: Part-time share
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Note: Between 1985 and 2010, the share of
the labor force in part-time employment has
risen from 26% to 40.3% among women and
from 1.9% to 7.8% among men.
Figure A2.2: Part-time to full-time transitions
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Note: The vast majority of transitions between part-time and full-time jobs involve a change in employers.
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Figure A2.3: Days spent in part-time work during the last 5 years (full-timers
aged 25-60 years)
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Note: Among current full-time employees between the ages of 25-60, the average number of days historically
spent in part-time has increased between 1985 and 2010, particularly among workers earning wages below
the median. At the same time, the variance of transient part-time episodes has increased, which implies
rising heterogeneity with respect to historic part-time experience.
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Figure A2.4: Days spent in nonemployment during the last 5 years (full-timers
aged 25-60 years)
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Note: Among current full-time employees between the ages of 25-60, the average number of days historically
spent in non-employment has increased slightly between 1985 and 2010, particularly among female workers
earning wages below the median.
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Figure A2.5: Share of education groups
Source: SIAB, own calculations Source: SIAB, own calculations
Note: Educational expansion has led to consistently increasing shares of university educated workers in the
labor force. Simultaneously, the share of workers with low or no qualification has decreased dramatically,
especially among women.
Figure A2.6: Share of experience groups
Source: SIAB, own calculations Source: SIAB, own calculations
Note: An aging of the labor force results in increasing shares of workers with long time spans to potentially
amass work experience. Note particularly the drastic decline in female workers fresh out of education.
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Figure A2.7: Share of occupation categories
Source: SIAB, own calculations Source: SIAB, own calculations
Note: Among both men and women, fewer workers now work in the extended manufacturing industry, even
though it is still the second largest employer for male workers. Note particularly that the extended service
industry employs the majority of women.
Figure A2.8: Share of industry sectors
Source: SIAB, own calculations Source: SIAB, own calculations
Note: Among both men and women, more workers now work in transport, commerce, financial services,
as well as health and education. Simultaneously, fewer workers now work in the basic goods sector and in
construction. The mechanical manufacturing sector has shrunk slightly in terms of employment, but not
dramatically so.
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Figure A2.9: Inequality development base year 1985, specification E
(Education)
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Note: This figure contrasts the observed increase in the gaps between wage quantiles with the counterfactual
increase in wage gaps, which would have prevailed if the distribution of education in the workforce had not
changed since 1985.
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Figure A2.10: Inequality development base year 1985, specification EE
(Education, Experience)
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Note: This figure contrasts the observed increase in the gaps between wage quantiles with the counterfactual
increase in wage gaps, which would have prevailed if the distribution of education and potential experience
in the workforce had not changed since 1985.
Figure A2.11: Inequality development base year 1985, specification EEH
(Education, Experience, Labor market history)
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Note: This figure contrasts the observed increase in the gaps between wage quantiles with the counterfactual
increase in wage gaps, which would have prevailed if the distribution of education, potential experience and
labor market histories in the workforce had not changed since 1985.
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Figure A2.12: Inequality development base year 1985, specification EEHOI
(Education, Experience, Labor market history, Occupation, Industry sector)
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Note: This figure contrasts the observed increase in the gaps between wage quantiles with the counterfactual
increase in wage gaps, which would have prevailed if the distribution of education, potential experience, labor
market histories, occupations and industry in the workforce had not changed since 1985.
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Figure A2.13: Counterfactual wage distribution, if full-timers had total
employment characteristics
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Note: This figure contrasts the observed log wage quantiles with the counterfactual log wage quantiles if the
employed had the characteristics distribution of the entire labor force (employed and unemployed)
Figure A2.14: Comparison of observed, counterfactual total employment and
reweighted counterfactual total employment sample (specification EEHOI)
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Note: The wage distribution under counterfactual total employment in 2010 would prevail if the employed
had the characteristics distribution of the entire labor force in 2010. Counterfactual total employment of
1985 reflects the wage distribution which would have prevailed if workers in 2010 had the characteristics
distribution of the entire labor force of 1985 (employed and unemployed).
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Figure A2.15: Days spent in part-time work during the last 5 years
(full-timers aged 30-60 years)
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Note: Among current full-time employees between the ages of 30-60, the average number of days historically
spent in part-time has increased between 1985 and 2010. At the same time, the variance of transient part-time
episodes has increased, which implies rising heterogeneity with respect to historic part-time experience.
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Figure A2.16: Days spent in nonemployment during the last 5 years
(full-timers aged 30-60 years)
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Note: Among current full-time employees between the ages of 30-60, the average number of days historically
spent outside of employment, and their variance, have increased between 1985 and 2010.
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Figure A2.17: Inequality development base year 1985, specification EEHOI of
total employment
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Note: This figure contrasts the counterfactual wage gaps which would have prevailed if the employed had
the characteristics of the entire labor force in the respective year (employed and unemployed) with the
counterfactual wage gaps which would have prevailed if the employed had the characteristics of the entire
labor force of 1985.
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Figure A2.18: Inequality development base year 2010, specification EEHOI of
total employment
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Note: This figure contrasts the counterfactual wage gaps which would have prevailed if the employed had
the characteristics of the entire labor force in the respective year (employed and unemployed) with the
counterfactual wage gaps which would have prevailed if the employed had the characteristics of the entire
labor force of 2010.
Figure A2.19: Inequality development base year 2010, specification E
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Log−wage quantile gaps, males, baseyear 2010,
 keeping Ed(ucation) fixed
Time
85
/1
5,
 8
5/
50
, 5
0/
15
 lo
g−
di
ffe
re
nc
es
1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
Source: SIAB, own calculations
85/15 gap
85/50 gap
50/15 gap
85/15 gap baseyear 10
85/50 gap baseyear 10
50/15 gap baseyear 10
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
1.
2
Log−wage quantile gaps, females, baseyear 2010,
 keeping Ed(ucation fixed
Time
85
/1
5,
 8
5/
50
, 5
0/
15
 lo
g−
w
ag
e 
di
ffe
re
nc
es
1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
Source: SIAB, own calculations
85/15 gap
85/50 gap
50/15 gap
85/15 gap baseyear 10
85/50 gap baseyear 10
50/15 gap baseyear 10
Note: This figure contrasts the observed increase in the gaps between wage quantiles with the counterfactual
increase in wage gaps which would have prevailed if the distribution of education in the workforce always
been that of 2010.
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Figure A2.20: Inequality development base year 2010, specification EE
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Note: This figure contrasts the observed increase in the gaps between wage quantiles with the counterfactual
increase in wage gaps which would have prevailed if the distribution of education and potential experience
in the workforce always been that of 2010.
Figure A2.21: Inequality development base year 2010, specification EEH
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Note: This figure contrasts the observed increase in the gaps between wage quantiles with the counterfactual
increase in wage gaps which would have prevailed if the distribution of education, potential experience and
labor market histories in the workforce always been that of 2010.
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Figure A2.22: Inequality development base year 2010, specification EEHOI
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Note: This figure contrasts the observed increase in the gaps between wage quantiles with the counterfactual
increase in wage gaps which would have prevailed if the distribution of education, potential experience, labor
market histories, occupations and industry in the workforce always been that of 2010.
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2.6.2 Tables
Table A2.1: Descriptives of full-time samples
Male full-time sample Female full-time sample
1985 2010
mean sd mean sd
Real wage in Euro 70.06 47.53 82.48 48.34
Log real wage 4.16 0.39 4.28 0.51
No/other degree indicator 0.19 0.40 0.08 0.28
Vocational degree indicator 0.71 0.46 0.71 0.45
University degree indicator 0.07 0.25 0.15 0.36
Work experience 27.34 11.19 28.98 10.13
No. of days in full time last 5 years 1546.04 487.51 1523.88 513.84
Fulltime spell in previous year? 0.96 0.19 0.96 0.20
No. of days in part time last 5 years 3.26 46.49 15.72 113.47
Part-time spell in previous year? 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.09
Agriculture and mining 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.13
Plastics, rubber, mineral products 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17
Chemicals 0.03 0.18 0.02 0.15
Machinery and metal products 0.15 0.36 0.13 0.33
Transport- and electrical equipment 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.31
Food and basic consumption 0.10 0.31 0.07 0.25
Hotels and restaurants 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.13
Construction 0.12 0.32 0.08 0.28
Trade 0.12 0.33 0.14 0.35
Transport and communication 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.26
Financial and insurance 0.08 0.27 0.18 0.38
Public services 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.21
Health and Education 0.03 0.18 0.05 0.23
Public administration 0.06 0.24 0.04 0.20
1985 2010
mean sd mean sd
Real wage in Euro 46.24 20.34 61.02 35.16
Log real wage 3.74 0.44 3.97 0.56
No/other degree indicator 0.27 0.45 0.08 0.27
Vocational degree indicator 0.66 0.47 0.73 0.44
University degree indicator 0.03 0.16 0.12 0.32
Work experience 24.03 11.90 27.39 11.14
No. of days in full time last 5 years 1356.01 598.16 1327.35 625.94
Fulltime spell in previous year? 0.93 0.26 0.93 0.26
No. of days in part time last 5 years 45.97 210.01 88.99 292.80
Part-time spell in previous year? 0.02 0.15 0.04 0.20
Agriculture and mining 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.08
Plastics, rubber, mineral products 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.11
Chemicals 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.13
Machinery and metal products 0.05 0.23 0.04 0.19
Transport- and electrical equipment 0.08 0.27 0.05 0.21
Food and basic consumption 0.13 0.34 0.06 0.25
Hotels and restaurants 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.18
Construction 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.13
Trade 0.18 0.38 0.16 0.36
Transport and communication 0.02 0.16 0.04 0.19
Financial and insurance 0.12 0.33 0.21 0.40
Public services 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.24
Health and Education 0.17 0.38 0.24 0.42
Public administration 0.08 0.27 0.06 0.24
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Table A2.2: Male’s most Frequent Occupations 1985 and 2010 (Top 5)
1985 2010
Occupation Share Occupation Share
Rank
1
Transportation 5.8% Office workers 7.8%
Rank
2
Metalworkers 5.8% Transportation 6%
Rank
3
Office workers 5.6% Storage workers 5.1%
Rank
4
Technicians 5.5% Retail workers 5.1%
Rank
5
Storage workers 4.8% Technicians 5.0%
Table A2.3: Female’s most Frequent Occupations 1985 and 2010 (Top 5)
1985 2010
Occupation Share Occupation Share
Rank
1
Office workers 25.5% Office workers 26.9%
Rank
2
Retail workers 11.3% Healthcare 12.4%
Rank
3
Healthcare 9.2% Retail workers 9.8%
Rank
4
Assembly
workers
4.1% Social workers 6.9%
Rank
5
Cleaning 3.7% Banking &
Insurance
3.5%
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0.257
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30.53%
0.101
56.76%
21.04%
0.101
56.76%
0.00%
85/50
0.098
0.093
5.25%
5.25%
0.075
23.16%
17.91%
0.065
33.65%
10.49%
0.051
47.56%
13.91%
50/15
0.136
0.129
5.15%
5.15%
0.075
44.74%
39.59%
0.036
73.36%
28.62%
0.050
63.37%
-9.99%
90/10
residual
0.158
0.173
-9.09%
-9.09%
0.114
28.31%
37.40%
0.078
50.44%
22.31%
0.069
56.12%
5.68%
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Table A2.8: Tests of differences between labor market histories above and below the
median wage
Days in part-time over the last
5 years
Days in nonemployment over
the last 5 years
Year 1985 2010 1985 2010
Males P-value of differencein means
0.0035 0 0 0
P-value of difference
in variances
0.0067 0 0 0
Females P-value of differencein means
0 0 0 0
P-value of difference
in variances
0 0 0 0
Table A2.9: Descriptive statistics of combined full-time and part-time samples
Males Females
1985 2010
mean sd mean sd
Real wage in Euro 69.89 47.51 81.61 48.15
Log real wage 4.15 0.40 4.27 0.52
No/other degree indicator 0.19 0.40 0.08 0.28
Vocational degree indicator 0.70 0.46 0.71 0.46
University degree indicator 0.07 0.25 0.16 0.36
Work experience 27.32 11.19 29.08 10.23
No. of days in full time last 5 years 1540.45 494.58 1494.81 544.03
Fulltime spell in previous year? 0.96 0.20 0.94 0.24
No. of days in part time last 5 years 6.29 78.41 37.03 203.05
Part-time spell in previous year? 0.01 0.08 0.03 0.18
Agriculture and mining 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.13
Plastics, rubber, mineral products 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17
Chemicals 0.03 0.18 0.02 0.15
Machinery and metal products 0.15 0.36 0.13 0.33
Transport- and electrical equipment 0.12 0.32 0.10 0.31
Food and basic consumption 0.10 0.31 0.07 0.25
Hotels and restaurants 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.14
Construction 0.12 0.32 0.08 0.27
Trade 0.12 0.33 0.14 0.35
Transport and communication 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.26
Financial and insurance 0.08 0.27 0.18 0.38
Public services 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.21
Health and Education 0.04 0.18 0.06 0.23
Public administration 0.06 0.24 0.04 0.20
1985 2010
mean sd mean sd
Real wage in Euro 43.64 20.41 55.40 33.52
Log real wage 3.67 0.48 3.85 0.59
No/other degree indicator 0.28 0.45 0.08 0.28
Vocational degree indicator 0.65 0.48 0.73 0.44
University degree indicator 0.03 0.16 0.11 0.32
Work experience 24.99 11.90 28.62 10.99
No. of days in full time last 5 years 1199.98 696.74 1048.65 759.52
Fulltime spell in previous year? 0.81 0.39 0.72 0.45
No. of days in part time last 5 years 209.50 513.80 366.32 642.41
Part-time spell in previous year? 0.14 0.35 0.25 0.43
Agriculture and mining 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.08
Plastics, rubber, mineral products 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.10
Chemicals 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.12
Machinery and metal products 0.05 0.22 0.03 0.18
Transport- and electrical equipment 0.07 0.26 0.04 0.20
Food and basic consumption 0.12 0.33 0.06 0.23
Hotels and restaurants 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.18
Construction 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.13
Trade 0.19 0.39 0.16 0.37
Transport and communication 0.03 0.17 0.04 0.19
Financial and insurance 0.12 0.33 0.19 0.40
Public services 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.24
Health and Education 0.18 0.38 0.26 0.44
Public administration 0.08 0.28 0.07 0.26
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2.6.3 Imputation of wages above censoring threshold
Our imputation procedure for wages above the contribution threshold of social security is
loosely based on Gartner (2005). We assume that log-wages are approximately normally
distributed and estimate expected wages above the censoring point with a Tobit model.
We regress log wages on education, age, nationality and individual labor market history,
separately for both genders. Results in the literature suggest that this type of imputation
leads to a slight upward bias in the variance of wages each year. Important for our analysis,
however, it does not lead to bias in the trend of wage dispersion.15 As we want to take into
account that the variance of wages is potentially correlated with individual characteristics,
we modify the procedure suggested by Gartner (2005) to explicitly model a heteroscedastic
variance for the Tobit regression. A simple imputation of log wages from the Tobit model
would exhibit too little variation. We therefore adjust imputed wages by a random draw
from a truncated normal distribution, using the predicted heteroscedastic variance from
the Tobit model. We impute separately for each year and for male and female workers.
Imputation by this method raises the mean wage by 0.8% and the standard deviation 14.6%
for males, and by 0.2% as well as 3.2% for females across all years.
2.6.4 Details of the counterfactual analysis
Composition reweighting for full-timers
We account for the selection into full-time work based on the observed composition of workers
regarding their socio-economic characteristics. Changes in the composition over time reflect
selective movements of individuals into and out of full-time work. Our aim is to quantify
the effects of such changes in the composition of full-timers on wage inequality. We use the
reweighting methodology introduced by DiNardo et al. (1996) to estimate counterfactual
wage distributions fixing the composition of a reference group (in our case the population
of full-timers in a reference year).
In the first part of our analysis, we analyze the distribution of full-time wages which would
result if the distribution of worker characteristics had not changed over time but only the con-
ditional wage structure (i.e. the wage distribution holding characteristics constant). Based
on these counterfactual wage distributions, we calculate and compare the development of
inequality as measured by the gaps between the 85th, 50th and the 15th wage percentiles
and the spread of residual wages. We take the residuals from a Mincer regression of log
15Compare the discussion in Card et al. (2013).
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wages w on a flexible specification of the characteristics listed in table 2.1. The dispersion
of residual wages represents wage inequality within narrow groups of workers defined by
the characteristics given in table 2.1. Changes in residual wage inequality may also be the
result of changes in the composition of the labor force (Lemieux, 2006). This will be the
case if there is heteroscedasticity, i.e. the conditional residual variance depends on observed
characteristics. In this case, shifts in the distribution of characteristics affect residual wage
inequality. For instance, overall residual wage inequality will typically rise if there is a rising
share of workers with above-average levels of within-group inequality.
Let tx = b denote the base year, for which the composition of the work force will be held
fixed, and tw = o the year for which we intend to estimate a counterfactual wage distribution.
We call this year the observation year. Here, we only use observations on full-timers in years
tw and tx. The counterfactual wage distribution using the conditional wage structure of year
tw = o but the distribution of characteristics x from the base year tx = b is given by
f(w|tw = o, tx = b) =
∫︁
x f(w|x, tw = o)dF (x|tx = b) (2.1)
=
∫︁
x f(w|x, tw = o)ρ(tx = b)dF (x|tx = o).
where f(w|tw = o, tx = o) is the actual density of wages for characteristics x in year tw = o
and ρ(tx = b) = dF (x|tx=b)dF (x|tx=o) is the reweighting factor which translates the density of observed
wages into the counterfactual density. Note that as a special case f(w|tw = o, tx = o) =∫︁
x f(w|x, tw = o)dF (x|tx = o), for which ρ(tx = b) ≡ 1 in equation (2.1). The reweighting
factor can be written as the ratio ρ(tx = b) = P (t=b|x)P (t=o|x)
P (t=o)
P (t=b) , where P (t = o) and P (t = b)
are the sample proportions of the observation year and the base year when pooling the data
for both years.
The proportions P (t = b|x) and P (t = o|x) are estimated by logit regressions of the respec-
tive year indicator on flexible specifications of the characteristics shown in table 2.1. The
logit regressions are based on the sample pooling the base year and the observation year.
Using the fitted logit probabilities, we then calculate the individual reweighting factors
ρi(tx = b) for observations i. All our estimates use the sample weights si which compensate
for the varying length of employment spells. For robustness reasons, we trim the maximum
value of individual observation weights to the value of thirty, in order to prevent extreme
values of the reweighting factor, which may occur as a result of extremely rare combinations
of characteristics. We tested a range of trimming thresholds, and found that values between
20 and 50 avoid extreme outliers, while at the same time excluding a very small number of
observations (details are available upon request).
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The reweighting factor can be incorporated into the estimation of counterfactual quantiles
based on the sample wage distribution while fixing the composition of full-timers in the
base year. Using the abbreviation ρ = ρ(tx = b), the reweighted (composition adjusted) p%
quantile is given by
Qp(w|tw = o, tx = b) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
w[j−1]+w[j]
2 if
∑︁j−1
i=1 (sρ)[i] =
p
100
∑︁n
i=1(sρ)[i]
w[j] otherwise
, (2.2)
where
j = min
(︄
k|
k∑︂
i=1
(sρ)[i] >
p
100
n∑︂
i=1
(sρ)[i]
)︄
,
w[i] is the ith order statistic of wages, and (sρ)[i] is defined accordingly (i.e. the order
statistic of the compound individual weights sρ, combining the sample weight s with the
reweighting factor ρ).
We consider the quantile gaps (differences in quantiles of log wages) between the 85th and
50th, the 85th and 15th as well as the 50th and 15th counterfactual percentile, i.e.
QG85/50(w|tw = o, tx = b) = Q85(w|tw = o, tx = b)−Q50(w|tw = o, tx = b) (2.3)
QG85/15(w|tw = o, tx = b) = Q85(w|tw = o, tx = b)−Q15(w|tw = o, tx = b) (2.4)
QG50/15(w|tw = o, tx = b) = Q50(w|tw = o, tx = b)−Q15(w|tw = o, tx = b). (2.5)
In addition to a graphical comparison of the actual and counterfactual development over
time, we also contrast the increase in the counterfactual quantile gaps with the actual
increase between 1985 and 2010. This allows us to quantify the share of the increase in
inequality associated with composition changes (where g ∈ {85/50, 85/15, 50/15})
shareQGg,x(w|tw = 2010, tx = 1985) = (2.6)
QGg(w|tw = 2010, tx = 2010)−QGg(w|tw = 2010, tx = 1985)
QGg(w|tw = 2010, tx = 2010)−QGg(w|tw = 1985, tx = 1985) .
For the logit regression, we use a sequence of specifications adding covariates in order to
investigate the incremental composition effect on wage inequality. We divide the vector of
characteristics into five groups of variables, namely educational outcomes (Ed), labor market
experience (Ex), labor market history (Hist), occupation and industry characteristics (Occ,
Ind) (see tables 2.1 and A2.14). Among those, we consider potential labor market experience
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Table A2.14: Specification overview
Label Covariates Specific covariates
E Education ed
EE Education, Experience ed, ex, ed ∗ ex, ex2, ed ∗ ex2
EEH Education,
Experience, Labor
market history
ed, ex, ed ∗ ex, ex2, ed ∗ ex2, pt, ft, pt5, ft5, ed ∗
pt5, ed ∗ ft5, pt52, ft52, ed ∗ pt52, ed ∗ ft52
EEHOI Education,
Experience, Labor
market history,
Occupation &
Industry
ed, ex, ed ∗ ex, ex2, ed ∗ ex2, pt, ft, pt5, ft5, ed ∗
pt5, ed∗ft5, pt52, ft52, ed∗pt52, ed∗ft52, occ, occ∗
ex, occ ∗ ex2, sec, sec ∗ ex, sec ∗ ex2, sec ∗ ed
Note: Covariates used for reweighting procedure. E.g. ed, ex, ed ∗ ex, ex2, ed ∗ ex2 reads that
education, experience, experience-squared and the two interactions education*experience and
exducation*experience-squared are used.
as continuous and all other variables as categorial, leading to a highly flexible specification
of the logit model. We calculate four versions of the counterfactual quantile gaps, starting
with a specification only controlling for education (row E in table A2.14).
Sequentially adding sets of covariates (characteristics) to our reweighting procedure, we
estimate the change in the counterfactual quantile gaps that is associated with the set of
covariates considered so far. This way, we quantify the incremental contribution of covari-
atess to the rise in wage inequality (this contribution is given by the figures in the columns
labeled ‘Increment’, see e.g. table A2.4). We decompose the difference between the ob-
served and counterfactual rise in inequality into the effects of separate sets of covariates.
For example, when adding occupation and industry characteristics (OI) to the reweighting
function that already contains education, experience and labor market history (EEH), we
measure the incremental effect of occupation and industry (OI) net of the effect contributed
by the set of covariates already included (EEH). We add covariates in the order given in
table A2.14. The incremental effect of each set of covariates depends upon the order in
which they are added to the model. Our reasoning behind the choice of the sequence shown
in table A2.14 is that we gradually move from exogenous and predetermined characteris-
tics towards characteristics that are the likely consequence of endogenous decisions of the
individual. We start with education because education typically remains fixed after labor
market entry. Next, potential work experience is a linear function of time and education.
Similary, labor market history involves characteristics which are affected by education and
actual work experience. Finally, occupation and industry can in principle be changed any
time conditional on education, experience and labor market history, and we are particularly
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interested as to whether occupation and industry play a role after accounting for all other
individual level characteristics.
One may wonder how the reweighting method deals with endogeneity, i.e. unobservables
that are not included in the analysis but that are potentially correlated with the included
observables. Fortin et al. (2011) show that for a causal interpretation one only has to make
the assumption that the distribution of unobservables for workers with identical observables
(including observed labor market history) is the same in the base year and the target year
(assumption 5, p. 21 in Fortin et al. 2011). Note that this does not rule out correlation
of observables and unobservables. Put differently, the relationship between observables and
unobservables is assumed to be time-invariant. This assumption would be violated, if e.g.
having prior part-time/nonemployment experience is increasingly associated with good or
bad unobservables. While we cannot rule out this possibility, there is no evidence for such
an effect. However, the point to be stressed is that a mere correlation between observables
and unobservables does not pose a problem to our method as long as the correlation does
not vary systematically over time.
Composition reweighting for total employment
The reweighting can be expanded to take into account selection between full-time work and
total employment based on observables, thus addressing the limitation that the SIAB data
do not provide comparable wages for part-timers. We first calculate wage distributions for
full-timers using the distribution of characteristics in the total employment sample, involving
both part-timers and full-timers. Then, in a second step, we reweight these counterfactual
wage distribution to the characteristics of a base year, analogous to section 2.6.4. The
resulting distribution can be interpreted as the wages that would have prevailed had all
individuals worked full-time and had their characteristics stayed at the level of the base
year.
The first step consists in within-period composition reweighting. We calculate counterfac-
tual wage distributions, which would have prevailed if all individuals had been paid full-time
wages. This interpretation holds under the assumption that returns to characteristics for
non-full-timers are equal to those for full-timers. The results of Manning and Petrongolo
(2008) suggest that hourly wage differentials for (female) part-timers in industrialized coun-
tries are not driven by differences in returns to characteristics, which lends credibility to
our approach. In order to calculate these distributions, we apply the reweighting technique
described in section 2.4.1, but instead of the full-time sample in a specific base year, the
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reference group is total employment in the same year. Let e ∈ {FT, TE} describe the em-
ployment group to which each observation belongs, where FT represents full-timers and TE
total employment. Full-time workers appear in both FT and TE. The reweighting factor
ρ(FT → TE, tx = o) is the probability of characteristics x in the total employment sample
in a given year, relative to the probability x in the full-time sample of the same year
ρ(FT → TE, tx = o) = dF (x|ex = TE, tx = o)
dF (x|ex = FT, tx = o) (2.7)
= P (e = TE|x, t = o)
P (e = FT |x, t = o)
P (e = FT |t = o)
P (e = TE|t = o)
Then, the counterfactual distribution of wages, assuming the entire labor force was working
full-time, can be written as
f(w|ew = FT, ex = TE, tw = o, tx = o) (2.8)
=
∫︂
x
f(w|x, ew = FT, tw = o, tx = o)ρ(FT → TE, tx = o)dF (x|ex = FT, tx = o)
Here, P (e = TE|x, t = o) is estimated by a weighted logit regression on the pooled sample
of the reference group (total employment TE) and the group of interest (full-timers FT ),
with the employment status indicator e denoting group membership of each observation.
In this step, we use the specification from table A2.15, in order to include the full set of
observable individual characteristics.
Table A2.15: Specification for counterfactual total employment
Variables Specific covariates
Education, Experience, Labor
mar- ket history, Occupation,
Industry
ed, ex, ed ∗ ex, ex2, ed ∗ ex2, pt, ft, pt5, ft5, ed ∗
pt5, ed ∗ ft5, occ, occ ∗ ex, occ ∗ ex2, sec, sec ∗
ex, sec ∗ ex2, sec ∗ ed
Note: Covariates used for reweighting procedure.
In a second step, we analyze the distribution of wages which would have prevailed, had all
employees worked full-time, and had their characteristics been fixed at the level of the base
year. By holding the composition of total employment constant over time, we control for
changes in the wage distribution due to changes in the selection into total employment over
time. This counterfactual distribution can be written as
f(w|ew = FT, ex = TE, tw = o, tx = b) (2.9)
=
∫︂
x
f(w|x, ew = FT, tw = o)ρ(ex = TE, tx = b)ρ(FT → TE, tx = o)dF (x|ex = FT, tx = o)
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where
ρ(ex = TE, tx = b) =
dF (x|ex = TE, tx = b)
dF (x|ex = TE, tx = o) (2.10)
= P (t = b|x, ex = TE)
P (t = o|x, ex = TE)
P (t = o|e = TE)
P (t = b|e = TE)
Analogous to section 2.6.4, we sequentially add groups of covariates to our logit specifica-
tions as described by table A2.14. This allows us to investigate the incremental changes in
inequality associated with the corresponding composition changes.
Choice of base year and interaction effects
As a robustness check and to account for interaction effects in the counterfactual analysis,
we reverse the role of the base year and the target year in our reweighting procedure.
So far, we have considered the wage distribution in 2010 and changed the distribution of
characteristics back to that of the base year 1985. This is indicative of the part of the
inequality increase that could be ‘reversed’ by undoing the change in characteristics. In
this case, the inequality change explained by composition effects is QG(tw = 2010, tx =
2010) − QG(tw = 2010, tx = 1985). Now, we focus on the opposite case in which we start
with the wage distribution in 1985 but only change the distribution of characteristics to the
level of 2010. This correspondends to the change QG(tw = 1985, tx = 2010) − QG(tw =
1985, tx = 1985), i.e. the part of the inequality increase that can be accounted for by solely
changing the distribution of characteristics while holding fixed the conditional wage structure
of 1985.
Figures A2.19 to A2.22 and tables A2.12, A2.13 report the findings. For males, the con-
tribution of the different sets of covariates to the overall inequality increase remain qual-
itatively similar, with a few notable exceptions. The general result is that compositional
changes in educational qualifications and in labor market histories provide substantial con-
tributions, while compositional changes related to potential work experience and the oc-
cupations/industry structure do so only to a much smaller extent (table A2.12 vs. table
A2.4). However, the impact of education changes is much stronger in table A2.12 compared
to table A2.4 (31.9%. 59.4%, 7.4%, 18.6% vs. 17.1%, 37.5%, -1.0%, 7.1%). This means
that compositional changes over time are associated with a stronger rise in wage inequality
based on the wage distribution in 1985 compared to 2010.16 Put differently, the effects of
16This conclusion is based on the following formal argument (10≡2010,85≡1985):
QG(tw = 85, tx = 10)−QG(tw = 85, tx = 85) > QG(tw = 10, tx = 10)−QG(tw = 10, tx = 85)
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a widening conditional wage structure f(w|x) is stronger when applied to the distribution
of characteristics in 1985 than when applied to that in 2010. This would naturally arise
if the 1985 distribution of characteristics is more heterogeneous so that applying diverging
wage returns to this more heterogeneous population leads to stronger inequality increases.
Take education, the share of low-skilled declines from a high initial level, while the share
of high-skilled increases (figure A2.5). Another difference between tables A2.4 and A2.12 is
that the contribution of occupations/industries falls when the base year 2010 is used (table
A2.12). In contrast to the results for education, the composition of occupation and industry
has changed in a way that wage inequality increases more strongly for the 2010 composition
of occupation and industry compared to the 1985 composition.
For females, the contribution of composition changes in work experience and recent labor
market histories remains qualitatively unchanged when we change the base year (columns
6 to 10 in tables A2.5 and A2.13). As for males, the compositional effects of educational
upgrading becomes much stronger in table A2.13. The only other effect for females, that
is not fully robust to the choice of the base year, concerns the changes in occupations and
industries. Here, table A2.13 shows pronounced effects on inequality in the upper and lower
part of the distribution, which are not present in table A2.5. The overall contribution of
compositional effects to rising female wage inequality in table A2.13 is even larger than for
the base year 1985 (table A2.5). In particular, composition changes can account for 78.4%
(103.2%) of the rise in female overall (lower tail) wage inequality between 1985 and 2010.
We conclude that the composition changes would have been associated with a large increase
in inequality based on 1985 wages compared to 2010 wages. This is in contrast to the widely
held view in the past that Germany used to be a country where institutions strongly limited
wage inequality (see Fitzenberger 1999 or Dustmann et al. 2014 for a critical assessment of
this view).
is equivalent to
QG(tw = 10, tx = 10)−QG(tw = 85, tx = 10) < QG(tw = 10, tx = 85)−QG(tw = 85, tx = 85).

Chapter 3
Changing Selection into Full-time Work
and its Effects on Wage Inequality –
An Application to Germany
3.1 Introduction
Germany experienced a considerable increase in wage inequality until 2010 (Dustmann et al.,
2009; Card et al., 2013; Möller, 2016; Biewen et al., 2018). For an assessment of what fac-
tors drive the observed changes in the wage distribution and the wage differences between
labor market groups, it is necessary to take into account that the selection into paid work
may change over time or may differ across groups. Importantly, selection into paid em-
ployment may depend on observed as well as on unobserved characteristics. Selection may
work through the changing composition of the workforce with respect to easily observable
characteristics, such as educational qualifications, work experience or age. It may also work
through selection based on unobserved factors like motivation, social skills or the ability to
adapt to changing circumstances. For example, increasing labor force participation is likely
to draw individuals into the work force who differ with respect to their unobserved skills
when compared to individuals who are already employed. The German labor market is
subject to considerable employment fluctuations through unemployment and considerable
long-term employment growth (see, for instance, Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998)). Given
these developments, changes in selection and changing composition are important for un-
derstanding the evolution of the wage distribution over time and for a comparison of wage
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distributions between groups. For instance, the rise in wage inequality over time will be
overestimated if falling unemployment draws people into employment who represent a neg-
ative selection of all workers. In this case, increasing wage inequality can be considered
the sign of a positive development because it implies that individuals who did not have
employment are entering work. Even if these individuals are earning wages at the lower end
of the distribution, this is an improvement over being unemployed. This was the motivation
underlying a range of reforms to labor market regulations between the late 90s and late
2000s in Germany. These reforms were aimed at increasing labor force participation and
easing transitions from unemployment into low quality jobs. However, if individuals newly
drawn into the labor force are not negatively selected with respect to unobserved qualities,
rising wage inequality is a sign of increasing disparity in wages among individuals who were
previously earning homogeneous wages.
This paper estimates selection-corrected quantile regressions to address two research ques-
tions regarding wage inequality among German men in 1995 and 2010. First, we consider
the shape of the wage distribution and the magnitude of inequality in wages which would
have prevailed if all unemployed had been working full-time. Because full-time employment
is selective and likely based on earnings prospects, we would expect wage inequality to be
higher if both the unemployed and the employed were working full-time. Our second ques-
tion addresses the changes over time: How would wage inequality have developed if selection
into full-time employment had not changed over time?
If the distribution of observed and unobserved skills was the same among unemployed and
employed individuals, correcting for selection would not be an econometric challenge. How-
ever, we expect full-time workers to differ substantially from unemployed workers. Then for
estimating the parameters of wage offer functions, standard regression techniques will usu-
ally be biased. Thus a common approach when analyzing the mean of the wage distribution
is to apply sample selection corrections based on Heckman (1979). These approaches are
not easily generalized to the entire distribution of wages, and therefore to measures of in-
equality such as quantiles. There exists a small but growing literature as to how to account
for unobservables in the analysis of wage distributions. For instance, Card et al. (2013)
estimate worker and firm fixed effects accounting for unobservable persistent differences be-
tween workers and between firms. However, the study does not account for the selection
into employment due to unobservables.
A limited number of approaches have been suggested to correct entire distributions for
selection due to unobservables. Most applications of selection corrected quantile regres-
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sions so far employ a control function approach, as in Buchinsky (2001; 1998), Albrecht
et al. (2009), Bollinger et al. (2011) and Picchio and Mussida (2011), which we also apply
for wage regressions based on German administrative data (see also Das et al. 2003 for
semi-parametric selection models). Huber and Melly (2015) point out that this selection
correction approach is only valid if the error terms in the selection equation and the wage
equation are independent conditional on the selection probability. This conditional inde-
pendence assumption implies equal slope coefficients for the determinants of wages in the
selection corrected quantile regressions of wages.
As our methodological contribution, we propose to respecify the estimated selection cor-
rected quantile regressions by transforming the dependent variable with the goal that equal-
ity of the slope coefficient then holds. The transformation is estimated based on the
identification-at-infinity assumption which is plausible in our application and which ensures
conditional independence in our application.1 Our approach is a modification of the two-
step approach by Buchinsky (1998) which includes an additional step to address the concern
raised by Huber and Melly. A version of their test of equality of slope coefficients is used
to guide the choice of the transformation. With the control-function approach augmented
by a transformation of the dependent variable, we estimate quantile regressions which are
corrected for selective movements between unemployment and full-time work. Undoing
the transformation based on the selection corrected quantile coefficients and employing the
decomposition technique of Melly (2005), we construct counterfactual wage distributions.
n a recent important paper, Arellano and Bonhomme (2017) suggest a copula based method
to provide a consistent estimate of quantile regressions with selection correction. They es-
timate quantile regressions while assuming a fixed copula between the conditional rank in
the wage distribution and the rank in the error term of the selection equation. The ap-
proach amounts to estimating rotated quantile regressions, which relate the τ th quantile
regression in the nonselected sample to a rotated value (the rank of τ th unselected quantile)
in the selected sample thus linking the two for estimation purposes. This is an alterna-
tive to Buchinsky’s selection corrections approach which estimates the difference between
the τ th quantiles in the two samples. The approach of Arellano and Bonhomme (2017)
has two disadvantages. First, the authors estimate the copula while assuming a specific
functional form, and they allow only for the covariates to have a limited impact on the
joint distribution of ranks. Second, the estimation of the copula is computationally very
1The idea to transform the dependent variable is similar to the approach applied in the companion paper
Biewen et al. (2019), which estimates the selection bias in employment for the estimation of the gender wage
gap. However, the actual implementation of the transformation approach differs between the two papers.
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involved. D’Haultfoeuille et al. (2014) suggest an approach in which identification relies on
the independence between covariates and selection for large values of the outcome, and on
the homogeneity of the estimand across the distribution. This assumption does not seem
plausible in our application.
Our findings show that the unemployed are a negative selection of the workforce, condi-
tional on education, in times of low unemployment as in the years 1995 and 2010. The
counterfactual wage distributions if everyone was working full-time would lie below the ob-
served wage distribution and wage inequality would be much higher. This suggests that the
unemployed would earn more heterogeneous wages than the already employed if working
full time. Put differently, the counterfactual wage distributions if everyone was working
full-time have thicker lower and upper tails than the observed wage distribution.
For our second research question, we find that those employed in 1995 would have had lower
wages in 2010 then those employed in 2010 and wage dispersion would have been higher.
Overall, this implies that full-time workers have become less heterogeneous with regard to
the factors driving wages as well as the selection into full-time work.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In section 3.2 we describe the data used
and provide descriptive evidence of trends in wages, unemployment and the instrumental
variables for the control function approach. Section 3.3 describes in detail our econometric
approach for estimating selection corrected quantile regressions and calculating counterfac-
tual wage distributions. We apply this approach to our data and discuss the results in
section 3.4. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Data and descriptive evidence
For our analysis we use the SIAB, an administrative dataset based on German social security
records. This study uses the factually anonymous Sample of Integrated Labour Market
Biographies (version 1975-2010, henceforth denoted by SIAB710).2 It contains a 2 percent
sample of all dependent employees who are subject to social security, all individuals receiving
unemployment benefits, but no self-employed or civil servants. We restrict the analysis to
those between the ages of 25 and 55 who are working in West-Germany. Wages are available
as daily wages in Euros, which we deflate to the level of 1990 and take the log of. Since
2We used the Scientic Use File supplied by the Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the German Federal
Employment Agency (BA) at the Institute for Employment Research (IAB), see Vom Berge et al. (2013) for
the data documentation.
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these wages are collected from administrative data sources, the measurements are very
precise and do not suffer from the problems of selective nonresponse or measurement error
commonly associated with wage information in survey data. While our dataset does not
contain information on hours worked, we are confident that daily wages among full-time
employees are sufficiently comparable. However, without working hours for part-time and
marginally employed workers, wage data for those observations is not comparable across
observations and jobs. Labor supply decision might vary greatly across time and between
individuals, which would create strong confounding effects. We therefore restrict attention
to full-time employees, thus following of literature (Dustmann et al., 2009; Card et al., 2013;
Möller, 2016). As a consequence of the unavailability of comparable wages for part-time
workers and because we do not observe individuals outside the labor force, we perform
our analysis only on the data for males. For males, the majority of selective movements
during working age occur between unemployment and full-time employment. However, this
is not the case for females. For them, part-time employment and absence from the labor
force affect large shares of the working age population, so any analysis which focuses on
movements between unemployment and full-time employment is not well suited to studying
the effects of selection on female wages.
We focus on the years 1995 and 2010. Those years represent the start and end of the greatest
rise in wage inequality for German workers, as well as the turning point in the development
of unemployment ((Biewen et al., 2018), (Möller, 2016)). Table A3.1 involves descriptive
statistics on the samples used for our analysis.
Levels of education are aggregated into three categories based on highest degrees obtained:
(i) High-educated: College (University/University of the Applied Sciences), (ii) Medium-
educated: High school and/or Vocational Training, and (iii) Low-educated: No/Other de-
gree. We capture each individual’s labor market history as the number of days spent in
full-time employment and part-time employment, aggregated over the last 5 years, respec-
tively. Episodes of part-time and non-employment are important determinants of individual
wage development, as shown by Paul (2016) and of changes in wage inequality in general
(compare (Biewen et al., 2018). All wages above the contribution threshold for social secu-
rity, which lies between the 85th and 90th percentile, are censored in the sample. For the
analysis of wage quantiles above the threshold we impute wages, using a method based on
Gartner (2005). The imputed wages are based on the fitted values of a Tobit model for cen-
sored data and take into account the heteroscedastic variance of the Tobit model. Because
of the severe censoring for the high-educated, we restrict our analysis to the medium- and
low-educated.
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3.2.1 Wage inequality
From the early 1990s onward, wage inequality increased substantially, as measured for in-
stance by the gap between the top quartile and the bottom quartile of the distribution of
gross wages. The top left panel of Figure 3.1 shows that, relative to their levels in 1995,
male workers near the bottom of the wage distribution suffered a decline in wages, while
those near the top experienced a rise. The median wage has been basically stagnant over
the entire period from 1995 to 2010, but workers in the lower half of the wage distribution
are now earning substantially less in real terms than they did in the nineties. Some increase
in inequality can be considered a natural result of diversified wages due to an aging popula-
tion and increased shares of highly educated workers (Dustmann et al., 2009; Biewen et al.,
2018). Generally though, the observed increase in inequality is seen as a negative develop-
ment, because it reflects falling wages for low earners. This has caused great concern among
policymakers and might have contributed to the introduction of a statutory minimum wage
in Germany (Caliendo et al., 2019).
Even within education groups, the wage distributions have widened since the mid 1990s.
As shown in panels 2 to 3 of Figure 3.1, this wage inequality increased strongly both for
the low-educated and the medium-educated. For the low-educated, real wages fell even up
to the top of the wage distribution, even above the upper quartile, and the decline of the
median real wage between 1995 and 2010 amounts to about 10 log points.
3.2.2 Unemployment
We focus our analysis on the unemployed which are subject to unemployment insurance and
are receiving unemployment benefits (Arbeitslosenhilfe, Arbeitslosengeld 1). Unemployment
insurance benefits in Germany are paid for a maximum of 12 months to individuals who
previously had a spell of dependent employment.3 The registered unemployment rates for
German men have changed substantially between 1995 and 2010. They start at 7.5 percent
in 1995 and reach their peak of 9.8 percent in 2004. After 2004, we initially see a decline
in unemployment which rises again slightly in the aftermath of the financial crisis. For
the subgroup with medium education, the aggregate changes in unemployment rates are
3Unemployment benefits are paid for a longer time period above certain age limits, which applies mostly
to workers above age 55. Long term unemployed are covered by other types of welfare which have undergone
multiple reforms over the observation timeframe and are not consistently observed in the dataset. Addi-
tionally, not all of those receiving welfare benefits are available for employment (e.g. due to illness or early
retirement with pensions below welfare levels). We therefore refrain from including the long-term unem-
ployed in our analysis, as they are not well suited for analyzing counterfactual wages if employment was not
selective with respect to worker characteristics.
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Figure 3.1: Wage inequality
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Note: Wage quantiles among full-time male workers in West-Germany, normalized to the levels of 1995,
separately by education category. Source SIAB, own calculations.
closely mirrored. Among those with low education unemployment rates are generally higher,
especially before 2005, but decline even more strongly than among the medium educated.
The strong drop in unemployment between 2004 and 2010 coincides with the rapid increase
in wage inequality documented in Section 3.2.1.
A common interpretation is that the fall in unemployment could be associated with a
stronger inflow of previously unemployed into full-time work (see e.g. Dustmann et al.,
2014). Those previously unemployed individuals might, on average, possess observable and
unobservable characteristics which are less highly valued in the labor market than those of
the previously employed workers. Therefore, the resulting labor force may be more hetero-
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Figure 3.2: Unemployment rates
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separately by education category.
geneous with regard to the drivers of wages (Biewen et al., 2018). Because work incentive
for low-wage workers have been strengthened by various labor market reforms in the early
2000s, this effect could be particularly strong in the lower tail of the wage distribution,
contributing to the decline of the quantiles below the median.
However, it is an open question whether a decline of unemployment necessarily implies a
widening of the lower tail of the wage distribution. We would like to mention three possible
counter arguments without being able to provide a comprehensive discussion. First, labor
market frictions might prevent wages of newly employed to differ substantially from those
of the already employed. Second, the cuts in unemployment benefits may also have reduced
the bargaining power of the incumbent workforce. Third, rising rates of retirement, which
also reduce the number of older individuals in unemployment, a falling supply of younger
workers, and higher wage flexibility among younger workers may reduce unemployment but
not widen the wage distribution.
3.2.3 Instruments for selection
Semiparametric identification of selection effects in quantile regressions of wages requires at
least one instrument satisfying an exclusion restriction (compare Buchinsky, 1998), analo-
gous to a Heckman sample selection model for mean regression. The instruments need to
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provide exogenous variation of the selection probability into employment without affecting
wages. Since the SIAB7510 data do not contain individual level variables, which we think
are suitable as instruments, we use as instruments four additional variables merged to the
SIAB7510 at the regional district level (Kreisebene). These variables are cohort sizes of
young adults aged 18 to 25 and 25 to 30 as well as graduation rates in lower secondary
and higher secondary education. These instruments reflect exogenous shocks to the labor
supply in the respective region and year, affecting individual employment chances. We be-
lieve the exclusion restrictions to be credible, because it is unlikely that wages respond in
the short run to labor supply changes between regional districts. Wage rigidities prevent
short term adjustment in response to labor supply variations due to new entrants into the
labor market (compare Bauer et al., 2007). This is partly because wage contracts generally
span multiple years and wages of new employees are not independent of wages for current
employees, after accounting for individual differences in employment history. Additionally,
collective bargaining in Germany work at the level of the industry or large firms and there-
fore do not allow for a wage response to shocks at the district level. District level data on
the instruments are obtained from the Federal Statistics Office’s regional database.4 Our
analysis will rely on an identification-at-infinity assumption, meaning that the support of
the instrument includes with positive probability cases, for which the selection probability
is close to one (Heckman, 1990a).
3.3 Methodological approach
3.3.1 Model setup
The model setup follows the notation of Huber and Melly (2015). The wage equation for
all individuals (employed or unemployed) is
Y ∗ = Xβ + v , (3.1)
where Y ∗ denotes the latent log wage in the absence of selection, X the vector of observable
covariates, being determinants of wages, v the error term, and β the vector of coefficients.
We assume that β0.5 = β, i.e. β represents the median coefficients and v represents the
4Data source: Regionaldatenbank des Statistischen Bundesamtes. If we include individuals aged 20 to
60, the strength of the instruments increases. This means that individuals in their early 20s and late 50s
are more strongly affected by labor supply shocks of young workers entering the labor force. However, we
restrict our empirical analysis to those 25 to 55 years old because different nonemployment states can not
be distinguished well in our data. Many individuals aged between 20 and 24 are still in education and
individuals in their late 50s start leaving the labor force through early retirement.
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residual of a median regression. Assuming a linear quantile regression, the conditional τ -
quantile of the latent wage Qτ (Y ∗|X) is specified by
Qτ (Y ∗|X) = Xβ +Qτ (v|X) = Xβτ , (3.2)
which also means that Qτ (v|X) = X(βτ − β) is a linear function of X. Correspondingly,
the τth quantile regression of Y ∗ is Xβτ + vτ , with vτ = v −Qτ (v|X) = v −X(βτ − β).
The selection problem arises because we only observe wages for employed individuals. Let
Y denote the observed wage and D the selection indicator. We specify
D = 1(Zγ + ε ≥ 0) ,
where Z is a strict superset of X, thus also including instruments for selection, which are
excluded in eq. (3.1), and ε is assumed to be independent of Z. The probability of selection
Pr(D = 1|Z) = Pr(Zγ + ε > 0|Z) (3.3)
is a function of Zγ. For the selective sample, the observation rule is Y = Y ∗ (Y ∗ observed)
only if D = 1. A conditional quantile in the selected sample is
Qτ (Y |Z) = Xβτ +Qτ (vτ |Z,D = 1) . (3.4)
The term Qτ (vτ |Z,D = 1) denotes the quantile-τ -specific selection bias, with Qτ (vτ |Z,D =
1) > (<)0 representing positive (negative) selection. The selection bias can be rewritten as
Qτ (Y |Z) = Qτ (Y ∗|Z,D = 1) = Xβτ + g˜(X,Zγ) (3.5)
where Qτ (vτ |Z,D = 1) = g˜(X,Zγ) because vτ depends on X and D = 1 on Zγ.
The control function g˜(X,Zγ), which properly accounts for selection bias, should be a
flexible function of X and Zγ, which is challenging because of the curse-of-dimensionality
regarding X being multivariate. Nonparametric identification requires both independent
variation of Zγ given X and identification at infinity. Identification at infinity means that
with positive probability, based on the distribution of Zγ, the selection probabilities Pr(D =
1|Z) is close to one (Das et al., 2003). The selection model above implies that Qτ (vτ |Z,D =
1) converges to zero (no selection), if the employment probability P (D = 1|Z) converges to
one, which is equivalent to Zγ going to infinity.
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Extending upon Heckman (1990a) and Andrews and Schafgans (1998), who consider the
case where u is independent of X, both the intercept and the slope coefficients β can be
identified, if we have observations with a selection probability close to one for each value of
X. Given the linear specification of Xβτ , a smaller subspace of the support A of X suffices,
where [E(X ′X) · I(X ∈ A)] can be inverted [I(.) denotes the indicator function] and where
the selection probability is close to one with positive probability. In our application, the
selection probability is quite large for most observations and the subset of observations with a
selection probability close to one (to anticipate: the median (upper quartile) of the selection
probabilities lies above 93% (96%) in all four subsamples considered in our application, see
table 3.1), is sufficiently large to estimate βτ consistently. In our application, we will use
the coefficient estimates based on the identification-at-infinity sample to characterize the
selection bias in the full sample.
3.3.2 Buchinsky approach
The selection correction approach proposed by Buchinsky (1998; 2001) applies a standard
Heckman selection approach with instruments (Heckman, 1979; Vella, 1998) to quantile
regression. Buchinsky specifies the selection correction term in the second stage [eq. (3.3)]
as a function of the inverse Mills ratio λ = φ(Zγˆ)Φ(Zγˆ) , where φ and Φ are the density and the
distribution function of a standard normal. However, even under joint normality of ε and
v, the selection correction term Qτ (vτ |Z,D = 1) is generally not a linear function in λ.
Thus, Buchinsky suggests to approximate the selection correction term Qτ (vτ |Z,D = 1) by
a power series (polynomial) of λ (see Vella 1998 on semiparametric approaches for selection
correction in mean regressions). Further, Buchinsky assumes that the joint distribution of
v and ε is independent of Z, conditional on the probability of selection Pr(Zγ + ε > 0|Z)
(Huber and Melly, 2015).
In the second step, the selection corrected quantile regression
Qτ (Y |X) = Xβτ + θτg(λ) (3.6)
is estimated for the selective sample with D = 1. Eq. (3.6) presumes that θτg(λ) represents
Qτ (vτ |Z,D = 1). g(.) is a power series of λ, and thus θτg(λ) approximates the selection
correction term Qτ (vτ |Z,D = 1).
Without the assumption that the joint distribution of v and ε is independent of X condi-
tional on Zγ, the selection model specified by eq.’s (3.2) and (3.3) implies that the selection
correction term Qτ (vτ |Z,D = 1) is some unknown function of both X and Zγ, see discussion
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of eq. (3.5) in section 3.3.1.
3.3.3 Huber-Melly test for conditional independence
Huber and Melly (2015) propose a quantile regression based test for the conditional indepen-
dence assumption, stating that the joint density of v and ε is independent of Z conditional
on Zγ. As noted by Huber and Melly (2015), Buchinsky’s approach builds upon this con-
ditional independence assumption, which implies homogeneous slope coefficients across all
quantiles, see discussion of eq. (3.2) in section 3.3.1.5
We illustrate this point in the following. Conditional independence implies for the joint
density of v and ε
fv,ε(·|Z) = fv,ε(·|Pr(D = 1|Z)) = fv,ε(·|Zγ) . (3.7)
When there is no sample selection, i.e. Pr(D = 1|Z) = 1 ∀Z, eq. (3.7) implies that v and ε
are independent of Z. Under conditional independence, the quantile regression coefficients
βτ are identified when controlling for the selection bias term Qτ (vτ |Z,D = 1) as a flexible
function of Zγ only as in Buchinsky (1998, 2001), see also Huber and Melly (2015, section
2.2).
Conditional independence in eq. (3.7) also holds for vτ and ε, implying that Qτ (vτ |Pr(D =
1|Z), D = 1) − Qτ (v|Pr(D = 1|Z), D = 1) does not depend upon Z conditional upon the
selection probability. Thus, the term X(βτ − β) only involves a constant difference in the
intercept, meaning that the slope coefficients in βτ do not depend upon τ .
When the conditional independence assumption does not hold, slope coefficients βτ may
vary across quantiles, which is typically a motivation as to why researchers apply quantile
regression in the first place. Huber and Melly (2015) point out that this limits the appli-
cability of the Buchinsky approach to correct for sample selection in estimating quantile
regressions.
Huber and Melly (2015) suggest a test based on the entire process of quantile regression
coefficients to investigate whether the conditional independence assumption holds. They es-
timate quantile coefficients for a fine grid of quantiles across the distribution and then test
the null hypothesis that the slope coefficients are identical. Violations of the null hypothesis
are detected by using Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) and Cramér-von Mises (CM) test statistics
to the coefficient process across quantiles. In practice, Huber and Melly use a grid of quan-
5The conditional independence assumption is implied by Assumptions C and E in Buchinsky (1998).
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tiles grid and suggest to implement the test for a range from the 10th to the 90th percentile
as a starting point. The first stage is estimated using the semiparametric Klein and Spady
(1993) estimator. The sample selection correction is based on a polynomial in the inverse
mills ratio of the estimated index function estimated. Inference is based on resampling the
influence function of the quantile regression estimator, building on the differentiability of
the selection correction function to take account of the first stage estimation error.
3.3.4 Our approach
In short, we first implement Buchinsky’s approach based on the original data and then ap-
ply the Huber-Melly test which strongly rejects conditional independence. This is why we
suggest to transform the dependent variable to account of heteroscedasticity in the original
data and then apply Buchinsky’s approach on the transformed dependent variable. Relying
on identification-at-infinity, the transformation is based on quantile regressions for the sub-
sample with a very high probability of participating. In our application, we are successful
in finding a transformation for which Huber-Melly test passes afterwards. Note that this is
not guaranteed and we undertake a specification search to find a proper transformation. If
the conditional independence assumption is not rejected for the transformed model, we can
use the transformed model to account for selection bias. Transforming back the dependent
variable allows us to estimate counterfactual distributions in absence of selection or in the
presence of a different selection mechanism.6
Now we describe in detail the different steps of our approach:
1. To estimate the probability to be in the selective sample, we estimate a Probit re-
gression Pr(D = 1|Z) = Φ(Zγ), assuming that the distribution of ε in eq. (3.3) is
independent of Z.7
6The basic idea to transform the dependent variable is similar to the companion paper Biewen et al.
(2019), which estimates the selection bias in employment for the estimation of the gender wage gap. However,
there are two key methodological differences. First, our paper only transforms the dependent variable while
leaving the covariates unchanged, while Biewen et al. (2019) transform the both the dependent variable and
the covariates. Second, our approach to determine the transformation factor relies on the identification-
at-infinity approach, which is plausible in our setting. Biewen et al. (2019) assume a location-scale model
Y ∗ = Xβ+g(x)u, where u is the rank in the conditional distribution of Y ∗ given x and derive a transformation
factor based on the estimated conditional dispersion in the selective sample under the assumption that the
dispersion of ranks in the selective sample is a function of the first stage selection probability.
7Huber and Melly (2015) use the alternative semiparametric estimator suggested by Klein and Spady
(1993), which is also part of the code for the test provided by Huber and Melly (2015). We have experimented
with both approaches (Probit and Klein and Spady) for some cases in our application and find little difference
between the two with regard to the fitted probabilities. For simplicity and for computational reasons, the
empirical analysis in this paper is based on the probit regressions for the first stage.
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2. Based on the Probit estimates in step 1), a subsample of the data is determined for
which identification-at-infinity is plausible. We estimate standard quantile regressions
for these subsamples for which we assume that selection is negligible. Using coefficient
estimates δu, δl at the upper quantile u and the lower quantile l, respectively, we then
estimate the predicted conditional quantile differences (l and u are tuning parameters)
σ(X, δ) = Xδu −Xδl (3.8)
for a worker with characteristics X. The transformation then involves dividing Y by
σ(X, δ).8
3. Next, we run selection corrected quantile regressions for the transformed outcome:
Qτ
(︃
Y
σ(X, δ)
⃓⃓⃓⃓
X
)︃
= Xβˇτ + g(θτ , Zγ) . (3.9)
We specify the selection correction as a piecewise constant function, with g(θτ , Zγ) =∑︁4
j=1 θτ,jI(Zγ ∈ Qj) involving dummies for four quintiles of the propensity score
I(Zγ ∈ Qj) and θτ = (θτ,j)j=1,...,4 (the highest quintile Q5 represents the omitted
category).9 Then, as our implementation of the Huber-Melly test for conditional
independence, we implement a Wald test of the equality of the slope coefficients βˇτ
along a grid of τ .
4. This step assumes that the conditional independence test in the previous step passes.
We run OLS for the transformed model for the identication-at-infinity sample and then
estimate the selection effect based on quantile regressions of the OLS residuals based
on the entire sample. Compared to estimating quantile regressions for the transformed
model with selection correction based on the full sample, the OLS estimator allows
us to realize efficiency gains based on the high probability sample and then use the
implied residuals based on entire sample to estimate the selection effects along the
distribution.
5. Finally, we undo the transformation by multiplying the coefficients with σ(X, δ).
For simplicity, we implement the conditional independence test as a Wald test of the equal-
8This is analogous to the heteroscedasticity correction approach of Chen and Khan (2003), using a het-
eroscedasticity correction based on the inter-quartile range of the conditional distribution.
9This specification yields better fits and more reliable findings than using a polynomial in the inverse
Mills’ Ratio λ.
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ity of slope coefficients over an equispaced grid of quantiles. Our application differs from
Huber and Melly (2015) regarding the following three issues, which prevent us from using
their code. First, bootstrapping the entire estimation process, inference takes account of
the estimation error in all stages including the transformation. Second, applying a weighted
cluster-bootstrap inference avoids nonconvergence of the probit in the first stage and is
cluster-robust at the regional level, which is the level of the variation of the instruments.10
Third, we approximate the selection correction term by a piece-wise constant selection cor-
rection function which is non-differentiable. Furthermore, implementing the Huber-Melly
test for Buchinsky’s estimator using a polynomial in the inverse-Mills-ratio based on the
untransformed model requires a lot of computation time due to our large sample size.
If the conditional independence test for the tranformed model rejects, we use this for re-
specifying our estimation approach. Note as a caveat that inference for our Wald tests for
homegeneous slopes does not take account of the fact that we search for a transformation
such that the conditional independence test passes. As part of our specifiction search, we
investigate which quantile regression coefficients change strongly across quantiles. To il-
lustrate this point, note that, based on prelimary estimates, the Huber-Melly tests never
passed for a model pooling both education groups. Therefore, we conclude that the nature of
the selection bias differs between the two education groups, which motivates us to estimate
separate models by education group.11
3.3.5 Counterfactual wage distribution under alternative selection rules
We use the estimated selection corrected quantile regression to estimate the counterfactual
wage distribution under different selection rules. We estimate the counterfactual distribu-
tion using a selection corrected Melly (2006) approach as in Albrecht et al. (2009) (see also
Machado and Mata 2005; Chernozhukov et al. 2013), while taking into account the trans-
formation of the outcome. Let Z, X, g(Zγ) apply to the observed sample and Z˜, X˜, and
g(Z˜γ˜) to the counterfactual sample, where γ˜ represents the counterfactual selection rule.
Specifically, we estimate two counterfactuals: First, the wage distribution if all individuals
in the sample were employed, and, second, the wage distribution if the selection rule of a dif-
ferent calendar year applies. The first counterfactual involves the covariates X˜ of the entire
sample and sets g(θτ , Z˜γ˜) [i.e. θτ = 0] equal to zero, corresponding to a selection probability
of one. For the second counterfactual, Z˜ and X˜ represent the employees and g(Z˜γ˜) their
10The code provided by Huber and Melly (2015) could be adjusted to provide cluster robust inference.
11Also, Machado (2017) finds differences in direction of selection across different sociodemographic groups.
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selection rule (implied by the first stage Probit estimates) in the different calendar year.
Our implementation of the Melly (2006) approach uses predictions of conditional quantiles
for a fine grid of equispaced τ ∈ [0.01, 0.02, ..., 0.99] for each observation in the counterfactual
sample to estimate the conditional distribution of log wages. The counterfactual conditional
quantile is
Qτ (Y |Z˜) = σ(X˜, δ)
[︂
X˜βˇτ + g(θτ , Z˜γ˜)
]︂
,
where βˇτ , δ, and g(θτ , .) (including the definition of the quintile dummies) are estimates
based on the observed sample.
We then stack the 99 predictions for all individual observations in the counterfactual sample
represented by (Z˜, X˜) and calculate the unconditional empirical quantiles of the entire
expanded sample, where the number of observations is 99 times the number of observations
in the counterfactual sample. This counterfactual distribution, denoted by TY (X˜, βˇ, δ, θ, γ˜)
represents the counterfactual distribution of Y for the sample with characteristics Z˜, the
alternative selection rule γ˜, and the selection corrected coefficients for the transformed model
βˇ, the coefficients of the selection correction terms θ, and the transformation coefficients δ.
The difference between the counterfactual distribution TY (Z˜, βˇ, δ, θ, γ˜) and the observed
wage distribution (i.e. TOY representing the quantiles of Y in the selective observed sample
with D = 1) describes the total effect of selection relative to the counterfactual, defined as
TOY − TY (Z˜, βˇ, δ, θ, γ˜) . (3.10)
We can now decompose the total selection effect into a component due to differences in ob-
served characteristics driving wages, i.e. the difference between X and X˜, and a component
due to differences in selection based on unobservables. To this end, we calculate a second
counterfactual distribution based on linear quantile regression based on X in the observed
sample of employees (without transformation) and then predicting the counterfactual dis-
tribution for the sample with X˜ using the Melly (2006) approach as described above. This
counterfactual distribution is denoted by TY (X˜, α) where α involves the quantile regression
coefficients for the observed sample.
The total selection effect in eq. (3.10) can be decomposed into the effect of changes in
observable characteristics
TOY − TY (X˜, α) , (3.11)
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and the residual effect of selection on unobservables
TY (X˜, α)− TY (Z˜, βˇ, δ, θ, γ˜) . (3.12)
We now discuss the two cases separately, thereby defining the decompositions estimated in
our empirical analysis
The first counterfactual wage distribution which would prevail if all observed individuals in
a given year, both full-time workers and unemployed, were employed and earning market
wages is obtained by setting θτ equal to zero. Then, eq. (3.10) defines the total effect of
selection into work, which is decomposed into the selection effect due to observables [eq.
(3.11)] and the effect of selection on unobservables [eq. (3.12)] when contrasting full-time
workers with the total sample of full-time workers and unemployed.
The second counterfactual wage distribution allows us to study the effect of changes in se-
lection over time. To estimate this counterfactual, we keep the conditional probability of
selection into full-time work, i.e. the index Zγ, and the distribution of observed character-
istics fixed at the level of the base year. Using the coefficient estimates obtained in the
observation year (in our application the year 2010), we estimate the counterfactual wage
distribution under the selection rule of a base year (in our application the year 1995). Let
the index b denote the base year and o the observation year.
Then,
TOoY − TY (Zb, βˇ
o
, δo, θo, γ˜b) (3.13)
is the total selection effect. It can be decomposed as above into the effect of the change
between base year and observation year in the selection of observables [eq. (3.11)] and in
the selection on unobservables [eq. (3.12)], both among full-time workers.
Note the following caveat: These counterfactual distributions do not account for general
equilibrium effects which might potentially lead to changing returns to skills in response to
an influx of previously unemployed into employment (see the detailed discussion in (Fortin
et al., 2011)). One likely response to such an influx would be falling returns to those
skill levels over-represented among the unemployed, e.g. low levels of education. Therefore,
returns to education might increase due to higher relative scarcity. Then, the estimated
counterfactual wage distribution would be less dispersed than the one arising when all
unemployed are employed and general equilibrium effects operate.
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3.4 Application
3.4.1 First stage
Our decomposition method with sample selection correction requires instruments which
affect the employment status but which do not affect wages. We run separate Probit regres-
sions of the full-time indicator by education group, i.e. separately for the low-educated and
the medium-educated.12
For the medium-educated, the probit regression accounts for the following covariates, which
are also allowed to affect wages: Age, age squared, number of days spent in full-time work
over the last 5 years, and number of days spent in part-time work over the last 5 years.
As additional instruments, which are measured at the district level and which are excluded
in the wage equation, we account for share of lower secondary graduates, share of upper
secondary graduates, share of individuals aged 18-25, and share of individuals aged 25-30
in the district. The employment history variable account for the recent employment expe-
rience being associated with current full-time employment, thus accounting either for state
dependence or for unobserved heterogeneity causing persistence in employment outcomes.
Later these covariates are also used as control variables in the wage regression accounting
for experience effects. We use labor supply instruments at the district level, assuming that
wages are not affected by these supply instruments in the short run. Because we account for
recent employment experience both in the selection equation and in the wage equation, this
is compatible with labor supply changes affecting wages in the medium run. All covariates
in the selection model are highly predictive for full-time employment among the medium-
educated and have the expected signs (see table A3.2, columns 2 and 3). In particular, the
excluded instruments are highly significant with an F-statistic of 20.4 in 1995 and 29.7 in
2010.
We also estimated the same specification for the low-skilled, however, the instruments were
nowhere close to be significant.13 Because the medium-educated are the larger group and
the medium-educated may complement low-educated workers, we use the average fitted em-
12This is done for two reasons. First, the propensity scores based on a Probit regression pooling the
two education groups and using the same regional instruments differ notably from those based on Probit
regressions by education group. Second, we could not find a transformed model passing the Huber-Melly
test when we account for selection based on a pooled Probit. Detailed results are available upon request. We
conclude that the selection into full-time work and the effect of selection on observed wages differ between
the two education groups.
13Note that in a specification pooling both education groups the instruments are significant. Recall,
however, that pooling was rejected by the data.
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ployment rate of the medium-educated at the district level based on the estimated selection
equation in table A3.2, columns 2 and 3, respectively, as alternative instrument for the se-
lection equation of the low-educated. The results for the low-educated are reported in table
A3.2, columns 4 and 5. This instrument proves highly significant with an F-statistic of 11.7
in 1995 and 32.9 in 2010, implying that a higher employment rate of the medium-educated
induced by labor supply changes also increases the employment rate of the low-educated.
As discussed in section 3.3.4, identification at infinity of the constant in the outcome model
requires that the selective sample of the employed contains observations with a propensity
score close to one. Figures 3.3 to 3.4 show that the distribution of the propensity score for
the sample of employed and unemployed is concentrated close to one in all cases. Table 3.1
shows selected quantiles of the distribution of propensity scores for the selective sample of
the employed. For the medium-educated, the median is 97% (97%) and the lower quartile
is 95% (96%) in 1995 (2010). For the low-educated, the median is 94% (96%) and the lower
quartile is 87% (78%) in 1995 (2010). Hence, we conclude that the identification-at-infinity
approach described above is quite plausible for our application.
Table 3.1: Probability of selection among employed
Medium-educated Low-educated
Year 25% quantile Median 75% quantile 25% quantile Median 75% quantile
1995 .945 .965 .977 .868 .936 .964
2010 .962 .970 .977 .778 .957 .967
Notes: Median and quartiles of the propensity score distribution restricted to the subset of full-time workers.
3.4.2 Conditional independence test for Buchinsky approach
We estimate Buchinsky’s approach without transformation for selection corrected quantile
regressions for our four cases using dummies for the quintiles of the propensity score to
account for selection. Predicting the observed wage distribution in the employment sample
using the Melly (2006) approach yields a close correspondence between the model prediction
and the actual distribution.14
We then implement our version of the Huber-Melly test of equal slope coefficients βτ for
the selection corrected quantile regressions in eq. (3.6). We perform a grid search over a
wide range of δu and δl for the second step transformation, to find the specification which
14In contrast, using a low order polynomial in the inverse Mills ratio did not result in satisfactory within
sample fit.
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of propensity scores in full sample by education
group, year 1995
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Notes: Propensity scores for being selected into full-time employment for the full sample of both employed
and unemployed individuals based on estimates in table A3.2. Source SIAB7510, own calculations.
most effectively reduces differences in slope coefficients. Selected Wald-tests are reported in
table 3.2. For the test range 80-20 (τ = .2, ..., .8) the test statistics decisively reject in all
cases. This also happens for the narrower test range 60-40 when implementing the test for
all covariates. Only for the covariate part-time during the last 5 years, the test does not
reject for the narrower test range. The rejection for all covariates is robust to other test
ranges in between.15 We conclude that Buchinsky’s approach based on quantile regressions
for log wages is not applicable for our application.
3.4.3 Transformation and conditional independence test - Steps 2 & 3
We use an identification-at-infinity sample to estimate the transformation factor σ(X, δ) in
step 2 of our approach. For this, we use observations with a predicted probability above
90%/85% in 1995/2010 for the low-educated and above 97.5%/98% in 1995/2010 for the
medium-educated, respectively. Based on different choices for the quantile range used for
the transformation, we estimate quantile regressions with selection corrections as in step
3. Then we undertake the conditional independence tests and chose the transformation
factor, i.e. the choice of δl, δu for the quantile differences used, according to the test results.
The findings are reported in table 3.3 for our preferred models passing the conditional
independence test.
In all cases, the conditional independence test passes for the narrow range 60-40 [u − l =
15Detailed results are available upon request.
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Figure 3.4: Distribution of propensity scores in full sample by education
group, year 2010
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Medium education, year 2010
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Notes: Propensity scores for being selected into full-time employment for the full sample of both employed
and unemployed individuals based on estimates in table A3.2. Source SIAB7510, own calculations.
60% − 40%] and for all individual covariates for both reported ranges. For the medium-
educated, the test passes for all covariates for 70-30 and also in 1995 for 80-20. For the
low-educated, the test passes for 70-30 in 2010 and barely so at a 3%-level in 1995. One has
to note that there are a three clear rejection for 80-20 considering all covariates, even though
for the invidual covariates the test passes in all cases. Note that Huber and Melly (2015)
caution themselves regarding the behavior of their conditional independence tests when
moving into the tail of the distribution. The comparison between tables 3.2 and 3.3 shows
that the transformation does a good job in reducing the differences in slope coefficients.
We conclude that the conditional independence assumption is sufficiently plausible for the
transformed model and the evidence for this is stronger for the medium-educated than for
the low-educated.16 With this in mind, we will be very cautious in not over-interpreting our
selection findings.
3.4.4 Goodness-of-Fit and impact of selection - Steps 4 & 5
Assuming that conditional independence holds, we run OLS regressions without selection
correction on the identification-at-infinity sample after the transformation. Then, we calcu-
late residuals for the entire employment sample based on the OLS coefficient estimates. For
these residuals, we then run quantile regressions on an intercept and the selection correction
terms. Assuming that conditional independence holds, this focuses on the evolution of the
16Note that for quantile regressions after transformation pooling low-educated and medium-educated the
conditional independence test is nowhere close to pass, i.e. the conditional independence test is not guaranteed
to pass after a mechanical transformation. Detailed results are available upon request.
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Table 3.2: Conditional independence tests for equality of slope coefficients in
selection corrected quantile regressions without transformation (P-Values)
Medium-Educated Low-Educated
Covariates Test range for τ 1995 2010 1995 2010
All 80-20 .000 .000 .000 .000
All 70-30 .000 .000 .000 .000
All 60-40 .000 .000 .000 .000
Age + Age squared 80-20 .000 .000 .000 .000
Age + Age squared 60-40 .000 .000 .000 .000
Part-time 5years 80-20 .000 .000 .000 .000
Part-time 5years 60-40 .863 .278 .001 .000
Full-time 5years 80-20 .000 .000 .000 .000
Full-time 5years 60-40 .000 .000 .000 .000
Notes: P-values of specification tests under the null-hypothesis of conditional independence as in Huber and
Melly (2015), testing for equality of the slope coefficients βτ in eq. (3.6) over τ (e.g. range 80-20 denotes
τ = .2, .25, ..., .75, .8). Selection corrected quantile regressions as suggested by Buchinsky (1998). Wald tests
on an equi-spaced five-percent-grid over the stated range for τ of the conditional distribution.
selection effects along the conditional distribution. Adding the OLS-fitted values to the
fitted values of the quantile regressions for the residuals provide the quantile regression fits
for the transformed model, which then can be used to simulate the wage distribution for
the employed as well as the counterfactual wage distribution if all unemployed were also
employed. These simulations are based on the Melly (2006) approach.
Contrasting the actual and simulated wage distribution for the employed allows us to assess
the goodness-of-fit for the observed unconditional wage distribution. Figure 3.5 show that
the fitted distributions closely track the actual distribution. Note that this is by no means
obvious in light of our complex multi-step estimation approach. If the identification-at-
infinity assumption were inappropriate or the transformation model/the model estimated
for the transformed data were misspecified, the fitted distributions could differ from the
actual distribution. The close fit between the actual and the fitted wage distribution also
adds credibility to the estimated counterfactual distributions discussed below. Note that
figure 3.5 shows the rise in wage inequality from 1995 to 2010. The 90-10 differential increases
by about 15 log points for the medium-educated and by about 40 log points for the low-
educated, with sizeable real wage losses in the lower tail of the distribution, especially for
the low-educated.
What is the nature of the estimated selection effects? Table A3.3 reports the estimated
average conditional selection effect [σ(X, δ)g(θτ , Zγ)] for log wages after undoing the trans-
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Table 3.3: Conditional independence tests for equality of slope coefficients in
selection corrected quantile regressions after transformation (P-Values)
Medium-Educated Low-Educated
Covariates Test range for τ 1995 2010 1995 2010
All 80-20 .385 .000 .000 .000
All 70-30 .956 1.00 .031 .394
All 60-40 .977 1.00 .541 .669
Age + Age squared 80-20 .999 .998 .474 .090
Age + Age squared 60-40 1.00 .992 .620 .751
Part-time 5years 80-20 .983 1.00 .155 .345
Part-time 5years 60-40 .993 1.00 .134 .507
Full-time 5years 80-20 1.00 .997 .035 .345
Full-time 5years 60-40 .985 .939 .672 .972
Range (u− l) for 80-40 75-35 80-30 75-25
Transformation (δu, δl)
Notes: P-values of specification tests under the null-hypothesis of conditional independence as in Huber
and Melly (2015), testing for equality of the slope coefficients βτ in eq. (3.6) over τ (e.g. range 80-20
denotes τ = .2, .25, ..., .75, .8). Selection corrected quantile regressions based on transformed model, with
tranformation based on predicted quantile difference σ(X, δ) in the identification-at-infinity sample, with
δ = (δu, δl for range u− l. Wald tests on an equi-spaced five-percent-grid over the stated range for τ of the
conditional distribution.
formation for selected values of τ and the selection probabilities Pr(D = 1|Z) = Φ(Zγ).
These calculations disentangle the relationship between selection probabilities and the co-
variates X thus overstating the size of the selection effects in the sample in light of the high
selection probabilities in our cases, see table 3.1. Table A3.3 covers a wide range of selection
probabilities representing most of their support in the employment sample. For a very high
selection probability of 99% the selection effects are zero and they grow with smaller selec-
tion probabilities. Around the median selection probabilities, the selection effects prove in
the order of 10 to 20 log points across all quantiles showing sizeable positive selection into
employment. Incidentally, the selection effects vary with τ , however, there is no common
pattern across the four cases. For the medium-educated they tend to increase with τ , except
for a very low selection probability in 1995. This suggests that for medium-educated selec-
tion effects grows with the rank in the conditional wage distribution. For the low-educated
the pattern along the conditional wage distribution is less clear. The selections effects are
more similar for different τ ’s. Specifically, for very low selection probabilities the selection
effect falls with τ , similar to the medium-educated in 1995, but the selection effcts increases
slighty with τ for intermediate values of the selection probabilities. While the estimated
selection effects imply that there is strong positive selection into employment when selection
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probabilities are around 93%-97%, the range of the median in the four cases, these results
do not allow us to quantify the selection affects along the unconditional wage distribution.
Based on section 3.3.5, we estimate the counterfactual distribution TY (X˜, α) to account for
the different selection of observables in the total sample X˜, where α involves the quantile
regression coefficients of log wages on X among the employed without selection correction.
To account both for selection on observables and unobservables, we estimate TY (Z˜, βˇ, δ, 0, γ˜)
setting θ = 0, because there is no need for selection correction when using the full sample.
Effectively, we predict wages based on the selection corrected coefficient estimates βˇ for
sample characteristics X. Figure 3.6 displays the counterfactual wage distributions if both
the unemployed and the employed were working full-time. The distribution labeled with
’Sel. on observables’ accounts for the differences in observables between employed and
unemployed and ’Full employment’ accounts for both observables and unobservables.
There are three key similarities across the four cases. First, all counterfactual distributions
lie for most part below the corresponding observed wage distributions, except for the absence
of selection on observables among the medium-educated in 1995. This means that the
employed in the sample are positively selected with regard to wages because the quantiles of
observed wages lie above the quantiles for the entire sample including the unemployed. This
reflects that wage quantiles for the unemployed would be lower than the corresponding wage
quantiles for the employed. Second, the distribution accounting for observables typically lies
between observed wages and the full employment distribution, implying that there is actually
both positive selection on observables and on unobservables among employees. Third, the
gap between observed wage quantiles and counterfactual wages is largest in the lower tail
of the distribution, it falls along the distribution, and closes in the upper tail. As to be
expected, the negatively selected unemployed are concentrated in the lower tail of the wage
distribution.
At the same time, there are some noteworthy differences across the four cases. The figures
in the upper panel of figure 3.6 shows that for the medium-educated in 1995 there is no
selection on observables and strong positive selection on unobservables. The results differ
for 2010, when we find small but positive selection on observables and much smaller positive
selection on unobservables than in 1995. Further, the total selection effect over most of
the distribution falls over time. Also for the low-educated, there are changing patterns
of selection (lower panel of figure 3.6). While both types of selection seem almost equally
important in 1995, the selection on observables dominates in the lower tail of the distribution
and both types of selection become stronger above the median. We conclude that while
3. Changing Selection into Full-time Work 85
selection on observables increased over time for both education groups the importance of
selection on unobservables fell.
3.4.5 Keeping selection as of 1995
As last step of our analysis, we estimate counterfactual wage distributions for 2010 assuming
that either selection on observables or selection on observables and unobservables had re-
mained at its values as of 1995. Again based on section 3.3.5, we estimate the counterfactual
distribution TY (X˜, α) with observables in the employment sample 1995 X˜ and coefficients
α for wage regressions among the employed in 2010. To account both for selection on ob-
servables and unobservables, we estimate TY (Zb, βˇ
o
, δo, θo, γ˜b) where βˇo, δo, θo represent the
coefficient estimates of our selection corrected quantile regressions in (o =) 2010, Zb are
the sample characteristics for the employed in 1995, and γ˜b the coefficients of the selection
model in 1995. Zbγ˜b determines the selection probabilities among the employed in 1995.
Figure 3.7 displays the two counterfactual wage distributions keeping selection as of 1995
together with the actual distribution in 2010. TY (X˜, α) is denoted as ’Observables of 1995’
and TY (Zb, βˇ
o
, δo, θo, γ˜b) as ’Total selection of 1995’. For both education groups. the effect
of the change in the selection between 1995 and 2010 is small relative to the total selection
effects within both years as shown in figure 3.6. A second common finding is that the
counterfactual wage distribution under the total selection as of 1995 lies below the 2010
distribution. This applies to the total range of the distribution for the medium-educated
and to the range below the 70%-quantile for the low-educated. For the medium-educated,
the distribution with observables as of 1995 lies between the distribution observed in 2010
and the distribution with total selection of 1995. Further, table 3.4 shows the spread of the
inter-quartile gaps for the observed counterfactual wage distributions. Both counterfactual
distributions displays a slightly larger wage dispersion as measured by the implied quantile
differences. For the low-educated, the counterfactual with observables as of 1995 basically
corresponds to the distributon of 2010, thus the change in the selection of observables does
not seem to have an impact. However, the distribution under total selection of 1995 shows
lower wages below the 70%-quantiles with a maximum gap around the 30%-quantile. This
means that wage dispersion in the middle of the distribution, e.g. as measured by the
interquartile differences, would have been higher under the selection as of 1995. However,
the increase is lower when moving to the tails of the distribution.
Summing up, we conclude that with the selection of employees as of 1995 wage inequality
would have been slightly higher in 2010. Despite the strong increase in wage inequality
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between 1995 and 2010, this findings suggests that the fall in unemployment up to 2010
by itself has not been associated with a change in the selection of employed towards higher
inequality. Further, despite the fall in real wages in the lower tail of the distribution, the
selection of the employed has changed towards higher wages.
Table 3.4: Counterfactual wage gaps with selection at 1995
Low education Medium education
1995 2010 1995 2010
Inter-
quartile
wage
gap
1 Observed 0.336 0.545 0.381 0.49Percentage of
baseyear
100 161.9 100 128.7
2 Observables of1995
0.336 0.501 0.381 0.472
Percentage of
baseyear
100 148.9 100 123.9
3 Total selection of1995
0.336 0.576 0.381 0.494
Percentage of
baseyear
100 171.11 100 129.57
1. The observed full-time log wage distribution
2. Counterfactual full-time wage distribution which would prevail if the distribution of characteristics X was
that of 1995
3. Counterfactual full-time wage distribution which would prevail if characteristics and selection with respect
to unobservables was fixed at 1995
3.5 Conclusions
As its methodological contribution, this paper proposes and implements a modification of
selection-corrected quantile regressions. This modification addresses Huber and Melly’s
(2015) concern that using a control function approach as suggested by Buchinsky (1998)
is only valid under equality of the slope coefficients on the determinants of the outcome
variable, which is only observed in the selected sample. We propose estimating a trans-
formation of the outcome variable based on the identification-at-infinity assumption and
then estimate selection-corrected quantile regressions for the transformed dependent vari-
able with the goal that equality of the slope coefficient then holds. A version of the test
suggested by Huber and Melly (2015) is used to guide the choice of the transformation. We
emphasize that whether the transformation approach works is specific to the application.
Undoing the transformation provides nonlinear selection-corrected quantile regressions for
the outcome variable of interest which can be used to estimate counterfactual distributions.
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Regarding the empirical analysis of wage inequality in Germany based on the suggested
modification of election-corrected quantile regressions, this papers addresses two questions.
The first one is: What would the wage distribution be if all unemployed were working full
time? Our analysis focuses on medium- and low-educated in the years 1995 and 2010. As
to be expected, the selection of the unemployed differs strongly from the full-timers. The
unemployed are negatively selected in terms of wages with respect to both observed char-
acteristics and unobservables driving the employment probability. If the unemployed were
working full-time, they would be over-represented at the bottom of the wage distribution
and therefore the overall wage dispersion would be higher. Negative selection is stronger
among the low-educated than it is among medium-educated workers. Our second question
is: How would the wage distribution have developed if selection into full-time employment
had not changed from 1995 to 2010? We find that under this counterfactual the level of
wages in 2010 would have been lower in the lower and middle part of the wage distribution
and wage inequality would have been slightly higher. Put differently, over time full-time
workers have become less heterogeneous with regard to the factors driving wages as well as
the selection into full-time work. This finding is somewhat in contrast to the existing liter-
ature emphasizing the role of composition changes in driving wage inequality (see Lemieux
2006, Dustmann et al. 2009, Biewen et al. 2018, among others). Further, selection due to
unobservables did not contribute in a substantial way to the rise in within-group inequality
for the medium-educated. Overall, our results suggest that the rise in wage inequality is not
driven by negatively selected, previously unemployed individuals entering full-time work. A
caveat to our findings is that we omit the high-educated because of the severe censoring in
this group, which may explain some of the differences to the previous literature.
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Figure 3.5: Actual and fitted wage distributions for employed
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Notes: Fitted wage distribution based on Melly (2006) approach. Use model estimates for transformed data
and then undo transformation. For transformed data, OLS regressions based on identification-at-infinity
sample and quantile regressions with selection correction based on entire sample of employed.
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Figure 3.6: Actual and counterfactual wage distributions
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Notes: Counterfactual wage distributions based on Melly (2006) approach, see section 3.3.5. ’Full employ-
ment’ and ’Sel.[ection] on observables’ represent counterfactual wage distributions when both the unemployed
and the full-time employed are working full-time. ’Sel. on observables’ represents the situation where the
wages are predicted based on standard quantile regressions on observed characteristics X, thus only account-
ing for differences in observable X. ’Full employment’ represents the situation where wages are predicted
based on the estimated quantile regressions with selection corrections, thus accounting both for differences
in observables X and in unobservables. The counterfactual wage distributons also use predicted wages for
the full-time employed.
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Figure 3.7: Actual wage distribution in 2010 and counterfactual wage
distribution keeping selection as of 1995
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Notes: Counterfactual wage distributions based on Melly (2006) approach, see section 3.3.5. ’Full employ-
ment’ and ’Sel.[ection] on observables’ represent counterfactual wage distributions when both the unemployed
and the full-time employed are working full-time. ’Sel. on observables’ represents the situation where the
wages are predicted based on standard quantile regressions on observed characteristics X, thus only account-
ing for differences in observable X. ’Full employment’ represents the situation where wages are predicted
based on the estimated quantile regressions with selection corrections, thus accounting both for differences
in observables X and in unobservables. The counterfactual wage distributons also use predicted wages for
the full-time employed.
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3.6 Appendix
Table A3.1: Sample descriptives
1995
Employed
1995
Unemployed
2010
Employed
2010
Unemployed
Age 38.92 38.98 41.34 39.98
Low-educated .1325 .2738 .1196 .3609
Medium-educated .7564 .6738 .716 .5993
High education .1111 .0524 .1645 .0398
Days in PT last 5 years 5.703 16.61 17.18 37.5
Days in FT last 5 years 1580 885.4 1597 518.3
N 169.243 27.833 145.196 29.846
Low-Educated
Age 39.37 39.64 39.16 33.39
Days in PT last 5 years 4.695 32.36 29.98 10.94
Days in FT last 5 years 1444 466.3 1346 143
N 25.148 14.121 20.766 11.256
Medium-Educated
Age 38.59 43.37 41.43 38.06
Days in PT last 5 years 4.069 0 14.53 34.13
Days in FT last 5 years 1587 1536 1608 514.8
N 144.095 13.712 124.430 18.690
Notes: Averages of explanatory variables by subgroup. ’Days in PT/FT last 5 years’ measure the number
of days in part-time/full-time employment during the last five years. Source: SIAB7510, own calculations.
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Table A3.2: First stage - Probit regression for full-time employment
Medium-educ 1995 Medium-educ 2010 Low-educ 1995 Low-educ 2010
Age -0.0468 -1.302∗∗∗ 0.517∗∗∗ -0.559∗∗∗
(0.0556) (0.0634) (0.103) (0.105)
Age squared -0.0185∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ -0.0899∗∗∗ 0.0481∗∗∗
(0.00693) (0.00788) (0.0128) (0.0135)
Part-time 0.193∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗
last 5 years (0.0239) (0.0128) (0.0440) (0.0187)
Full-time 0.494∗∗∗ 0.625∗∗∗ 0.464∗∗∗ 0.610∗∗∗
last 5 years (0.00352) (0.00336) (0.00584) (0.00556)
LS grad rate 9.791 -2.493 - -
(6.407) (5.174)
HS grad rate 29.21∗∗∗ 11.10∗∗ - -
(6.682) (4.904)
Share age 3.888∗∗∗ 3.930∗∗∗ - -
20-30 years (0.911) (0.645)
Share age -6.386∗∗∗ -5.994∗∗∗ - -
18-25 years (2.044) (1.484)
Fitted prob. - - 1.513∗∗∗ 1.282∗∗∗
Medium-educ (0.442) (0.224)
N 158,216 143,120 30,860 32,022
F_stat Instr. 20.4 29.7 11.7 32.9
Notes: Probit coefficients. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. Instruments for
selection (rows 8 to 11) are measured at district level. The instruments for the medium-educated represent
exogenous labor supply shocks due to variation in cohort sizes of individuals entering the labor market.
For the low-educated, the instrument ’Fitted Prob. Medium’ represents the average fitted employment
probability for the district level based on the Probit regressions in the second and third row, respectively.
F_stat Instr. denotes the F-Statistic for significance of the instruments. * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p <
0:01
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Table A3.3: Average conditional selection effect for log wages by selection
probability
Medium-educated 1995
Selection Conditional quantile τ
Probability 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
99% 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
96% 0.094 0.136 0.175 0.199 0.198
95% 0.192 0.209 0.234 0.252 0.242
85% 0.383 0.244 0.212 0.227 0.223
Medium-educated 2010
Selection Conditional quantile τ
Probability 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
99% 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
97% 0.139 0.186 0.247 0.300 0.323
96% 0.258 0.257 0.278 0.301 0.303
85% 0.417 0.415 0.469 0.543 0.582
Low-educated 1995
Selection Conditional quantile τ
Probability 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
99% 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
95% 0.117 0.119 0.125 0.119 0.121
93% 0.228 0.239 0.243 0.236 0.240
88% 0.362 0.292 0.253 0.238 0.243
Low-educated 2010
Selection Conditional quantile τ
Probability 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
99% 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
96% 0.094 0.136 0.175 0.199 0.198
95% 0.192 0.209 0.234 0.252 0.242
85% 0.383 0.244 0.212 0.227 0.223
Notes: Estimated average conditional selection effect [σ(X, δ)g(θτ , Zγ)] for log wages after undoing
the transformation. The selection effects are a function of the selection probability Pr(D = 1|Z) =
Φ(Zγ). Further, they differs by the τ th quantile regression and by the transformation factor σX, δ.
We calculate the average of [σ(X, δ)g(θτ , Zγ)] among all workers in the employment sample for
a given selection probability, irrespective of the worker’s actual selection probability. Table 3.1
reports all quartiles of the selection probabilities.

Chapter 4
Non-monotonic Selection Issues in Elec-
toral Regression Discontinuity Designs
4.1 Introduction
The Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD), which exploits a natural experiment in order
to estimate local average treatment effects (LATE), has rapidly risen in popularity among
researchers in recent years (Cook 2008). Much like other causal program evaluation methods,
the RDD can be biased by endogenous selection and lose internal validity. Therefore, it is
of concern to researchers how cases of self-selection can be detected in advance.
In the case of the Regression Discontinuity Design, self selection invalidates the identifying
assumption that the sub-populations near the assignment threshold are perfectly comparable
in the absence of treatment (Lee 2008). When implementing RDDs, it is common practice
in the literature to consider channels of influence trough which units of observation can
influence their treatment status and perform data-driven tests of the identifying assumption
(Imbens & Lemieux 2008).
We distinguish between monotonic and non-monotonic sorting dynamics. Non-monotonic
sorting occurs when some individuals select into treatment while similar numbers of individ-
uals select out of treatment. Such sorting can also happen in the form of forced de-selection
by an external influence, even if all the individuals have the same treatment preference. In
the literature, two kinds of tests for internal validity of the RDD are typically applied: The
density based test by McCrary (2008) and checks for balanced covariate levels on both sides
of the threshold. Non-monotonic sorting can not be detected with current implementations
95
4. Non-monotonic Selection Issues 96
of the former and is often difficult to identify with the latter.
I will motivate the importance of finding selection issues in advance, by presenting several
likely channels of influence through which individuals can manipulate their treatment as-
signment in an RDD. This article contributes to the literature by discussing non-monotonic
selection in the RDD and developing a modified application of the McCrary specification
test which can reliably detect non-monotonic sorting at the threshold. To my knowledge,
the problem of non-monotonic sorting dynamics in RDD applications has not been studied
in detail before. The test for non-monotonic selection works by identifying sub-samples of
data whose likelihood of sorting in one direction is higher than their likelihood of sorting in
the other. I then perform the density analysis on these sub-samples. If the sub-samples dis-
play an uneven density at the threshold while the full sample does not, then non-monotonic
sorting is present at the threshold.
In order to illustrate the considerations for using and the workings of the specification test,
I apply it to two RDD analysis, one by Lee (2008), about the incumbency advantage in
United States Senate elections. By applying the test to this dataset, I follow up on the
findings of Caughey & Sekohn (2011), who point out that results of close elections for US
congressmen are not as randomly distributed as one would expect them to be. Also, this
application illustrates that selection problems can be present even in well-established RDDs
and in environments where one would, at first glance, think them unlikely. The second
application is based on the first stage RDD of Dell (2015), which is also an RDD which
exploits close elections.
In election settings, such as this, it is not intuitively obvious why non-monotonic selection
should be an issue. The individual units of observation only have incentives to attain higher
election outcomes and therefore sort themselves monotonically. However, the data contains
only candidates from one party. In this case, successful monotonic sorting by each party’s
candidates amounts to non-monotonic sorting in the analysed sample. When applying the
modified test to the election data, a suitable sub-sample which is likely to be more successful
at sorting themselves above the threshold, are those candidates who’s party was already in
office at the time of the assignment process. The results from testing of this sub-sample
indicate that a degree of sorting appears to be present. The magnitude of the estimated
density discontinuity depends in part on the exact specification of the test, but the overall
indications point strongly towards sorting effects. The reason why such sorting should be
present is not clear cut. I arrive at the conclusion that no single factor seems to be primarily
responsible, but rather a the cumulative effect of several actions with individually limited
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influence on election results.
The remainder of the text is organised as follows: The next section provides a quick overview
of the bias introduced by endogenous selection in the Regression Discontinuity Design. It
also establishes the distinction between monotonic and non-monotonic selection. This is
followed by a description of the density based validity test and the modification which
enables it to detect non-monotonic selection, in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 is dedicated to
selection issues in the RDD application about incumbency advantages and also provides
possible explanations for the testing results. Finally, conclusions resulting from the discussed
properties of the test and applications are drawn.
4.2 Monotonic and non-monotonic selection in the RDD
The RDD exploits discontinuous rules, or events with discontinuous effects, to estimate
local average treatment effects (LATE). Treatment is assigned according to a determinis-
tic function, which is often a policy, law, or institutional program which assigns resources
or sanctions. In addition to the outcome variable and treatment status, an independent
variable is observed. This is also called the running, assignment or forcing variable. Selec-
tion into treatment is determined by a function of this variable.1 In the Sharp Regression
Discontinuity Design, assignment is completely determined by this function. In the Fuzzy
Regression Discontinuity Design, the value of the running variable only partly determines
participation in treatment. Since the same sorting dynamics create identification issues for
both Sharp and Fuzzy RDD, this section will focus on the Sharp version of the design.
Let X ⊂ R denote the assignment variable, with xi ∈ X the realization of this variable for
individual i and yi ∈ Y the outcome variable. If an individual’s realization of X is above
a specific threshold value c, then the individual is assigned treatment. Let Ii(xi) ϵ [0, 1]
denote treatment status. This treatment assignment mechanism implies that no overlap
exists between treatment and control groups in terms of the independent variable X.
If the location of c is determined exogenously, individuals with very similar realizations of
the assignment variable are likely to be similar in those characteristics which determine the
outcome in the absence of treatment. In the limit, when comparing individuals directly
at the threshold, the control individuals should, on average, be perfectly comparable to
those receiving treatment. Identification of the LATE requires an assumption about the
1For the purpose of this paper, only a single assignment variable is considered. An extension of the RDD
with multiple assignment variables is discussed in Papay, Willet and Murnane (2011).
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smoothness of counterfactual outcomes at the threshold: The conditional expectation func-
tions E[yi(1)|xi = c] for treated and E[yi(0)|xi = c] for non-treated individuals must be
continuous in c.
When this assumption holds, the LATE is identified as: LATE = limx↓cE[yi|xi = x] −
limx↑cE[yi|xi = x]
Figure 4.1 shows an example of a fictional RDD, where the counter-factual expectations are
smooth across the threshold:
Figure 4.1: Counter-factual expectations, Sharp RDD
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Note: The solid lines show the true function underlying the data generating process. The dashed lines show
the counter-factual expectations of the underlying function, which would prevail in the absence of treatment
(lower dashed line) or if everyone was treated (upper dashed line).
The above assumption is fundamental for causal inference from RDD results. Violation
of this assumption skews the RDD estimates with systematic selection bias of unknown
magnitude and makes LATE estimates invalid.
In an applied setting, it might not be intuitively clear what would cause the continuity
condition to be plausible. In its pure form, it is empirically not testable. To remedy this
4. Non-monotonic Selection Issues 99
problem, Lee (2008) has linked the continuity assumption to the degree of control that
individuals have over their realization of the assignment variable.
In many empirical settings, observed persons have some control over their realization of the
assignment variable. They will take action to influence their realization of the assignment
variable in accordance to their personal motives and underlying abilities. If individuals only
roughly influence the assignment variable, then this function will include a stochastic error
component. Individuals have imprecise control over X, when the density of X conditional
on characteristics is continuous. This characteristic enables the empirical specification test
discussed in section 4.3.
With imprecise control, treatment assignment in an area close to the threshold is “as good
as randomized”, meaning that the probabilities of having a value of X slightly above or
below the cutoff are the same for an individual with given characteristics (Lee 2008) The
continuity assumption for the potential outcomes yi(Ii) is satisfied as a consequence of
random assignment near the threshold. 2
In many applications it is assumed that all individuals have the same preference regarding
treatment status. There might be a clear benefit from participation or non-participation. If
individuals have uniform treatment preferences and the ability to precisely manipulate the
assignment variable, then they will only shift their realization of the assignment variable in
one direction.
However, this is not true for all applications. What I call non-monotonic manipulation occurs
when some individuals realization of the assignment variable is shifted in one direction,
while that of others is shifted towards the opposite. This can happen when the population
consists of heterogeneous groups with different preferences regarding treatment assignment.
A situation where this kind of manipulation was suspected was the introduction of the new
German parental leave benefit (Elterngeld) on Jan. 1. 2007. The reform created incentives
for some parents to postpone the birth of their child and for others to accelerate it. Birth-
shifting to exploit cutoff dates is often considered unlikely, but the results of Tamm (2013)
, Dickert-Conlin & Chandra (1999) and Gans & Leigh (2009) indicate that it is actively
practised. This finding is important because several articles about policy evaluation use the
timing of births as the cutoff for RDD analysis (Dustmann & Schönberg 2011 and Lalive
2008). In this case, Tamm (2013) finds evidence of selection into the new parental leave
2It is important to note that some forms of random components in the running variable are not sufficient
for the continuity assumption to hold. If the random component is censored at the threshold, endogenous
sorting may still be a threat to the validity of the RDD.
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system, but the results for the group of parents who are expected to profit from the old
system are less clear.
If both groups are of comparable size, similar numbers of individuals sort themselves to
each side of the threshold. Therefore, the manipulation taking place at the threshold will
not result in a jump in the density of the running variable, while still leading to systematic
differences between treated and control groups.
Individual treatment preferences are not the only source of non-monotonic selection. It can
also occur when realizations of the assignment variable are precisely manipulated by outside
forces with contrasting preferences. In the application of Section 4.4, the sample individuals
have strictly monotonic treatment preferences and some of them appear to be able to shift
their assignment variable slightly above the threshold. For some other individuals however,
their assignment variable is precisely manipulated to slightly below the threshold by non-
sample individuals with opposing preferences. Both mechanisms can lead to problems with
internal validity of the RDD, because the commonly used specification tests have trouble
detecting non-monotonic manipulation.
4.3 Specification Testing
Since sorting dynamics in RDDs are often not immediately apparent, data driven specifica-
tion tests are commonly used to rule out selection bias.
Two general data-driven approaches to testing RDD assumptions are available. One is to
check observed covariates for smoothness at the threshold. If clear imbalances in covariate
levels exist between individuals slightly below and above the threshold, the smoothness of
counterfactual outcomes is unlikely. This approach relies on the availability of high-quality
covariate data relevant to potential selection dynamics, which is often not available. In
those cases where the characteristics affecting selection are unobserved or miss-measured,
covariate tests can not rule out sorting dynamics.
A more generally applicable method for testing the identifying assumption of an RDD is
the density based test developed by McCrary (2008). Applying this test to the entire
sample will not detect non-monotonic sorting at the threshold. But the method used for
finding discontinuous jumps in the density is also used for testing sub-samples to identify
non-monotonic sorting.
The object of analysis for this test is the density function of the assignment variable. Uncen-
sored random components in each individual’s value of X imply continuity of the cumula-
4. Non-monotonic Selection Issues 101
tive distribution function, conditional on underlying characteristics of each individual. And
therefore imply continuity of the conditional density of the assignment variable. Continuity
of the conditional density also implies continuity of the overall density of the assignment
variable across the population.
If precise sorting or other types of non-random selection into treatment take place at the
threshold, the density of X will not be smoothly distributed at the cutoff. It is therefore
possible to check for violation of the identifying assumption by testing for continuity of the
density function of the running variable at the threshold. This is done by estimating the
size of a potential discontinuity in the density at the cutoff, which, in principle, is similar
to performing a RDD-analysis on the density function of the assignment variable, with
the treatment effect being equivalent to the deviation from continuity. Consequently, the
techniques used for the density based specification test are closely related to those used in
conventional RDD settings.
Under certain conditions a variation of the density testing procedure can be used to detect
non-monotonic sorting. The size of the bias introduced by this kind of sorting dynamics is in
direct proportion to the share of the two subgroups with contrasting treatment preferences
in the sample. Within each treatment-preference group, a discontinuity in the density of
observations would be present at the threshold. Therefore, testing separately for each sub-
group would allow the researcher to discover these sorting dynamics.
Precise identification of the subgroups can be challenging, since the mechanics of manipula-
tion and the individuals involved are rarely observable. If they were, data driven tests would
not be required. If group membership can not be precisely determined for each individual,
it is still possible to find evidence of non-monotonic manipulation. For this purpose it is
sufficient to identify elements of the population for which the probability of belonging to one
group is higher than that of belonging to the other group. As long as one of the sub-groups
is over-represented in the tested sample and the sorting dynamics are sufficiently strong,
the density test can detect those dynamics.
This approach requires additional information about the individuals compared to the straight
density test, in order to determine group membership. It does however have two distinct
advantages over simple tests of covariate smoothness. First, covariate data does not need to
be of high quality and missing observations pose less of a problem. For example, categorical
data can be used to determine subgroups suspected of self-selection. Second, this approach
is helpful when self selection can not be identified in terms of a single covariate level but
instead depends on interactions between covariates.
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4.3.1 Details of estimation
For the specification test, a histogram of the density function is created by finely binning
the running variable and assigning the frequency counts to the bin midpoints. The bins are
constructed in such a way that no bin contains values of X from both sides of the threshold.
Then a Local Linear density smoother is applied separately to the histogram on each side
of the threshold.34 A kernel-weighted linear regression is applied to small sections of the
data. Each section is defined by an evaluation point x0 and the bandwidth h. The bin
midpoints are used as regressors and the counts per bin, as regressands. 5The kernel function
that is most beneficial for RDD-applications is the triangle kernel, which shows optimal
performance at boundary points.6 Weights are assigned in a linear way, with the peak of
the weight distribution at the evaluation point. At the boundary, the weight distribution is
truncated and its peak lies at the boundary point itself.
A potential discontinuity in the density function will be found by performing separate re-
gressions on both sides of and estimating the outcomes at the cutoff. The discontinuity
would show up as the difference of the boundary estimates at the threshold being signifi-
cantly different from zero. The specification test is then performed as a Wald-Test with the
null-hypothesis that the jump in the density is zero.
It is necessary to select two tuning parameters for the estimation process: The size of the
histogram bins and the bandwidth for Local Linear estimation.
The bin size has only minor effects on the results. In most applications, the estimator
described above is very robust to changes in bin size, under the condition that a sufficient
number of bins are covered by the bandwidth of choice.7 I employ the bin size selection rule
3A detailed discussion of the asymptotic properties of local linear estimation can be found in Fan and
Gijbels (1996). It has been shown by Hahn, Todd and Van der Klaauw (2001) that, for the purposes of the
RDD, local linear estimation is highly efficient.
4As discussed by Lee and Card (2008), the treatment effect is asymptotically not identified for non-
parametric estimation without functional form assumptions in conventional RDD applications with discrete
running variables. However, this issue is not present in the density based specification test, if the running
variable has continuous support. The binned running variable is not discrete in the conventional sense,
because it can be defined by the researcher and the bin width can asymptotically shrink to zero when the
data density approaches infinity.
5A detailed description of the Local Linear estimator as described in McCrary (2008) is included in the
Appendix section 4.6.1.
6Compare Cheng et al. 1997 & Lee and Lemieux 2010 for a discussion about the merits of different kernels
in the RDD.
7This robustness has been formally shown by McCrary (2008) and the results found in Section 4.4 are in
line with those conclusions.
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suggested by McCrary (2008), which is a variation of the widely used Scott’s rule for bin
size selection.8
Both more critical and more difficult is the choice of the bandwidth. It is a measure of the
flexibility of the local linear model. For each evaluation point, the bandwidth determines
which bins, and therefore which observations, are used for the point estimator. In RDD
applications this means that the bandwidth determines how close to the threshold the data
is evaluated for the discontinuity estimate.
The choice of bandwidth is essentially a trade-off between reduced bias and precision of the
estimates. A small bandwidth for Local Linear estimation will result in a better approxi-
mation of the underlying function and reduce the bias, since only observations closer to the
cutoff are used for estimation purposes. However, the estimate will be based on a smaller
number of observations, which will reduce the precision of the result.9
Bandwidth choice for non-parametric estimation has been analysed in detail in the literature
and a number of solutions have been proposed.10 When ease and speed of implementation
is a priority, as it is in the case of specification testing, so called ‘rule of thumb’ (ROT)
bandwidth selectors are commonly used. A ROT bandwidth for the special case of density
estimation at boundary points has been proposed by Fan, Gijbels (2006) and by McCrary
(2008). Using the suggested procedure, I fit a fourth-order polynomial model to each side
of the histogram and choose the bandwidth depending on the mean squared error and the
curvature of the fitted model.11 However, since the suggestions for the best bandwidth
selection technique vary wildly in the literature, I treat the ROT bandwidth as a starting
point and calculate tests for a wide range of bandwidths.
8The suggested bin size is b = 2σˆN− 12 , with σˆ being the standard deviation of the assignment variable in
the sample. See Scott (1979).
9As part of a discussion of the asymptotic properties of local linear estimation at boundary points, it has
been shown by Hahn, Todd and Van der Klaauw (2001) that the optimal bandwidth converges to zero at a
rate of N− 15 , when the sample size approaches infinity. Implying that the bandwidth should be proportional
to N− 15 .
10See Pagan and Ullah (1999) for practical results from subjective bandwidth choice. Cheng (1997) and
Imbens, Kalyanaraman (forthcoming) for presentations of plug-in methods. Fan and Gijbels (1996) for a
“rule of thumb” for bandwidth selection. And Ludwig & Miller (2005) for a cross-validation technique.
11Compare Appendix 4.6.2 for a description of the ROT.
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4.4 Empirical Applications
The applications analysed in this section are an RDD by Lee (2008), about the political land-
scape in the United States, and an RDD by Dell (2015), about the effects of the partisanship
of mayors on violent crime in Mexico.
Lee determines the inherent vote share advantage which candidates for the House of Rep-
resentatives receive if their party is the incumbent at the time of election. The hypothesis
is that, individual characteristics being equal, those candidates whose party is in office at
the time of the election have advantages over their competitors in terms of the vote share.
Specification tests for the whole sample reject the presence of sorting effects. However, when
applying the sub-sample test for non-monotonic sorting, the results indicate some level of
precise selection at the threshold. This is an instance where the selection preferences of
sample individuals are monotonic, but where the assignment variable can be subject to
manipulation by exogenous agents, in this case the opposing Republican candidates.
Dell (2015) treats the average vote share of different party candidates as a proxy for socio-
economic characteristics of the mayoral district. The hypothesis is then that districts in
which a party barely won are, on average, comparable to those where the party barely lost.
In contrast to the article by Dell, who uses election results for the Partido Accion Nacional
(PAN), I consider election results for the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), which
allow for higher numbers of observations. While Mexican elections are, in principle, not
immune to experiencing manipulation of vote shares, results of the specification test indicate
no sorting issues in this sample (BBC News, 2012). Both applications showcase why we
should be aware of the unexpected ways in which non-monotonic sorting can affect RDDs.
4.4.1 Testing the full sample of the incumbency Regression Discontinuity De-
sign
Treatment, in the form of incumbency, is assigned when the vote share difference of a party
crosses the threshold at zero percent. The vote share difference is defined as the percentage
difference in vote shares between a candidate and his next closest contender. This value is
positive for the winner of the election and negative for the losers. Only candidates of the
Democratic Party are included in the sample. The results for Republican candidates are
expected to reversely mimic those of the Democrats in the majority of cases.
The assignment variable is the vote share difference at time t. This value is centred by
definition, so that the threshold value c lies at zero. All districts with Democrat vote share
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differences to the right of the cutoff have Democrat incumbents at the time of the next
election in period t + 1. The indicator Iit+1 = 1[V Sit = 0.5] describes the incumbency
status of the candidate’s party.
The outcome variable is the party vote share in the election at time period t+1. In the appli-
cation, Democrat vote share in the following election (V Sit+1) is regressed on the Democrat
vote share difference in the previous one and on a vector of candidate characteristics (wit+1).
V Sit+1 = αt+1wit+1 + βt+1Iit+1 + γt+1V Sit + eit+1 (4.1)
with E[eit+1|wit+1, V Sit] = 0. The RDD is necessary because wit+1, V Sit and Iit+1 are all
correlated with wit. By performing parametric regressions separately on both sides of the
cutoff, Lee (2008) finds that there is an incumbency advantage of about 7.8 percent of the
vote share in the data.
The identifying condition of f(V Sit|wit) being continuous in V S depends on the assump-
tion that election results contain a substantial random component, because many factors
influencing election outcomes are beyond any candidate’s control. For example, weather or
traffic conditions can influence election turnouts. However, some opportunities for precise
manipulation in political elections have been observed and I discuss them in Section 4.4.5.
A small range of available covariates: past political experience, number of election runs,
party vote share in t− 1 and the probability of the party winning the election in t− 1, show
balanced levels within a 5 percent margin of the cutoff.
When applying the density based specification check described in Section 4.3 to the data,
no significant sorting can be detected.1213 To establish the robustness of the results for
different values of the tuning parameters, I performed the test with the reference bin size
and bandwidth, as well as fractions and multiples of both reference values.
Table 4.1 shows the discontinuity estimates for all combinations of tuning parameters and
Figure 4.2 shows the fitted model. The version in this graph provides, upon visual inspection,
the best approximation of the data close to the cutoff of all tested variations.
12A dataset containing the information for the Lee study has been obtained from the Mostly Harm-
less Econometrics Data Archive: http://economics.mit.edu/faculty/angrist/data1/mhe (last visited
15.05.2014).
13The sample is trimmed at the extreme ends of the forcing variable to remove outliers and improve the
clarity of plots without affecting local linear estimators.
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Figure 4.2: Density estimates for Democratic candidates
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Note: Dark lines show flexible local linear kernel regressions fitted to binned observations, separately on both
sides of the threshold. 95% confidence bands in thin lines. Bin size of 0.0048, bandwidth of 0.1061.
The results indicate a very smooth distribution of election results at the threshold. No
discontinuity estimate exceeds two standard deviations and the estimated differences in log-
densities at the threshold range between 0.0104 and a maximum of 0.1831. For the entire
range of bandwidths and bin sizes, t-tests do not reject the null hypothesis of a smooth
distribution. On the aggregate level, the density function is continuous at the threshold.
4.4.2 Testing the sub-sample of incumbent Democratic candidates
In a recent article, Caughey and Sekhon (2011) have questioned whether the outcome of
close elections to the U.S. House really is as randomised as Lee (2008) assumes. They show
that a number of relevant covariates are not well balanced at the threshold.14 Covariate
imbalance is greatest away from the threshold, diminishes when looking at observations
closer to the threshold, and increases again for extremely close elections. They report that
covariates become more balanced within shrinking margins around the threshold, down to a
margin of five percent. This finding is in line with the results from Lee (2008). However, for
14These covariates include, among others, the political experience advantages for Republican and Demo-
cratic candidates, campaign money spent and donation funds received.
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Table 4.1: Estimated discontinuities in the density at the threshold, test
results for the full sample of Democratic candidates
Quarter the
reference
bandwidth
0.0531
Half the
reference
bandwidth
0.1061
Reference
bandwidth
0.2123
Twice the
reference
bandwidth
0.4245
Four times
the
reference
bandwidth
0.8491
Reference
bin size
0.0097
0.1359
[0.1871]
0.4676
0.0844
[0.1247]
0.4985
0.1258
[0.0856]
0.1417
0.0484
[0.0605]
0.4237
-0.0108
[0.0414]
0.7942
Half the
reference
bin size
0.0048
0.1004
[0.1851]
0.5875
0.0800
[0.1245]
0.5205
0.1163
[0.0856]
0.1743
0.0454
[0.0605]
0.4530
-0.0116
[0.0414]
0.7793
Twice the
reference
bin size
0.0194
0.1831
[0.1827]
0.3163
0.0968
[0.1247]
0.4376
0.1304
[0.0856]
0.1277
0.0484
[0.0604]
0.4229
-0.0104
[0.0414]
0.8017
Note: The table shows the size of the estimated discontinuity in the density at the threshold, with standard
errors in brackets and p-values in italics. The reference bandwidth and bin size are selected according to the
ROT approach (compare appendix section 4.6.2).
smaller margins, especially those of less than one percent, covariates become less balanced.
As causes for this behaviour, monotonic manipulation of the running variable is ruled out
by the density based test. Non-monotonic sorting issues in the sense that equal numbers
of individuals with opposing treatment preferences sort themselves to each side is also not
possible, because the sample of Democratic candidates have strict monotonic treatment
preferences.
An explanation could be a combination of monotonic manipulation by sample individuals
and external forces with different treatment preferences: From the perspective of each party,
manipulation is always strictly monotonic positive, since winning the election is the primary
goal of any candidate running for office. However, the aggregate situation is not as clear,
since both Democrat and Republican candidates engage in manipulative activities.15 If a
Democrat party candidate was able to precisely control his vote share, he would realize
15For this argument, a strict two-party system is assumed. This assumption closely but not entirely reflects
the political realities of post-war elections to the U.S. House of Representatives.
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a vote share margin of victory marginally above the threshold. As a direct consequence,
his Republican contender would receive a vote share slightly below that of the Democrat
candidate, and therefore marginally below the threshold.
If some candidates from one party have the ability and opportunity to manipulate their
vote shares, we have to assume that the other party would possess the same capabilities.
Consequently, a number of Republican candidates would also be able to precisely manipulate
their vote share. Those candidates would win a disproportionate number of close elections,
causing a similar number of Democrat candidates to barely lose the elections. This would
lead to a discontinuous jump downwards in the density of Democrat vote shares.
If comparable amounts of successful precise manipulation were achieved by both Democrats
and Republicans, the effects would mask each other over the entire sample and make detec-
tion by means of the density test impossible.
We can not identify in which elections which candidate might have successfully engaged in
precise sorting. However, it is enough to identify sub-samples of candidates who have an
above-average probability of precisely manipulating their assignment variable or having it
manipulated by the opposing candidate.
One such sub-group would be those candidates whose party already was the incumbent
party at the time of the election which determines assignment. This is in line with the
finding that the covariate imbalances in close elections found by Caughey and Sekhon (2011)
are especially pronounced between candidates running for the incumbent party and the
candidates of the challenging party. The incumbent party is more deeply interwoven with
the administrative institutions and therefore has potentially greater influence on the election
process.
Another possible subgroup with a higher chance of successful manipulation would be those
candidates who’s party holds the office of secretary of state, who is in charge of the elections,
or who’s party provides the state governor.16
One might ask if the increase in the probability of winning of incumbent party candidates is
not just the expected effect of the incumbency advantage from the previous election. Indeed,
when looking at the aggregate of all incumbent party candidates, they have substantially
higher chances of winning the next election. However, under the identifying assumption
of the RDD, this should not be true for close elections. Instead, incumbent party candi-
16In the case of the state governor, I could not detect similar evidence of sorting mechanisms.
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dates should be winning more often with higher margins of victory, since the incumbency
advantage is reflected in a higher vote share.
If the incumbent party candidates are more successful at shifting their vote share precisely
upwards, the mechanics leading to a discontinuity in the subgroup density would work as
follows:
I take Equation 4.1 as starting point, with the vote share at t+1 as the outcome of interest
for the RDD. For the specification test, the density of the democrat vote share at time t
is analysed. And t− 1 is the election which determines incumbency status for the purpose
of subgroup testing. The density of the winners of the election in t − 1, who will be the
incumbents in time period t, f(V Sit−1|Iit−1 = 1), is truncated at zero (compare Figure 4.3).
If no selection process is at work, then the distribution of election results in the next period,
t, will appear like that of Figure 4.4. The results for incumbent party candidates, the
winning party of the election in t − 1, are concentrated at the upper end, because βt, the
vote share advantage from incumbency, shifts them upwards. The model determining vote
share for this election follows the same concept as Equation 4.1:
V Sit = αtwit + βtIit + γtV Sit−1 + eit (4.2)
Under the no-sorting assumption, since individual characteristics w are continuously dis-
tributed, f(V Sit|wit) is continuous in V S. The density of V St is smooth across the thresh-
old for all groups of candidates. If however the non-monotonic sorting dynamics described
earlier are present, then we would expect densities like to those in Figure 4.5. Incumbent
candidates of both parties have a higher chance of winning close elections. For our sample of
Democrat candidates, this leads to discontinuous jumps in the density of both the winning
and losing party candidates of the previous election. For the winning ones, the discontinuity
of value δ1 > 0 is caused by their ability to influence close elections in their favour. For
the losing party candidates, the discontinuity of value δ2 < 0 is caused by their opponents
ability to win close elections. Over the density of the entire sample of Democrat candidates,
a discontinuity of size δ = δ1 + δ2 is present. When both parties are very similar in terms
of average political influence over time, both discontinuities cancel out and the density for
the full sample does not show a gap at the threshold.
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4.4.3 Results of sub-group testing
These results from the test on the sub-sample of incumbents at time t differ sharply from
the ones for the aggregate sample. Estimated discontinuities in the density at the cutoff are
considerably larger for all bandwidths and bin sizes. The estimates vary in size depending
on the choice of tuning parameters, generally exceed two standard deviations and are always
larger than one standard deviation. Plotting the local linear smoother over the histogram
in Figures 4.6 and 4.7 shows a sharp downturn in the chance of barely loosing an election
for the sub-sample. This indicates that of the incumbent Democrat candidates, the vast
majority wins the elections they are running in, strengthening the notion that incumbent
party candidates on average possess superior means of securing election wins. Especially
when restricting the analysis to very close elections, by selecting a bandwidth below one
percent of the vote share difference, the average chance of winning the election is significantly
higher if the candidate’s own party is in power.
Table 4.2: Estimated discontinuities in the density at the threshold, test
results for the sub-sample of Incumbent-party candidates
Quarter
reference
bandwidth
Half refer-
ence band-
width
Reference
bandwidth
Double
reference
bandwidth
Discontinuity 0.882 0.344 0.310 0.542
Standard Error 0.356 0.216 0.143 0.103
P-value 0.013 0.111 0.030 0.000
Bandwidth 0.049 0.098 0.196 0.391
Note: The first row shows the size of the estimated discontinuity in the density at the threshold. The
reference bandwidth and bin size are selected according to the ROT approach (compare appendix section
4.6.2)
Some variation is visible in the results, depending on choice of the bandwidth. Because
of this sensitivity, I performed the test for a finely gridded range of bandwidths ranging
from 0.02 to 0.25, maintaining the reference bin size of 0.0098 (Figure 4.8). As would
be expected, precision of the estimates degrades with shrinking bandwidths, due to lower
observation counts available within the bandwidth. For bandwidths larger than of 2% of the
vote share, as well as for bandwidths smaller than one percent, significant discontinuities are
estimated. As with previous applications, the results are relatively stable under variations
in bin size. The null hypothesis of continuity of the vote share difference is not rejected
for half the reference bandwidth, even though it is rejected at all other bandwidths. Figure
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4.8 shows a more detailed view of this phenomenon. Tests for the discontinuity being non-
zero are significant at the 5% level for all bandwidths smaller then 0.08 and larger then
0.2. When considering 10% significance levels, the null is rejected everywhere except for
a small range of bandwidths between 0.11 and 0.125. The graph of the significance level
exhibits a hump in the area of the halved reference bandwidth. While the discontinuities
are not always significant at very high levels for all bandwidth choices, a sharp increase in
the differences between treated and control candidates at the threshold, compared to the
full sample analysis, can not be denied. This strongly hints at substantial differences in
the behaviour at the boundary between incumbent party candidates and candidates of the
challenging party. Even more important, the estimated jump in the density at the cutoff
actually increases for very small bandwidths, when only data from the closest elections is
used. This result is in line with the findings of Caughey and Sekhon (2011), who report
that differences in covariate values increase for extremely close elections with vote share
differences of one percent or lower, after having converged before with shrinking margins.
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Figure 4.3: Determination of incumbent status in t-1
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Note: Winners in t − 1 (=incumbents in t) and losers in t − 1 (=non-incumbents in t) are determined by
vote share and precisely separated at the threshold.
Figure 4.4: Assumed distribution at t without sorting
Election results t, no selection
Voteshare margin of victory at time t, centered at 0
D
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n
Incumbents t
Non−incumbents t
Full sample
Note: Assuming no sorting at the threshold, incumbents in t (=winners of t−1) have a higher overall chance
of winning, but not in close elections. The reverse is true for non-incumbents. Therefore the densities of
both groups are smooth across the threshold and so is the density of the full sample.
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Figure 4.5: Distribution at t with sorting
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Note: If incumbents (of both parties) sort above the threshold, the densities of both incumbents and non-
incumbents will show discontinuous jumps of similar magnitude but opposite sign at the threshold. Therefore
the density of the full sample remains smooth across the threshold.
Figure 4.6: Density estimates for incumbent Democratic candidates
0
.5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
−1 −.5 0 .5 1
Note: Dark lines show flexible local linear kernel regressions fitted to binned observations, separately on both
sides of the threshold. 95% confidence bands in thin lines. Bin size of 0.0049, bandwidth of 0.2014.
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Figure 4.7: Density estimates for incumbent Democratic candidates
0
.5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
−1 −.5 0 .5 1
Note: Dark lines show flexible local linear kernel regressions fitted to binned observations, separately on both
sides of the threshold. 95% confidence bands in thin lines. Bin size of 0.0049, bandwidth of 0.0504.
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Figure 4.8: Significance levels depending on bandwidth
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Note: Only for a small range of bandwidths for the local linear kernel regression can we confidently reject
the hypothesis of no discontinuity in the density of incumbent party candidates at the threshold.
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4.4.4 Application to Mexican mayoral elections
In Dell (2015), the author uses an RDD to analyse the causal effect of mayor partisanship
on drug related homicides in Mexico from 2007 to 2010. When conservative president Felipe
Calderon came to power in 2006 his party, the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) spearheaded
the “war on drugs”. Municipalities which were won by PAN mayors experienced more
frequent and effective police activity against drug trafficking organisations. Dell’s RDD
strategy is based on the concept that, on average, municipalities in which the PAN barely
won the mayor’s office are comparable with municipalities in which it barely lost. Exploiting
this natural experiment, the article shows an average difference in drug related homicides
of 33 per 100.000 inhabitants at the vote share threshold.
As with the application by Lee (2008), sorting dynamics can not be ruled out a priori in
this electoral RDD. Surrounding characteristics of the elections are different, with mayoral
elections during the observed time frame not being balanced between two parties. Mexico has
three prominent parties, with the PAN, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) and
the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) alternating in strength across municipalities.
Within the sample, the PRI wins 59% of the elections and the PAN 24%. Therefore the
mechanics of the relatively strict two party system in the Lee example are no longer present.
Since the three parties are, on average, not equal in political strength, sorting into treatment
is less likely to be masked by equal magnitudes of sorting out of treatment, if non-monotonic
selection takes place. The full sample density test has higher chances of detecting sorting
behaviour.
The replication files provided in the online appendix of Dell (2015) are limited to elections
within a +5% and -5% vote share interval around the threshold. I perform the density based
test analogous to Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 in first for the the full sample of PAN candidates,
with the ROT selected bandwidth and a range of tuning parameters spanning 2% to 5% of
the vote share.
The results in Table 4.3 show no indication of selection issues. Fitting a linear model on the
5% vote share bandwidth, the estimated discontinuity is almost zero. At all bandwidths,
the discontinuity is not significant. Although it is not small at the reference bandwidth the
confidence bands increase with smaller bandwidths and therefore diminishing numbers of
observations. If the PAN was capable of deciding significantly more or less close elections
for itself than the other two parties combined, it would show up as a discontinuity.
When restricting the sample to those candidates in whose municipalities the PAN was
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Table 4.3: Density test results for all PAN candidates
Refrence
Band-
width
Bandwidth
3 % vote
share
Bandwidth
4 % vote
share
Bandwidth
5 % vote
share
Discontinuity -0.412 -0.221 -0.133 -0.039
Standard Error 0.314 0.246 0.218 0.194
P-value 0.190 0.368 0.542 0.840
Bandwidth 0.020 0.030 0.040 0.050
Note: The first row shows the size of the estimated discontinuity in the density at the threshold. The
reference bandwidth and bin size are selected according to the ROT approach (compare appendix section
4.6.2)
Table 4.4: Density test results for for PAN incumbent candidate sub-sample
Reference
Band-
width
Bandwidth
3 % vote
share
Bandwidth
4 % vote
share
Bandwidth
5 % vote
share
Discontinuity -1.953 -0.711 -0.402 -0.276
Standard Error 1.395 0.600 0.469 0.401
P-value 0.161 0.236 0.392 0.491
Bandwidth 0.017 0.030 0.040 0.050
Note: The first row shows the size of the estimated discontinuity in the density at the threshold. The
reference bandwidth and bin size are selected according to the ROT approach (compare appendix section
4.6.2)
already in office at the time of election, analogous to the incumbency sub-sample of Section
4.4.2, Table 4.4 shows a similar picture to the results in Table 4.3. For all bandwidths,
the discontinuity is not significant at any level, but it is larger across the board, compared
with the full sample estimates. These results reinforce the testing done by Dell (2015),
who reports no hints of sorting behaviour in Mexican mayoral elections. Even though the
potential for precise manipulation of the vote share is not not lower in Mexican mayoral
elections,
4.4.5 Discussion
The results from the sub-sample specification test performed in section 4.4.3 suggest the
presence of non-monotonic sorting issues in this particular RDD application. Such a result
poses the question why it should be possible for incumbent party candidates to influence
close elections in a way which systematically increases their chances of victory. A number of
possible channels of influence exist which might allow for relatively precise manipulation of
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election results. The first is precise influence on the vote count by non-democratic means.
Either in the form of ex-ante activities, such as the buying of votes, or in the form of ex-post
manipulation, an example of which would be miss-reporting of vote counts. While the liter-
ature reports no evidence that vote fraud would be a regular or systematic issue for elections
in western democracies, the possibility can not be ruled out completely (Alvarez and Hall
2006). Events like the recount of the Florida presidential elections votes in 2000 occasionally
make the headlines and spark scepticism about the validity of election processes ((Lott Jr.,
2001)). Especially in the case of very close elections, where only a relatively small amount
of manipulation would be necessary to turn the results. As vote count manipulation is, by
nature, a clandestine activity, small scale manipulation could potentially go undetected in
the majority of cases. Occasional incidents of verified vote rigging show that democratic
safeguards are not always effective. One such incident of electoral fraud in the U.S. was
the Texas senatorial runoff election in 1948. The election was a very close one, with both
campaign offices being aware of that fact. Caro (1990) reports that the campaign staff of
challenger Lyndon Johnson influenced voters by directly paying out cash, appointing sym-
pathetic election officials and bribing influential local bosses who would send their employees
and dependants to vote for Johnson. Additionally, allies of Johnson later confirmed acts of
ex-post manipulation, where election officials would interfere with the counting and tabu-
lation of votes, to ensure favourable results for their party.17 In the end, Johnson won the
election by a very small margin of only 87 votes out of about one million votes total (Caro
1990).
Yet, even though media attention devoted to elections, especially close ones, has increased
during the last decades, the number of confirmed incidents of vote rigging has been small
and ever declining.18 If electoral fraud was common in U.S elections, the increase in media
coverage and scrutiny should have led to an increase in contested elections. But the fraction
of contested elections for the U.S. House has constantly and substantially decreased during
the postwar period, as Jenkins (2004) reports. Even though some cases of illegal manipu-
lation of the voting process surely have not been discovered, it is likely that the fraction of
elections which were decided by fraudulent actions, is quite small. These findings suggest
that vote fraud has rarely been a deciding factor for elections in western democracies, during
the time period covered by the data. In all likelihood, vote fraud alone is not sufficient for
17Election judge Luis Salas, who was involved in the tabulating of votes, later admitted the fraudulent
manipulation of election results. See Caro (1990).
18The work of Campbell (2005) only reports a minimal number of elections where fraudulent activities
were discovered over the last decades.
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explaining the dynamics at the threshold apparent in the Lee data.
In the case of Mexican mayoral elections, we do not observe precise sorting behaviour which
might result from electoral fraud, even though elections in Mexico are sometimes subject
to fraudulent behaviour, as reported by McCann (1998) and Lehoucq (2003). However, the
stakes in mayoral elections are not as high as those for representatives on the national level,
which might reduce incentives for fraud. Another possible explanation would be that on
the local levels the consequences for fraud by the incumbent are so weak, that vote-rigging
results in clear wins or losses, instead of close elections.
A second mechanism, which might play an important role in deciding close elections, is the
use of ‘emergency’-resources. Political parties will allocate more resources to close elections,
than they would to those where they expect a clear win or loss. In these elections, the
marginal effect of resources spent is greatest. Even activities which are extremely costly can
be deemed worthwhile, if only a minimal shift of the vote count is necessary to win the elec-
tion. These resources are not necessarily of a monetary nature, but can also take the form
of organisational capacities or the ability for dealing with unforeseen events. Particularly,
parties and candidates in extremely close elections will perform actions which are costly in
terms of political influence or long term credibility, in order to win the race. Examples of
such actions would be the trading of political favours, populist promises or policies which
are not in line with the party platform. They might also make use of one-time resources,
like calling in favours from influential groups or individuals. It is hardly possibly to measure
a candidate’s emergency-resources, which prevents researchers from analysing potential im-
balances in this covariate. Candidates with superior financial and organisational resources
are better informed about the current state of the race and can react more quickly and
effectively to problems which their supporters might encounter. Those actions combined
would exacerbate existing imbalances in terms of campaign funds for very close elections.
They would also lead to a situation where the candidate with access to superior ‘emergency’-
resources has a distinct advantage. The actual magnitude of this specific kind of resource is
likely unobservable. However, it is reasonable to assume that incumbent party candidates
usually do possess an advantage in that regard.
For the Mexican mayoral elections, as noted earlier, the stakes are not as high and the
resources available to the candidates are orders of magnitude below those for US House
representatives. It is therefore likely that candidates are unable to monitor ongoing elections
as quickly and effectively, and might lack the necessary information and resources to precisely
influence elections in progress. This, in turn, would lead to a larger random component in
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the vote share outcome, which strengthens the RDD identification strategy.
The third, channel by which close elections can be non-randomly decided is the legal influ-
ence which incumbent parties have over the political administration. Among those measures
are voter-suppression tactics like restrictive voter ID laws and targeted placement of polling
stations.19 For example by increasing the density and convenience of the polling infrastruc-
ture in areas with historically strong support for the incumbent party. Selective recounting
of votes is another instrument which may allow for relatively precise manipulation of the
vote score. Increased influence allows a party to lobby more effectively for or against vote re-
counts in districts which they expect to favour their, or the opposing candidate, respectively.
Nevertheless, the number of times where recounts have reversed the results in a U.S. House
race has been very small. According to Caughey and Sekhon (2011), vote recounts only
had a pivotal effect on the election results in less than ten percent of the sample elections
in which recounts did happen. While the result was reversed in favour of the incumbent
party candidate in all reported cases, the low overall percentage of pivotal recounts rules out
recounting as the main factor in explaining the observed imbalances. Incumbent parties do
have other means, by which they could influence the vote share in close elections. Election
officials in local offices usually do have a certain amount of discretion when dealing with
unclear or provisional ballots, as is analysed by Kimball et. al. (2006). The party which
has endeared itself to the administrative personnel during their last term in office will have
gained an advantage as a result. Also, the partisanship of election officials can play a role in
circumventing adverse conditions for the own party’s supporters. One example of such prac-
tices, reported by Hauser and Holusha (2006), is that officials and judges can extend voting
hours in districts which favour the party they are affiliated with. This kind of manipulation
is more likely in very close elections, because the marginal effect is larger.
The channels for manipulation presented here probably do not represent all avenues by
which candidates can precisely sort themselves around the threshold. While no singular
main reason why sorting at the the vote percentage cutoff should be possible in U.S. House
elections is apparent, it is likely that the described effects, possibly combined with undis-
covered factors, lead to the observed sorting behaviour.
19For a discussion of the impact of voter ID laws on election outcomes in the US, see Weiser et al. (2005).
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4.5 Conclusions
In this article, the issues associated with non monotonic endogenous sorting in the context
of the RDD are presented and a testing method for the validity of the design is discussed.
The merits of thoroughly checking the data for evidence of precise manipulation of the
assignment variable are motivated by a description of the various ways by which individual
units can influence their realization of the assignment variable. Such manipulation can be
detected by a specification test which is designed to find discontinuities at the threshold
in the density function of the running variable. When non-monotonic sorting is happening
at the threshold, the testing procedure described in the literature can be modified to suit
the challenge. By testing sub-samples of the data which contain disproportionate numbers
of individuals who manipulate their assignment score in a single direction, non-monotonic
sorting can be detected. While it is possible to detect this problem by means of covariate
distributions, the density based test expands the arsenal of researchers with a method far
less demanding of the quality and spectrum of covariate data.
As example applications, the well established RDD analysis of the US-House incumbency
advantage by D. Lee (2008), and the Mexican mayoral election RDD by Dell (2015), are
examined with regards to a special form of non-monotonic selection effects. For the US
House elections, testing on the aggregate level of all Democrat candidates does not reject the
hypothesis of continuity of the assignment variable at the threshold, which is in line with the
results of McCrary (2008) and the specification testing performed by Lee himself. However,
the situation is not quite as clear when considering non-monotonic selection. Within a
sample of all Democrat-candidates, the strictly positive self-selection of Democrats would
be masked by the strictly positive self-selection of Republican candidates, considering the
predominantly two-party system. The sub-sample of democratic-party candidates whose
party was the incumbent at t− 1 displays unexpected behaviour of the density function at
the threshold. This is the sub-sample of individuals who are most likely able to precisely
influence their assignment variable, according to Caughey & Sekohn (2011). Results for
this sub-sample reject the hypothesis of a smoothly distributed assignment variable at the
threshold for a substantial range of tuning parameters, with significance actually increasing
for very close elections. Therefore it appears likely that certain candidates possess the
ability to precisely sort themselves to one side of the threshold. In the case of the Dell
(2015) application, no evidence for non-monotonic sorting can be found.
So far, no comprehensive explanation is available which would explain why precise manip-
ulation of the vote share difference should be possible in US House elections, although a
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number of factors which might contribute to the sorting dynamics were discussed. Qualita-
tive analysis of candidate behaviour in close elections could shed more light on this issue.
These results might lead to a reinterpretation of the incumbency advantage estimated by
Lee (2008), if higher probabilities of winning close elections are common perk of being the
incumbent. Since manipulation of the assignment variable is performed primarily by incum-
bent party candidates, it is worth considering to what extent the ability for manipulation
in one election translates into a vote share advantage in the next election. From this per-
spective, it is worth considering if the discovered imbalances between close winners and
losers introduce lead to a cumulative incumbent party advantage over multiple elections. In
the latter case, sorting behaviour in subsequent elections might be an integral part of this
advantage.
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4.6 Appendix
4.6.1 Description of the Local Linear density smoother
Construct J bins with j = 1...J and bin width b. Let Jl and Jr denote the number of bins
to the left and right of the cutoff c, respectively. The bins are defined as intervals:
(dj , dj+1] with dj = c− b(1− j + Jl)
and bin midpoints Xj with |Xj − dj | = |Xj − dj+1| = b2 . Calculate the normalized observa-
tion counts per bin:
Nj =
1
Nb
N∑︂
1
1(dj < xi ≤ dj+1) (4.3)
The histogram is then established by plotting the frequency counts Njon the bin midpoints
Xj .
The Local Linear estimator for a given bandwidth h and a kernel weighting function K, at
xi = x0is described by:
yˆ(x0) = β0ˆ(x0) + β1ˆ(x0)(x0 − x0)
with βˆ0(x0) and βˆ1(x0) minimizing the loss function:
L
(︂
βˆ0(x0), βˆ1(x0)
)︂
=
J∑︂
j=1
(︂
Nj − βˆ0(x0)− βˆ1(x0)(Xj − x0)
)︂2
K
(︃ |Xj − x0|
h
)︃
· {1(x0 ≥ c)1(Xj > c) + 1(x0 < c)1(Xj < c)}
The expression in curly brackets ensures that no observations from one side of the threshold
are used to calculate density estimates on the other side.
The triangular kernel is given by the expression:
K(x0) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩1− |x0| if |x0| ≤ 10 otherwise
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The coefficients for the local linear regression are then calculated as:
βˆ =
⎛⎝β0ˆ
β1ˆ
⎞⎠ =
⎛⎝S0 S1
S1 S2
⎞⎠−1⎛⎝T0
T1
⎞⎠
With Sk and Tk defined as:
Sk =
J∑︂
j=1
K
(︃(Xj − x0)
h
)︃
(Xj − x0)k
Tk =
J∑︂
j=1
K
(︃(Xj − x0)
h
)︃
(Xj − x0)kNj
Consequently, the estimator at point x0 is described by:
yˆ(x0) = βˆ0(x0) = T0
S2 − S1(Xj − x0)
S0S2 − (S1)2
The outcome of interest is then:
γ ≡ ln lim
x0↓c
y(x0)− ln lim
x0↑c
y(x0)
Define limx0↓c y(x0) = y+and limx0↑c y(x0) = y−. The estimate for a jump in the density is
then:
γˆ = ln yˆ+ − ln yˆ−
= ln
(︄
T+0
S+2 − S+1 (Xj − c)
S+2 S
+
0 − (S+1 )2
)︄
− ln
(︄
T−0
S−2 − S−1 (Xj − c)
S−2 S
−
0 − (S−1 )2
)︄
With S+k = Sk for Xj > c and S
−
k = Sk for Xj < c as well as T
+
k = Tk for Xj > c and
T−k = Tk for Xj < c.
It is shown by McCrary (2008) that the estimation bias
√
nh (γˆ − γ) is approximately nor-
mally distributed and asymptotically converges to zero under the following conditions: Ev-
erywhere except at c, the density function y(x) has three continuous and bounded deriva-
tives, h → 0, Nh → ∞ and bh → 0.20 This leads to an approximate standard error for the
estimator γˆ of:
σˆγ =
√︄
1
hN
24
5
(︃ 1
yˆ+
+ 1
yˆ−
)︃
(4.4)
20For a proof, see Appendix I of McCrary (2008).
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4.6.2 Bandwidth selection
The histogram from the first step of the specification testing procedure is taken as a starting
point. Then a separate ROT bandwidth is computed for both sides of the threshold. This
is done by fitting a polynomial of the fourth order to the data on each side and calculating:
h¯l = κ
(︄
σ¯2l
|c−Xl|∑︁
λˆ
′′
l (Xj)2
)︄ 1
5
(4.5)
h¯r = κ
(︄
σ¯2r
|c−Xr|∑︁
λˆ
′′
r (Xj)2
)︄ 1
5
Where Xl = X0, Xr = XJ . The index l describes the variables for the regression to the left
of the cutoff, and index r describes those for the regression to the right. Let σ¯2l and σ¯2r be
the mean squared error for the regressions on both sides of the cutoff. While λˆ′′l and λˆ
′′
r are
the estimated second derivatives of the fourth order polynomial model.
In order to calculate the standard errors for the local linear regression as per equation 4.4,
the average of both ROT bandwidths is taken. This average is used for the local linear
estimator on both sides of the cutoff.

Chapter 5
Candidates’ Professions and the Gen-
der Gap in Parliaments
– Experimental Evidence
5.1 Introduction
In most countries, women are underrepresented in parliaments relative to their share in the
population. This gender gap can be observed across nations and at all levels of government.
For instance, women occupied only 20 percent of the seats in Congress and 24.8 percent in
state legislatures in the US in 2018 (CAWP, 2018), 37.4 percent in the European Parlia-
ment (European Parliament, 2017), and about 31 percent and 32 percent in the German
Bundestag and the British House of Commons, respectively (IPU, 2018). This is even more
remarkable since each of these entities has more women than men in the population (World
Bank, 2017) and we would therefore expect female candidates to have an advantage at the
polls. This underrepresentation of women has consequences for policy decisions because
female politicians tend to have different policy preferences and priorities than their male
colleagues (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Clots-Figueras, 2011, 2012; Thomas, 1991). For
instance, parliaments with higher shares of women assign more resources to healthcare and
education (Holman, 2014).
Many factors contribute to this situation. This includes women’s lower level of political
ambitions (Fox and Lawless, 2010) and their higher inhibition to enter competition (Niederle
and Vesterlund, 2007), as well as structural disadvantages like biased coverage in the media
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(Carlin and Winfrey, 2009) and shenanigans of party leaders in favor of male candidates
(see Carroll, 1994; Esteve-Volart and Bagues, 2012; Fox and Lawless, 2010; Stambough and
O’Regan, 2007, among others). By contrast, the existing evidence is inconclusive about
the role of the voters in this context, that is, whether there is a systematic bias against
female candidates in the electorate. While some studies report small negative effects of
being female (e.g. Giger et al., 2014; Sanbonmatsu, 2002), others show either no impact of
candidate gender (McElroy and Marsh, 2010) or even a small advantage for women (Black
and Erickson, 2003).
In this paper, we examine an aspect of voter behavior which has been overlooked in the
literature so far, but may explain part of the representation gap and some of the variation
in the results of these earlier studies. More specifically, we test whether voters have a
preference for candidates working in typically male-dominated professions. If this is true,
male candidates would possess a hidden systematic advantage over female candidates in
situations in which their respective profession is either a prominent feature in the campaign
or directly stated on the ballot as additional information on the candidates.1
For the analysis, we use data from an election experiment built into an exit poll of voters
in Germany in 2014. Respondents faced a list of 30 imaginary candidates of their favorite
party and were asked to select the six they would prefer to represent them. Using different
information treatments, we first examine whether there is a direct gender preference among
voters in the absence of other information about the candidates. To this end, we exogenously
assign first names to the candidates which unambiguously indicate a certain gender. In
consequence, female voters strongly prefer female candidates, while male voters seem to be
indifferent towards candidate gender. The results for female voters are in line with earlier
findings of same-sex preference in the literature (e.g. Dolan, 1998; Sigelman and Sigelman,
1982). Due to this strong bias among the women in our sample, female candidates enjoy a
sizable bonus on average in this scenario.
In the second step, we look at the results of six different ballot versions in which we add
information about the candidates’ profession. More specifically, each candidate appears
on two ballot versions with a male-dominated, a female-dominated and a gender-neutral
profession, respectively. This way, we are able to identify the impact of the different types
of professions while keeping the candidates’ name, gender, and position on the list constant.
1The former is the case in candidate-centered elections with simple majority voting (McDermott, 2005),
the latter happens in many countries around the world, including some states in the US, Germany, and
Switzerland.
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Our findings suggest that profession information profoundly affects the selection decision.
First, individuals reveal a preference for candidates working in a profession which is typi-
cally associated with the respective individual’s gender, e.g., male voters for physicists, engi-
neers, firefighters, and metalworkers, and female voters for psychologists, elementary school
teachers, elderly care nurses, and medical assistants. Second, this bias towards professions
dominated by one’s own gender is significantly stronger for men than women, confirming
sociological research about stronger gender stereotyping among men (e.g. Miller and Budd,
1999; Miller and Hayward, 2006). As a consequence, the advantage for female candidates
in the situation without profession information vanishes and even reverses into an electoral
bonus for male ones, once we use our findings to simulate results with more realistic shares
of male and female candidates working in male and female dominated professions. Finally,
this bonus for men leads to losses in electoral ranks for female candidates and therefore to
lower chances of rising to the top of the list and ending up in parliaments.
With respect to the literature, these findings suggest that studies examining gender pref-
erences among voters in settings in which profession information does not play a role, will
tend to find more positive results with respect to the electoral chances of female candidates
(e.g. Baltrunaite et al., 2016; Black and Erickson, 2003; Dolan, 1998; McElroy and Marsh,
2010). While others, in which profession information is available (e.g. Chakraborty, 2012;
Giger et al., 2014), will find negative results.
The paper continues as follows: In section 5.2, we present and discuss the most relevant
literature on the use of information cues in low-information elections and the likely impact
of profession and gender stereotypes. Then, we introduce the design of our experiment in
section 5.3. Section 5.4 describes the resulting sample and shows that the random allocation
of respondents to the different information treatments led to very similar comparison groups.
In section 5.5 we describe how we identify the impact of gender and profession. Section 5.6
reports the empirical findings for both steps of the analysis, as well as for several robustness
checks. Finally, section 5.7 discusses the potential implications of the results, limitations of
this study, and possible directions for follow-up research on the topic.
5.2 Voting, professions and stereotypes
An extensive literature is dedicated to the issue of electoral results for female candidates.
It is divided in three main strands.
The first one analyzes the legislative consequences of female representation among politi-
5. Candidates’ Professions and the Gender Gap in Parliaments 130
cians. Since the number of women in parliaments and among representatives tends to be
lower than that of men, many authors study the counterfactual effects on policy if gender
shares were balanced. For instance, Holman (2014) and Thomas (1991) provide evidence
that parliaments with stronger female representation increase government spending and as-
sign more resources to healthcare, education and family support. Chattopadhyay and Duflo
(2004) find that in India village councils with higher shares of women provide more of those
public goods which benefit women. Parts of the existing literature also cover the effects of
female policymakers on subsequent electoral success of female candidates. The findings are
heterogeneous and depend on the country studied. Baskaran and Hessami (2018), using
data from Germany, show that female candidates reach higher vote shares in local council
elections if the respective mayor is a women. However, Ferreira and Gyourko (2014) find no
evidence for political spillovers of female mayors in the USA.
A second group of studies is concerned with the supply of female candidates, i.e., the selec-
tion processes which determine the makeup of party lists and the characteristics of female
candidates. Which therefore play an important role in determining the share of women in
parliaments. Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) present evidence that women are less likely
to sort themselves into competitive environments like political campaigns. Results from
Fox and Lawless (2010) indicate that women are also less likely to be recruited as political
candidates in the US, and if they are, it is in more competitive districts with a greater
risk of losing (Carroll, 1994; Stambough and O’Regan, 2007). In consequence, Anzia and
Berry (2011) as well as Ferreira and Gyourko (2014) suggest that those women who do run
and get elected are more capable on average, due to the harder selection process they go
through. There is mixed evidence if having more female candidates on party lists affects
their representation in parliament. For instance, Campa (2011) finds no significant change
in female representation after the introduction of gender quotas on ballots in Spanish mu-
nicipal elections. Esteve-Volart and Bagues (2012) show evidence that this may be due to
parties systematically placing female candidates on less favorable positions on the ballot,
which diminishes the effects of gender quotas. However, Baltrunaite et al. (2016) exploit
the introduction of new election rules in Italy in a regression discontinuity design and find
evidence for strong supply side effects on the election of female representatives.
An important third strand of research, and the one to which our paper contributes the
most, studies the determinants of voter demand for female candidates. Early work by
Sigelman and Sigelman (1982) shows only weak gender effects among US undergraduate
students, especially in comparison to the strong impact of the age of the candidates. Their
experimental survey also contained information on candidate professions, but as all of them
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were gender neutral, it is not possible to derive any results about gender stereotyping from
this setup. Huddy and Terkildsen (1993) look at gender effects from a different angle. They
provide experimental evidence that voters associate typically female and male candidate
traits with different areas of political expertise. Candidates with male traits are considered
more competent on the topics of economics and national security, while female character
traits are associated with higher competence in topics which require compassion, such as
social security and education. Overall, voters seem to consider male character traits to
be more important for office holders than female character traits. If this extends to male-
dominated professions compared to female-dominated ones, it could explain the impression
stated above that studies in environments in which professions play a role tend to find
less favorable results for female candidates than in circumstances without information on
occupations. Similarly, the different traits attributed to male and female candidates may
also explain the finding by McDermott (1997) that female candidates fare better when
running for the Democrat Party compared to the Republican Party in the US. Since their
perceived competences aline much more closely with the preferences of the electorate of the
former party. Going one step further in the analysis and considering the voting patterns
of male and female voters separately, there is strong evidence that individuals prefer to
be represented by candidates of their own gender. Such behavior is shown by both Dolan
(1998) and Sanbonmatsu (2002).
The article most similar to ours in terms of experimental design and empirical approach is
McDermott (2005). Using experimental survey data from state-wide races in California, she
demonstrates that in low-information settings, occupational characteristics of the candidates
serve as a signal for qualification and educational achievement and thus influence voter
decisions. The study has two limitations with respect to our topic, however. First, the
focus on races for executive offices featured only one candidate per party, which means that
the party affiliation of the candidates most likely dominated the other information cues.
And second, the experiment only varied whether the given profession of the candidates was
revealed or not, but did not exogenously assign gender and different professions to the same
candidates. Taking a closer look at gender-profession interactions and their impact on the
electoral gender gap is therefore not possible with this setup.
Our paper contributes to this literature in a number of ways. First, it examines experimen-
tally whether we can explain the different findings on the gender gap in voter preferences
with the presence of profession information about the candidates. To this end, we conduct
the same election experiment in the absence and presence of profession information and
compare the magnitude of the respective gender gaps. Second, we investigate how different
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types of professions impact the electoral chances of male and female candidates separately.
We focus in particular on the role of occupations that are strongly dominated by either
gender and may therefore transport certain connotations. And third, we are able to use our
rich data containing individual-level information on the participants, their voting behavior,
and the characteristics of the candidates in order to specifically look at stereotypical and
atypical gender-profession combinations and how voters react to them. To the best of our
knowledge, the last two points constitute the first attempts to examine this topic with an
adequately powerful experiment and sample size.
With these contributions, our paper also relates to the literature on the hiring of employees,
as the context of choosing the best candidate for office resembles the selection of a new
employee rather closely. In both cases, the respective principal chooses an agent out of many
applicants based on a rather limited set of information about the latter. Gender preferences
revealed in hiring decisions could therefore easily exist in voting decisions and vice versa. For
instance, Azmat and Petrongolo (2014) conduct a comprehensive review of the international
literature on gender differences in hiring and conclude that there is evidence of significant
discrimination against women in high-status or male-dominated jobs and against men in
female-dominated ones. If politics is considered a more male-dominated domain and more
masculine competences like assertiveness and risk-taking are perceived as necessary to thrive
there, this could explain a part of the observed gender gap. Additionally, if voters do not
care per-se about the gender of the candidate, but appreciate candidates working in high-
status or male-dominated jobs in general, this points towards possible negative spill-over
effects for female candidates from the labor market into the political arena in situations in
which candidate profession is an important cue.
5.3 Survey design
For the analysis of these phenomena, we use data from a large election experiment con-
ducted as part of an exit-poll at the simultaneous elections to the EU parliament and local
councils in Germany in May 2014. At a total of 28 locations in 15 different communities
in the population-rich states of Baden-Württemberg and Nordrhein-Westfalen, voters were
approached outside the polling stations and asked to participate in an anonymous study on
voter behavior.2 In order to obtain a representative sample of voters in these places, inter-
viewers were instructed to approach every third person leaving the buildings. All persons
2The original questionnaire in German is available from the authors upon request
5. Candidates’ Professions and the Gender Gap in Parliaments 133
who consented to take the survey obtained the questionnaire and could fill it out on their
own with the interviewer remaining nearby in case of questions.3
The questionnaire was structured in four main parts:4 The first asked individuals about the
election they just participated in. That is, which party they voted for, how many candidates
of that party they knew, and how satisfied they were with their choices. The second was
a hypothetical election in different versions which constitutes the core of the present study
and will be explained in more detail below. The third part inquired about the experience
of voting in this hypothetical election, e.g. what methods they used to select candidates
and what additional information they would have liked to know about them. Finally, the
fourth elicited the basic personal characteristics of the respondents, that is, their gender,
age group, education, family status, and current profession.
In the election experiment, survey participants were asked to allocate six votes among a list
of 30 hypothetical candidates, which they should think off as candidates from their preferred
party. Thus, the setup mimics the situation of voters who have to choose between mostly
unknown candidates of their preferred party on a lower institutional level. For instance in
an open list election as used in many countries of Northern and Central Europe or a primary
election to determine a party’s candidate in a local race in the US.
Respondents were randomly assigned to a total of 16 different versions of the hypothetical
election. All of them featured the same candidates, as defined by their family names, at the
same ballot positions, but varied in the amount of information provided to the participants.
For the purposes of this paper, we use the following eight versions as presented in figure
5.1: The first one only features the family name and the initials of the first names, such
that they appear in a gender-neutral way to the participant. Version 2 spells out the whole
name and thus reveals the gender of the candidates. Male and female candidates appear
alternating, starting with a male candidate on the first spot. Finally, versions 3 to 8 use the
same names and gender as version 2, but additionally state a profession next to the name
of the candidates.
The setup of our data collection provides a number of advantages over traditional sources.
Compared to surveys conducted on the phone some time after the election, it directly
targets the group of people most relevant for this research at a point in time as close to
the real decision-making as possible. Selection issues with regards to voting participation
3Bishop and Fisher (1995) have shown that filling out questionnaires oneself increases the accuracy of the
answers by reducing the social desirability bias.
4A separate part included questions for other research projects which are not important in our context.
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are minimized by drawing respondents only from those individuals who actually went to
the polls. This ensures that our respondents are in the right set of mind to correctly
answer questions about how they voted and how they would choose in a slightly different
environment. Furthermore, a paper-based questionnaire and hypothetical election ballot is
much more similar to the real act of voting and making one’s cross. In particular in terms
of being able to visually scan the whole list of candidates. This would not be possible in the
case of phone interviews, especially when the case in question is an election with multiple
candidates.
In comparison to using real election outcomes, our setup allows for a much stronger iden-
tification of the key effects of interest as the exact combinations of gender and profession
of the hypothetical candidates are exogenously determined, while potentially confounding
factors like ballot position, name recognition, or age are all either unknown or held constant.
This approach makes it possible to precisely set the composition of candidate characteristics
and perfectly isolate the effect of profession information on the voter’s willingness to choose
female candidates from changes in the supply of candidates. Furthermore, having informa-
tion about several important characteristics of the participants enables us to examine the
behavior of relevant subgroups separately, most importantly male and female voters. This
is typically impossible when looking at election data due to the anonymity of the voting
process.
5.4 Sample descriptives
In total, 2327 voters filled out one of the eight questionnaire versions relevant for this study.
We further restrict the sample to those respondents who stated their gender and allocated all
of their six votes among the candidates in the hypothetical election. Thus, we end up with
1826 respondents for the empirical analysis. Table A5.2 reports the descriptive statistics
for the resulting sample. It shows that 49.8 percent of the respondents were female, the
average age was around 44 years5 and 66.8 percent had a university entrance qualification
(the German "Abitur"). Finally, about 54.4 percent reported to have voted for a center-left
party, which includes the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Green Party, and the socialist
Left Party (Die Linke). In terms of regional distribution, 53.1 percent of participants were
interviewed in a larger city (more than 100,000 inhabitants) and 53.2 percent in the state
of Baden-Württemberg.
5As participants were asked to indicate their age in intervals (see the questionnaire in the appendix), we
use the interval means for this calculation and 75 for the group of participants over 65.
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Figure 5.1: Ballot versions and informational content.
As we will often present results by voter gender in the next sections, it is also interesting
to compare the participants by gender. To this end, Table A5.2 also presents the respective
personal characteristics of male and female participants. The numbers show that male and
female voters in the sample appear very similar. The two groups only deviate somewhat
with respect to their age distribution and education level. More specifically, female voters
are underrepresented in the age group between 26 and 35 years (15 vs. 20 percent among
male respondents), slightly overrepresented among those aged 46 to 55 (21 vs. 18 percent),
and report a somewhat smaller share of individuals with a secondary or higher degree (64
vs. 69 percent).
Finally, we want to check whether the random allocation of respondents to the different
ballot versions led to very similar groups facing the various information treatments. Table
A5.3 confirms that this is the case. It reports the descriptive statistics of the survey par-
ticipants for each ballot version and marks those instances in bold in which the average of
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the respondents in one version differs significantly (on the 5 percent level) from the mean
of the others. Thus, we can see that the individual groups resemble each other very much
in terms of personal characteristics. Only in 8 out of 136 cells in table A5.3 do we observe
significant deviations on the 5 percent level, that is, in roughly 5.6 percent of the cases.
Given this wide-ranging similarity in the observable characteristics of survey participants
across treatments, it seems plausible to assume that they also share the same unobservable
characteristics on average and hence constitute credible counterfactuals.
5.5 Identification strategy
Given this experimental setup and the random assignment to the different ballot versions
with incrementally increasing or changing informational content, we apply a three-step ap-
proach to examine the impact of profession information on the chances of female candidates
to get elected. We start by focusing on the ballots without profession information to examine
whether our survey participants exhibit a direct preference for either gender. Then, we look
at the ballot versions displaying the candidates’ occupation to check whether the inclusion
of this information leads to indirect changes in the electoral prospects of female candidates.
As this is going to be the case, we finally further exploit the experimental setup to test
whether this effect is driven by preferences for certain gender-profession combinations. The
following subsections present each of these steps in more detail.
5.5.1 Direct gender preferences
To see whether the gender gap in parliaments may be driven by direct voter preferences
for male candidates, we look at the voting behavior of participants who faced hypothetical
election ballots without any profession information and check whether the probability of
candidate i to get one of the six votes of participant j depends on the gender of the candidate.
To this end, we use ballot version 2 and estimate the following model by logit:
Pr (voteij |X) = Λ(α0 + α1femalei + α2rank&namei) (5.1)
Here, female is an indicator variable for whether the candidate appears as a woman on the
ballot, i.e., appears with a traditionally female first name.6 To take the potential influence of
ballot position and family name into account, we additionally control for each candidate’s
average probability to receive a vote in ballot version 1 (rank&name). Male and female
6Where X is the vector of explanatory variables, in this case X = (femalei, rank&namei).
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first names are exogenously allocated to the 30 candidates on the list and the better ballot
position for men is taken into account by rank&name. Coefficient α1 thus represents the
average electoral bonus or disadvantage female candidates possess compared to their male
counterparts, i.e., the electoral gender gap.7 In an extension to the model, we also look at
possible differences in the estimated electoral gender gap by gender of the voter by including
an indicator for whether voter j is female (femvot) and its interaction with the gender of
the candidate (female× femvot).
5.5.2 Effect of profession information
In the second step, we measure whether the electoral gender gap differs in the presence
of profession information on the ballot. To this end, we consider the voting behavior of
participants facing ballot versions 3 to 8 In these, the same hypothetical candidates appear
at exactly the same positions as in version 2, only with additional information about their
respective occupation stated after their names. We pool all these observations and run the
specification in equation 5.1 with this sample to see whether the estimated coefficient of
female changes under these circumstances. If there is a large deviation from the earlier es-
timate obtained in the situation without profession displayed on the ballot, we can attribute
this change to the inclusion of this piece of information about the candidates.
The impact of gender-profession combinations
If the presence of profession information on the ballot turns out to affect the electoral
chances of male and female candidates differently on average, we want to know more about
the mechanisms at work. In particular, we want to answer three interrelated questions:
First, is this change in voting behavior a mere consequence of switching from one decision
criterion to another (here, from gender to profession) and thus happening coincidentally,
or do voters systematically connect certain professions with a specific gender and take that
(un)consciously into account? Second, do certain kinds of occupations affect the electoral
chances of male and female candidates differently? And third, do male and female voters
react differently to gender-profession combinations?
To examine these issues, we chose the 30 professions used in our study such that they are well-
known and can be characterized as one third female-dominated, gender-neutral, and male-
dominated, respectively. The criterion for this sorting was the share of female workers in a
7We do not include any other candidate characteristics, as they are unknown to the participants by design
and therefore redundant. Furthermore, all voter-specific variables do not matter here either, since we restrict
the sample to participants who allocated the full six votes.
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certain occupation as reported in the German Microcensus of 2010, an annually conducted
representative household survey providing information on about 800,000 individuals. We
define a profession as female dominated if the share of women exceeded 70 percent among
its workforce in that year, as gender neutral if it lay between 40 and 60 percent, and as
male dominated if it was below 30 percent. Table 5.1 shows the selected professions and
their respective share of female workers. To prevent that differences in the skill level of the
selected occupations influence our analysis, we also ensured that half the professions in each
gender category can be considered as high and low skill employment. The corresponding
values for the share of higher educated individuals (defined as having obtained the Abitur,
the general qualification for university entrance in Germany) among the workforce in the
respective profession are also displayed in table 5.1, with thresholds of above 70 and below
30 percent, respectively. Thus, we end up with six distinct groups of five professions each,
distinguished by gender dominance and skill level.
We distributed the 30 occupations to the 30 candidates on each list such that every candidate
features a distinct profession on any given ballot and none of them appears twice. Further-
more, we exogenously varied the allocation of professions to candidates over the six ballot
versions which contain this information. More specifically, every candidate appears with
an occupation from a different gender-dominance and skill-level group in each version.8,9
Given this exogenous variation of professions across candidates and ballot versions and since
participants were randomly allocated to the different ballot versions, we can use this setup
to identify the true effects of working in one type of profession compared to another as well
as how this varies with the gender of both the candidate and the voter, respectively.
Type of occupation
We start with a very simple model, in which we only focus on the type of occupation. That
is, we regress the probability of candidate i to get one of the six votes of participant j on a
constant and indicators for male- and female-dominated occupations, controlling for nothing
except ballot position and family name:
Pr (voteij |X) = Λ
(︂
β0 + β1female-dominatedi + β2male-dominatedi
+ β3rank&namei)
(5.2)
8Table A5.1 in the appendix displays which profession was shown for each candidate across ballot versions.
9Two candidates (numbers 7 and 9 from the list) slightly deviated from this rule due to an apparent
accident in the allocation. In consequence, one of them (number 9) appears with the same profession in two
ballot versions.
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Table 5.1: Fraction of female workers and graduates from
Gymnasium in the selected professions.
Profession Fraction of ...Female Gym. grad.
Female-dominated
H
ig
he
r
ed
uc
at
ed Psychologist 0.726 0.972
Elem. schoolteacher 0.781 0.966
Pharmacist 0.734 0.964
Social pedagogue 0.718 0.884
Bookseller 0.726 0.738
Lo
w
er
ed
uc
at
ed Elderly care nurse 0.864 0.264
Medical assistant 0.990 0.208
Textile cleaner 0.853 0.160
Cleaner 0.890 0.147
Hairdresser 0.905 0.131
Gender-neutral
H
ig
he
r
ed
uc
at
ed Teacher 0.569 0.998
Lawyer 0.569 0.993
Dentist 0.424 0.989
Physician 0.471 0.987
Local public servant 0.492 0.835
Lo
w
er
ed
uc
at
ed Inkeeper 0.418 0.327
Postal worker 0.507 0.234
Retailer 0.565 0.215
Cook 0.575 0.234
Confectioner 0.557 0.154
Male-dominated
H
ig
he
r
ed
uc
at
ed Physicist 0.218 0.987
Construction engineer 0.167 0.971
Electrical engineer 0.044 0.956
Software developer 0.135 0.837
Computer scientist 0.137 0.767
Lo
w
er
ed
uc
at
ed Firefighter 0.003 0.300
Carpenter 0.019 0.203
Farmer 0.222 0.179
Metal worker 0.145 0.137
Painter 0.063 0.088
Source: German Microcensus 2010, own calculations.
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This way, we obtain the average effects of appearing with a female- or male-dominated
profession on the ballot on the candidates’ electoral chances relative to the situation in
which they would be identified as working in a gender-neutral profession. If coefficients
β1 and β2 turn out to be statistically insignificant, we can conclude that the presence of
profession information changes the electoral chances of male and female candidates either
only coincidentally or through some other channel than gender perceptions. If they are
statistically significant, on the other hand, we can interpret them as evidence that the
voters systematically connect certain professions to a gender and use this information for
their decision.
Profession preference by gender of voters
Next, we examine whether male and female voters react differently to the inclusion of
candidate professions, i.e., we look at differences in the preferences for individual profession
types between male and female voters. Each time, we introduce an indicator for whether the
voter/candidate is female and interact it with the indicators for the profession types. Given
the established fact in the literature that voters are more likely to vote for someone similar
to them (e.g. Cutler, 2002; Sigelman and Sigelman, 1982), we would expect male voters to
favor male-dominated professions and female voters to prefer female-dominated professions
on average. With respect to the gender of the candidate, the effect may go both ways.
If voters follow traditional views of what men and women are supposed to do, this would
trigger better electoral prospects for male candidates working in male professions and female
candidates in female professions. However, if atypical gender-profession combinations catch
more attention, inspire sympathy or respect, the results could go into the other direction.
Typical and atypical gender-profession combinations
Finally, we combine the two perspectives and consider the impact of different types of
occupations by candidate and voter gender. To this end, we rerun the analysis from the
previous section, but separately for male and female voters. This will enable us to see
whether male or female voters differ with respect to their support for traditional or atypical
gender-profession combinations. As previous studies show that men tend to adhere more
strongly to traditional views about the appropriate professions for men and women (Miller
and Hayward, 2006), it is possible that this behavior plays a role in elections as well.
We also estimate an additional specification which includes a variable which indicates if
the candidate and voter have a similar profession, and a variable which indicates if they
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have similar profession and the same gender. Evidence from theoretical and experimen-
tal psychology strongly suggests that voters prefer candidates which display socioeconomic
characteristics similar to their own.10 We expect that this preference for similarity also
applies to professions. The inclusion of the indicators allows us to analyze if such similarity
effects are present in the data and estimate their strength. In order to separate the effects of
profession and gender, we control for average vote probabilities per rank from ballot version
2.11
5.6 Empirical analysis
5.6.1 Direct gender effects
Direct gender effects without profession information
In a first step, we quantify the effects of candidate gender on vote share which are caused
by the shift from ballot version 1 to ballot version 2. These are direct gender effects as
differences in vote share between otherwise identical candidates of varying gender and reflect
differences in voter preferences between male and female candidates. Gender is visible to
voters in the form of unambiguous first names. Version 1 only contains information on
candidate surnames, while version 2 adds information cues about first names.
The first column of table 5.3 shows the vote share effect of being a female candidate, reported
in odds ratios.12 Table A5.4 reports the same effects in percentage points. All standard
errors are clustered at the voter level in order to account for correlation between candidate
choices by the same voter.
Female candidates show a significant vote share bonus relative to male candidates. Con-
10For instance, Piliavin (1987) shows experimental evidence for similarity effects in age, race and sex.
Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) explore the heuristic mechanism which leads to similarity preferences.
11The same results can be obtained by controlling for rank averages from ballot 1, as in equation (5.1),
and additionally controlling for candidate gender.
12Abbreviating Pr(y = 1) as Pr(y), the odds ratio is defined as
OR = Pr(y|x = 1)/(1− Pr(y|x = 1))Pr(y|x = 0)/(1− Pr(y|x = 0))
and shows how many times more likely an outcome of y = 1 is relative to y = 0, if x is equal to 1. If the
estimated odds ratio for the female candidate indicator is larger than 1, female candidates are more likely to
receive the vote than male candidates. If it is smaller, female candidates are less likely to receive the vote.
The odds ratio shows the odds of receiving the vote for a female candidate as a share of the male candidate’s
odds. For small values of Pr(y = 1), the odds ratio is a good approximation of the relative probability of an
outcome. In this case, an odds ratio for the female indicator of, for example, 1.05 can be interpreted as an
approximately 5 percent higher chance of female candidates receiving the vote.
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ditional on ballot position and influence of their family name, they receive approximately
33 percent more votes and their likelihood of receiving the vote is 4.47 percentage points
higher than that of males. This is a substantial vote share bonus when considering that
purely random voting would lead to a probability of 20 percent to receive each vote. Male
candidates have an average probability of receiving the vote of 19.2 percent while female
candidates, on average, receive 21.1 percent. Being female therefore is no drawback for
candidates in list elections. On the contrary, voters even seem to have a baseline preferance
for female candidates.
As an additional measure of electoral success, we calculate average list rank gains or losses
for candidate groups when switching from ballots with less information to ballots with more
information.13 These measures of rank gain reflect the effect on electoral achievement which
was caused by the introduction of the next information cue. When considering list rank
gains as a measure of electoral success, female candidates climb an average of 1.47 ranks
relative to their position in the list of ballot 1.
In the second columns of tables 5.3 and A5.4, the effect of being a female candidate is inter-
acted with voter gender. The base category, against which the vote share of all other voter
and candidate combinations are measured, are male candidates and male voters. Relative
to this base category the vote share of female candidates and male voters is not significantly
different, as shown in the third row of table 5.3. However in the second row of table 5.3
female candidates are approximately 33 percent more likely to receive the vote of a female
voter than male candidates are likely to receive the vote of a man. The fourth row of table
5.3 shows that male candidates are approximately 23 percent less likely to receive the vote
of a female voter than that of a male voter. The cross table of odds ratios between all
voter and candidate categories (table 5.4) reinforces the notion that the positive vote share
difference for female candidates is driven by female voters. For instance, female candidates
are 27.5 percent more likely to receive the vote of a women than that of a man. While fe-
male voters display significant preferences for candidate gender, male voters are indifferent
with respect to candidate gender. Thus, direct gender effects are driven by female voter
13In each ballot version, the number of votes determines the final rank each candidate achieves in the
election outcome. For instance, moving from ballot version 1 to ballot 2 we can calculate for each candidate
the rank gain by subtracting the final rank in ballot version 2 from the final rank which the candidate
achieves in ballot version 1. Taking the average of rank gains and losses over the subgroups of male and
female candidates, we obtain the effect of gender on list rank. Average rank gains for candidates of certain
profession types (interacted with gender) are calculated analogous in the move from ballot version 2 to ballot
versions 3 to 8. List rank gains provide a very intuitive measure of electoral success. However, list rank gains
of individual candidates also depend on the election results of other candidates. Because of the discontinuous
nature of list ranks the results are less precise than measured vote shares.
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bias against male candidates. The probability of receiving the vote of a man does not dif-
fer significantly between male and female candidates, which indicates that men do not use
gender as a cognitive shortcut for candidate skill. In this respect, our findings align with
those of Dolan (1998) who shows that female voters are more sensitive to candidate gender.
However, indifference towards gender does not imply that men vote randomly if gender is
the only information cue available. When asked about the method by which they allocate
their votes in this low information setting, the majority of respondents stated that they
based their decisions on names and the position in the candidate list (compare table 5.2).
These statements are confirmed by the highly significant coefficient on the list rank effect
in table 5.3, which indicates that male voters base their voting decision in this setting on
list rank and surname.
Table 5.2: Methods used to allocate the votes, by information treatment and
gender
Information stated on the ballot (Treatment)
None Gender Gender &
Profession
Fraction stating this particular type of method among those who used one
(Open question, multiple answers possible)
Voter gender Males Females Males Females Males Females
Names 0.448 0.569 0.472 0.458 0.040 0.028
Foreigners 0.207 0.120 0.139 0.125 0.018 0.012
First 6 on the list 0.207 0.120 0.056 0.104 0.033 0.007
Randomly 0.000 0.060 0.056 0.041 0.016 0.002
Profession 0.067 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.687 0.719
Age 0.100 0.000 0.056 0.146 0.007 0.012
Gender 0.034 0.020 0.361 0.408 0.093 0.155
Family status 0.034 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007
Education 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.111 0.102
Representativeness 0.000 0.000 0.083 0.042 0.084 0.106
Similar to oneself 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.029 0.039
Notes: (1) This table shows the fraction of voters indicating to have used the respective method among
those who declared they had allocated their votes in a particular way. In order to solicit unbiased answers,
this question was asked in open format, i.e., without predetermined alternatives. (2) The method used by
the most individuals is marked in bold for each ballot version.
Direct gender effects with profession
Next, we test if the direct effect of candidate gender on vote share depends on the availability
of profession information on the ballot. To this end, we estimate specification 1 on the pooled
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sample of ballot versions 3 to 8. Results are shown in columns three of table 5.3 and table
A5.4. When candidate professions are included in the information on the ballot there is no
vote share effect for female candidates. The odds ratio for the female candidate indicator
of 0.998 is close to one and statistically insignificant. Gender based candidate choice by
voters, which leads to a substantial vote share advantage for female candidates in ballot 2,
appears to be replaced by a separate set of voter preferences which is heavily influenced by
professions. In the questionnaire about the method which they chose to allocate votes, 70
percent of voters with ballots 3 to 8 state that candidate profession was the most important
factor that they based their decision on (table 5.2). These new preferences do not favor
female candidates.
Now we interact the female candidate indicator with voter gender, replicating regression
specification 2 on a sample from ballots 3 to 8. The aim is to evaluate if male and female
voters respond differently to the inclusion of profession information on the ballot. Results are
displayed in columns four of table 5.3 and table A5.4. When professions are unknown, male
voters are indifferent towards candidate gender while female voters prefer female candidates.
With known professions we see a different pattern. Male voters no longer balance their votes
between male and female candidates, instead they are about 15.3 percent less likely to give
the vote to a female candidate. Female voters, on the other hand, are 15.6 percent less likely
to give the vote to a male candidate. Profession information by itself can’t be the cause
of these shifts in preferences because profession information cues are perfectly balanced
between candidates of both genders by experimental design. Therefore it is the interaction
of profession information and candidate gender which leads to gender bias in voting by
both male and female voters. In the following section we explore the influence of profession
information cues and their interactions with candidate gender in detail.
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Table 5.3: Direct gender effects
Ballot 2 Ballot 2 Ballots 3-8 Ballots 3-8
Female cand. 1.335*** 0.998
(0.0881) (0.0257)
F.cand.*F.vot. 1.335*** 1.002
(0.0801) (0.0295)
F.cand.*M.vot. 1.047 0.0847***
(0.0875) (0.0295)
M. cand.*F.vot. 0.768*** 0.844***
(0.0517) (0.0295)
Rank effects ballot v. 1 Yes Yes No No
Rank effects ballot v. 2 No No Yes Yes
Base Male cand. 0.192 0.199
Base Mcand, Mvot 0.211 0.212
Note: Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Effects in odds ratios show how much more likely a candidate is to receive the vote, relative to the base
category. Under fully random voting, the base probability would be 0.2 for each candidate.
Table 5.4: Cross table of direct gender effects
Base F. cand.*M.
vot.
M. cand.*F.
vot.
M. cand.*M.
vot.
F. cand.*F. vot. 1.275*** 1.738*** 1.335***
F. cand.*M. vot. 1.363*** 1.047
M. cand.*F. vot. 0.768***
Note: Effects in odds ratios, p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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5.6.2 Indirect gender effects
Indirect gender effects through profession type
Table 5.5: Raw profession effects
Profession type Male dominated Neutral Female dominated
Probability of re-
ceiving the vote
21.6% 18.6% 19.8%
Note: Under fully random voting, each occupation category would receive 20% of all votes.
In this chapter we analyze indirect gender effects which are transmitted through profession
information cues. Men and women are not evenly distributed between professions. Some
professions are heavily dominated by males, e.g. engineering, manual labor and construc-
tion. Other professions are almost entirely dominated by women. These professions are
often found in education and healthcare. Many professions are gender neutral in the sense
that equal numbers of men and women pursue them. For instance lawyers and retail work-
ers. Ballot versions 3 to 8 add information cues on professions of each of the three types
defined by gender dominance. Each ballot contains equal numbers of male and female can-
didates in each profession so that vote share effects of gender dominated professions are
independent of candidate gender. Within each profession type, professions are balanced by
required qualification. This ensures that gender dominance and not perceived education
levels determine voter preferences for each profession type. Even when not controlling for
list ranks, the profession types differ in their probability of receiving the vote. In terms of
raw probabilities, male dominated professions are more likely to receive the vote than female
dominated ones, and both are more likely to be voted for than gender neutral professions
(table 5.5).
This pattern continues in the results from a logit model which controls for list rank effects.
We show the effects of each profession type in figure 5.2. As in the case of raw probabilites,
we see evidence of strong profession type effects. Male dominated professions enjoy a sig-
nificant vote share bonus and are 20 percent more likely to receive the vote than neutral
professions. Female dominated professions are significantly more likely to be voted for than
neutral professions (8 percent), but are significantly less likely to be voted for than male
professions.14 In terms of list ranks, candidates with male professions gain, on average, 1.85
14The difference between the vote share bonuses for candidates in male dominated and female dominated
professions is highly significant with a t-test p-value of 0.0023.
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rank positions. Candidates with female professions gain 0.17 ranks and neutral professions
lose 1.68 list ranks (table 5.8).
This clear ordering of categories establishes that gender dominance plays an important role
in voter valuation of professions. If male dominated professions act as information shortcuts
for typically male character traits like assertiveness and toughness, as suggested by Huddy
and Terkildsen (1993) and Lemkau (1983, 1984), it would explain voter preference for such
professions. However in that case we would expect both male voters and female voters to
prefer candidates in male professions. As we show in figure 5.3 and table A5.5, only male
voters prefer male professions while female voters are indifferent between male dominated
and neutral professions. Therefore the vote share bonus for male professions is unlikely to
be driven by inferred political ability of such professions.
1.08
1.2
Female prof.
Male prof.
1 1.1 1.2 1.3
Odds ratio relative to Base category: Neutral prof.
Prob. Neutral prof:  .186
Profession effect by gender dominance
Figure 5.2
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Profession type effects by voter gender
We now interact gender dominated professions with voter gender using data from ballot
versions 3 to 8. Therefore, we quantify how voters value professions which are typically held
by members of their own gender.
Figure 5.3 , table A5.5 and table 5.6 show that female voters clearly prefer female domi-
nated professions to male or neutral professions. They are almost 30 percent more likely to
vote for candidates in female dominated professions than for candidates in male or neutral
professions. Conversely, male voters bestow a large vote share bonus (almost 40 percent)
upon candidates in male dominated professions, relative to neutral professions. They are
also significantly less likely to vote for candidates in female professions compared to those
in male or neutral professions. It is therefore clear that voters favor candidates in profes-
sions which are dominated by their own gender. This gender biased profession effect is more
pronounced among male voters, which stands in contrast with the lack of direct gender pref-
erences which male voters display when professions are unknown (compare section 5.6.1).
Male voters do not let gender directly influence their voting decision but show strong indi-
rect gender preferences through the occupation channel. They favor candidates with male
dominated professions and show a dislike for candidates in female dominated professions.
Female voters on average prefer female professions but their biases are weaker than those of
male voters. The vote share bonus they give to candidates in female dominated professions
is lower than the bonus given by male voters to male professions. Female voters are also
indifferent between male dominated and neutral professions.
Table 5.6: Cross table of profession effects by voter gender
Base F.
vot.*Male
prof.
F.
vot.*Neutral
prof.
M.
vot.*Male
prof.
M.
vot.*Female
prof.
M.
vot.*Neutral
prof.
F. vot.*Female prof. 1.284*** 1.317*** 0.962*** 1.452*** 1.279***
F. vot.*Male prof. 1.026 0.72*** 1.133*** 1.000
F. vot.*Neutral prof. 0.703*** 1.104** 0.970
M. vot.*Male prof. 1.569*** 1.380***
M. vot.*Neutral prof. 0.879**
Note: Effects in odds ratios
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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1.28
.996
.971
1.38
.879
Female prof., F. vot.
Male prof., F. vot.
Neutral prof., F. vot.
Male prof., M. vot.
Female prof., M. vot.
.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6
Odds ratio relative to
Base category: Neutral prof. Male vot.
Probl Neutral prof. Male vot. = .189
Profession effect by gender dominance
and voter gender
Figure 5.3
Profession type effects by candidate gender
In the next step, we interact gender dominated profession types with candidate gender.
The interaction of candidate genders and profession describes whether or not the candidate
conforms to the stereotypes of “men doing men’s work" or “women doing women’s work".
By testing if voters value the profession types differently for male and female candidates we
can quantify the effects of stereotypical gender-profession combinations on vote share. Since
voters use information cues as cognitive shortcuts, candidates with stereotypical gender and
profession combinations might enjoy a vote share bonus if voters perceive such stereotypical
candidates as more predictable or more similar to themselves. The latter has been shown
to be an important determinant of voter choice, since voters gravitate towards candidates
which are close to them in terms of sociodemographic distance (Cutler, 2002). Results
are displayed in figure 5.4 table A5.6 and cross-table 5.7. Candidates who adhere to the
stereotype of men in male dominated professions are preferred over male candidates in
other professions. They are approximately 32.5 percent more likely to be voted for than
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male candidates in neutral professions, and 27 percent more likely than male candidates in
female dominated professions.
Female candidates enjoy a significant vote share advantage if they adhere to the stereotype
of women in women’s professions compared to women in neutral jobs. However, female
candidates in male professions also gain a vote share advantage over those in neutral profes-
sions. The vote share advantages of female candidates in both male and female dominated
professions are of similar size. There is no statistically significant difference in the probabil-
ity of receiving the vote between females in female or male dominated professions (compare
column one, row one of table 5.7). While female candidates in female professions enjoy a
vote share advantage of 17 percent over females in neutral professions, females in male pro-
fessions have an advantage of 13 percent over those in neutral professions. For candidates
in neutral professions, their gender does not influence the vote share in any significant way.
These effects are partially reflected in the way that candidates who adhere to stereotypes
gain list ranks. Table 5.8 shows that stereotypical male candidates gain an average of 3.33
list ranks when moving from ballot version 2 to ballot versions 3 to 8. Atypical male candi-
dates on the other hand lose 0.4 ranks. Stereotypically female candidates gain 0.067 ranks
and female candidates in male professions gain 0.367 ranks. While stereotypically female
candidates receive more votes, their positions on ballots 2 and 3 to 8 are such that despite
their increased vote share they don’t always manage to surpass the threshold required for
higher ranks.
Table 5.7: Cross table of profession effects by candidate gender
Base F.
cand.*Male
prof.
F.
cand.*Neutral
prof.
M.
cand.*Male
prof.
M. cand.
Female
prof.
M. cand.
Neutral
prof.
F. cand.*Female prof. 1.030 1.139*** 0.889*** 1.137*** 1.163***
F. cand.*Male prof. 1.107** 0.864*** 1.105** 1.130***
F. cand.*Neutral prof. 0.780*** 0.998 1.020
M. cand.*Male prof. 1.279*** 1.308***
M. cand.*Female prof. 1.022
Note: Effects in odds ratios
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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F.cand. # Neutral prof.
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Base category: Neutral prof.# Male cand.
Prob. Neutral prof.# Male cand.:  .184
Profession effect by gender dominance
and candidate gender 
Figure 5.4
Profession type effects by candidate and voter gender
Next, we interact profession types with candidate gender and report results separately for
male and female voters. Results are displayed in figure 5.5 and table A5.7. Male voters have
a clear preference for candidates who adhere to the stereotype of men in male dominated
professions. These candidates are approximately 41 percent more likely to receive the male
voter’s vote than male candidates in neutral professions. Male candidates in female profes-
sions, or female candidates in female and neutral professions get even fewer votes from male
voters.
Female voters strongly prefer stereotypical female candidates. They award a vote share
bonus of roughly 72 percent to female candidates in female professions, relative to the base
category of male candidates in neutral professions. However, this base category receives
the lowest vote share from female voters, which slightly overemphasitzes the bonus for
stereotypical female candidates. All other candidate categories have significantly higher
probabilities of being voted for than the base category, with odds ratios ranging between
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Table 5.8: List rank gains
A. List ranks gained for candidates in each profession
type
Profession type Male dominated Neutral Female
dominated
0.167 -1.683 1.850
B. List ranks gained for each profession type,
stratified by candidate gender
Profession type Male dominated Neutral Female
dominated
Candidate gender Male Female Male Female Male Female
3.333 0.367 -1.300 2.067 -0.400 0.067
Notes: Panel A shows the gain and loss in list ranks when profession information is made available to the
voters, averaged over all candidates of the respective profession type. Panel B shows the same list rank
gains as in panel A, but averaged over subgroups defined by profession type and candidate gender.
1.17 and 1.32. Still, female candidates in female professions receive by far the most votes
from female voters.
We conclude that gender stereotypes are advantageous for the vote share of male candidates,
but that their role in determining the vote share of female candidates is more complex.
Females gain a vote share advantage from having typically female professions, just like
male candidates gain from typically male professions, although the advantage for women is
somewhat smaller. In both cases, this advantage is driven by voters of the respective gender.
But female candidates also profit from male dominated professions, almost to the same
degree as from female professions. However, while the vote share bonus for stereotypical
female candidates is driven by female voters, the bonus for non-stereotypical females is
driven by male voters who show a baseline preference for candidates in male professions.
Vote share bonuses for stereotypical candidates might appear through two channels. First,
the information cues of candidate gender and gender typical profession complement each
other to create the image of a stereotypical person. Stereotyping allows the voters to infer
additional characteristics about the candidate, which he or she might not know but which
are part of the stereotype (compare Rahn (1993)). This in turn makes such candidates
more predictable which might positively influence voter choice in low information contexts
which always carry a lot of uncertainty for the voter. Second, voters are more likely to
vote for candidates which are similar to themselves, as shown by Cutler (2002). Additional
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evidence from theoretical and experimental psychology strongly suggests that voters prefer
candidates which display socioeconomic characteristics similar to their own.15 We find
that similarity between voters and candidates with respect to gender, profession and the
combination thereof leads to strong positive vote share effects. In table 5.9 we show that
voters have a very high chance of giving the vote to candidates who have the same profession
as themselves. The odds of giving the vote to a candidate with the same profession are
several times higher than with other candidates.16 Even more so if they share the same
gender. By definition, voters of both genders more often pursue occupations dominated
by their own gender. Therefore female voters are more likely to have the same profession
and gender as stereotypical female candidates and the same holds for male voters, which
in turn leads to higher vote shares for stereotypical candidates. Note, however, that the
vote shares of profession/candidate combinations do not vary by much when controlling for
profession/gender similarity of candidate and voter (table 5.9). Similarity between voter and
candidate is therefore a significant predictor of vote probability, but only explains a small
part of the vote share differences between stereotypical and non-stereotypical candidates.
This is mainly because the number of voters who have exactly the same profession as a
candidate is fairly small in our sample. Only 4 percent of voters share a profession with a
candidate and only 2 percent share both profession and gender.
It is likely that voters prefer candidates who are similar to themselves in a wider sense, which
would vastly expand the number of voters who encounter similar candidates on ballots.
For instance, they might prefer candidates who work in fields which are related to their
profession. A male voter who works as a carpenter might, for example, prefer candidates
who are craftsmen in other fields. The expanded similarity channel might therefore still
contribute substantially to the stereotype preferences which we observe.
Extension: Simulated vote shares and rank gains under realistic distribution of
professions
In the previous section we have shown that voter preference for male candidates in male
dominated professions is stronger than for female candidates in female dominated profes-
sions. Conversely, voters give less votes to male candidates in female dominated professions
15Piliavin (1987) shows experimental evidence for similarity effects in age, race and sex. Goldstein and
Gigerenzer (2002) explore the heuristic mechanism which leads to similarity preferences.
16Such high odds ratios can no longer be reliably interpreted as percentage differences but instead serve to
illustrate the relative strength of the effect. We show the results in odds ratios for comparison of profession
stereotype effects with figure 5.4.
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Table 5.9: Candidate to voter similarity
Same profession indicator 5.089∗∗∗ (1.140)
Same gender indicator 1.181∗∗∗ (0.0306)
Same profession and gender 1.582 (0.505)
F. cand.*Female prof. 1.174∗∗∗ (0.0536)
F.cand.*Male prof. 1.148∗∗∗ (0.0527)
F.cand.*Neutral prof. 1.028 (0.0450)
M. cand.*Male prof. 1.317∗∗∗ (0.0568)
M. cand.*Female. prof. 1.031 (0.0467)
Rank effects ballot v. 2 Yes
P_val_same_jointly 0
Note: Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Effects in odds ratios show how much more likely a candidate
is to receive the vote,relative to the base category.
Under fully random voting, the base probability would be 0.2
for each candidate.
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Prob. Neutral prof.# Male cand.= .203 |.163
Figure 5.5
than to female candidates in male dominated professions. Aggregating over all professions
we find no vote share advantage for either gender when profession information cues are
available to the voter. Estimating the gender specific vote share effect for ballot versions 3
to 8, which contain the profession information cues, shows that female candidates receive
a statistically insignificant 0.02 percent higher vote share. Their probability of receiving
the vote is only 0.037 percentage points higher. Compared to the ballot versions without
profession information cues, in which female candidates receive 33 percent more votes than
male candidates, this is a substantial drop in vote share. While voters on average like to
vote for female candidates, this bonus vanishes when candidate professions are known.17
The ballots in the experimental setting contain equal numbers of candidates for each combi-
nation of gender and profession-type. However, by definition, vastly more men pursue male
dominated professions and more women work in female dominated ones. Such a gender
17As shown in section 5.6.1, female voters vastly prefer female candidates while male voters are indifferent
with regards to candidate gender.
5. Candidates’ Professions and the Gender Gap in Parliaments 156
imbalance within professions will be reflected in the makeup of party lists. Therefore the
candidates in real elections do not display the same balanced distribution of professions
across genders as the ballots in our experiment. The more pronounced vote share bonus
of stereotypically male candidates (31 percent) relative to other candidate types will then
lead to a reduced vote share for the aggregate of female candidates. Stereotypically female
candidates only gain a bonus of 16 percent, non-stereotypical females 13 percent and non-
stereotypical males receive no vote share bonus at all. A reduction in the aggregate female
vote share is simply a mechanical consequence of increasing the numbers of stereotypical
candidates on the ballot relative to the number of non-stereotypical ones.18 The number
of male candidates who earn the highest vote share increases while the number of male
candidates who receive no bonus decreases. For females however, the number of candidates
who earn a vote share bonus of 16 percent increases, and the number of those who gain a
13 percent bonus decreases. Since those two vote shares are similar, they largely balance
each other out and the aggregate female vote share does not change. In order to quantify
the effect of realistic profession distributions on aggregate female vote share, we simulate
vote results for different distributions stereotypical candidates by reweighting the share of
candidate gender/profession combinations. We show the results for the observed experiment
and for three different simulated distributions. Without reweighting the share of female can-
didates in each profession type (male dominated, female dominated, neutral) is 50 percent.
The first simulated distribution has a share of 70 percent female candidates within female
dominated professions and a share of 30 percent females within male dominated professions,
with the reverse holding for males. The second distribution has a female share of 80 per-
cent in female dominated professions and 20 percent in male dominated ones and the third
has shares of 90 percent and 10 percent, respectively. These shares all represent realistic
distributions of gender typical professions. In reality, women make up between 99 and ≈
70 percent of workers in female dominated professions and between 0.03 and 22 percent in
the male dominated ones (compare table 5.1). Vote share results for the three simulations
are given in table 5.10. They show that under realistic distributions, female candidates
suffer a vote share disadvantage of -3.2, -4.7 and -6.1 percent, respectively, for the three
simulated distributions. Compared to the vote share bonus which female candidates receive
if professions are unknown, this is a drastic decline. Driving these changes in vote share
are voter preferences for stereotypical professions, not a preference for candidate gender in
18Here we assume that no general equilibrium effects affect the vote share. That is, voter preferences for
candidate types are independent of candidate supply as long as at least one candidate of each type is present
on the ballot.
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itself. Voter predilection for professions overrides their preferences for female candidates,
causing the swing in voter demand. When asked directly about the criteria they chose to
select candidates, the vast majority of voters declared that they based their voting decision
on profession information if that information was known (table 5.2). When professions were
unknown, many voters selected candidates for their name and gender. More specifically,
male voters who previously were indifferent to gender, rather give their vote to male candi-
dates in male dominated professions than to any other candidates. This leads to a reduction
in the female vote share bonus from 33 percent to almost zero in our sample and to a fe-
male vote share penalty of up to 6.1 percent when professions are realistically distributed
by gender.
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5.7 Conclusion
In this study, we examine whether information about the profession of candidates running
for public office affects the electoral gender gap, i.e., the difference in probability to get
elected between men and women. To this end, we use data from an election experiment
built into an exit-poll of voters at the elections to the EU parliament in Germany in 2014.
We exploit the random allocation of participants into various information treatments to
obtain unbiased estimates for direct and indirect gender effects. Our findings suggest that
voters, especially women, are inclined to lend their support to female candidates if there
are no other cues about the candidates’ characteristics and positions. Once the candidates’
occupations are revealed, however, the voters use these as their main selection criterion. This
leads to shrinking support for female candidates and may even turn into an electoral bonus
for male candidates. This remarkable change is driven by male voters who strongly favor
stereotypical male candidates working in male-dominated professions. The magnitude of this
effect may even be underestimated, as we abstained from including professions indicating
manager or supervisor positions, which are typically male-dominated, and houseman or
housewife, in which women are overrepresented.
In essence, these results reveal an interesting pattern in the voting behavior of male voters,
boiling down to a position of: “I don’t care about the gender of the candidates, as long as they
are competent, and I believe people working in male professions are just that.” In a sense,
focusing on profession leads to same-sex preference. This has implications for gender equity
policy. It means that the still existing segmentation of parts of the labor market spills-over
to the political arena as well. In consequence, any progress of women on the labor market
will also lead to progress in addressing the electoral gender gap. That is, policies to promote
gender quality at work may also increase female representation in parliaments and councils
in the medium and long-run. It also means that there is no baseline-preference for male
candidates. Which implies that policy measures which aim to improve female representation
in parliaments do not necessarily stand in opposition with voter preferences.
The findings in this paper are not transferable to every political context, however. They are
derived and relevant for elections with a low information environment in which the gains
from inferred information from stereotyping are much greater than in situations in which
the candidates are well known. Typical examples for such low information elections are
open lists and primary elections with many candidates belonging to the same party, or any
election in which the candidates are relatively unknown, typically on lower institutional
levels. By contrast, high-profile races for important political offices in which only a handful
of prominent candidates compete against each other are unlikely to be influenced by gender
stereotyping. Besides, candidates at the national level tend to be full-time career politicians
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who only marginally differ in terms of profession anyway. Further research on the strength
of gender-profession stereotypes in different contexts may therefore focus on determining
which share of voters use heuristics for their voting decision across different election systems,
institutional levels, and numbers of candidates running.
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Table A5.2: Descriptive statistics for the sample of voters
Full sample Male voters Female voters Male-Female
difference
mean sd mean sd mean sd p-values
Female voter 0.50 0.50
Age below 26 0.21 0.41 0.20 0.40 0.22 0.41 0.292
Age 26-35 0.18 0.38 0.20 0.40 0.15 0.36 0.005
Age 36-45 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.35 1.000
Age 46-55 0.19 0.40 0.18 0.38 0.21 0.41 0.106
Age 56-65 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.34 0.14 0.35 1.000
Age over 65 0.13 0.34 0.14 0.34 0.13 0.34 0.530
Secondary degree 0.67 0.47 0.69 0.46 0.64 0.48 0.023
City 0.53 0.50 0.54 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.393
Baden Wuerttemberg 0.53 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.54 0.50 0.393
Voted for left-leaning party 0.54 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.200
Observations 1826 916 910
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Table A5.3: Randomization across ballot versions
Version 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Sample size 213 222 239 255 247 253 246 238
Female 0.612 0.479 0.524 0.442 0.466 0.479 0.511 0.489
(0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Age 16-25 0.134 0.212 0.224 0.260 0.204 0.199 0.229 0.187
(0.34) (0.41) (0.42) (0.44) (0.40) (0.40) (0.42) (0.39)
Age 26-35 0.189 0.157 0.155 0.186 0.196 0.220 0.157 0.143
(0.39) (0.36) (0.36) (0.39) (0.40) (0.42) (0.36) (0.35)
Age 36-45 0.144 0.180 0.164 0.124 0.132 0.144 0.178 0.126
(0.35) (0.38) (0.37) (0.33) (0.34) (0.35) (0.38) (0.33)
Age 46-55 0.209 0.161 0.203 0.190 0.200 0.191 0.195 0.209
(0.41) (0.37) (0.40) (0.39) (0.40) (0.39) (0.40) (0.41)
Age 56-65 0.179 0.207 0.125 0.103 0.132 0.093 0.131 0.143
(0.38) (0.41) (0.33) (0.30) (0.34) (0.29) (0.34) (0.35)
Age 66+ 0.144 0.083 0.129 0.136 0.136 0.153 0.110 0.191
(0.35) (0.28) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.36) (0.31) (0.39)
Currently married 0.547 0.519 0.560 0.521 0.536 0.485 0.511 0.555
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Children [y/n] 0.555 0.525 0.534 0.471 0.545 0.468 0.515 0.591
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49)
No. of children 1.144 0.977 1.034 0.975 1.081 0.940 1.030 1.117
(1.26) (1.15) (1.17) (1.25) (1.25) (1.33) (1.32) (1.20)
Education low 0.385 0.307 0.328 0.295 0.340 0.358 0.297 0.316
(0.49) (0.46) (0.47) (0.46) (0.47) (0.48) (0.46) (0.47)
A-level 0.265 0.326 0.310 0.361 0.302 0.259 0.360 0.294
(0.44) (0.47) (0.46) (0.48) (0.46) (0.44) (0.48) (0.46)
University degree 0.350 0.367 0.362 0.344 0.357 0.384 0.343 0.390
(0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.49) (0.48) (0.49)
Vote share SPD 0.275 0.293 0.287 0.243 0.292 0.266 0.278 0.302
(0.43) (0.45) (0.44) (0.42) (0.45) (0.43) (0.44) (0.45)
Vote share CDU 0.253 0.236 0.263 0.292 0.257 0.253 0.316 0.285
(0.42) (0.42) (0.43) (0.45) (0.43) (0.43) (0.46) (0.44)
Large city 0.521 0.532 0.515 0.510 0.534 0.561 0.528 0.521
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
State of BW 0.526 0.527 0.556 0.514 0.502 0.534 0.520 0.538
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Note: Mean values of the respective variables by ballot version. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Means which deviate significantly (5 % level) from random allocation in bold. Only 8 out of 136 cells show
significant deviation.
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5.8.2 Tables from section 5.6.1
Table A5.4: Direct gender effects
Ballot 2 Ballot 2 Ballots 3-8 Ballots 3-8
Female cand. 0.0447∗∗∗ -0.000371
(0.0101) (0.00412)
Fcand*Fvot 0.0466∗∗∗ 0.000262
(0.00998) (0.00387)
Fcand*Mvot 0.00720 -0.0258∗∗∗
(0.0131) (0.00528)
Mcand*Fvot -0.0392∗∗∗ -0.0264∗∗∗
(0.00956) (0.00391)
Rank effects ballot v. 1 Yes Yes No No
Rank effects ballot v. 2 No No Yes Yes
Base Male cand. 0.192 0.199
Base Mcand*Mvot 0.211 0.212
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses
The coefficients show percentage point changes in the probability of receiving the vote.
Under fully random voting, the base probability would be 0.2 for each candidate.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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5.8.3 Tables from section 5.6.2
Table A5.5: Profession effect by gender dominance and voter gender
Female prof.*F. vot. 0.0410∗∗∗ (0.00628)
Male prof.*F. vot. -0.000624 (0.00617)
Neutral prof.*F. vot. -0.00469 (0.00613)
Male prof.*M. vot. 0.0544∗∗∗ (0.00830)
Female prof.*M. vot. -0.0200∗∗∗ (0.00702)
Rank effects ballot v. 2 0.218∗∗∗ (0.0251)
Base Neutral prof. M. vot. 0.189
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses
The coefficients show percentage point changes in the probability
of receiving the vote. Under fully random voting, the base probability
would be 0.2 for each candidate.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A5.6: Profession effect by gender dominance and candidate gender
F. cand.*Female. prof. 0.0248∗∗∗ (0.00782)
F.cand.*Male prof. 0.0200∗∗∗ (0.00762)
F.cand.*Neutral prof. 0.00327 (0.00706)
M. cand.*Male prof. 0.0451∗∗∗ (0.00757)
M. cand.*Female. prof. 0.00352 (0.00729)
Rank effect ballot v. 2 0.219∗∗∗ (0.0251)
Base M. cand.*Neutral prof. 0.184
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses
The coefficients show percentage point changes in the probability
of receiving the vote. Under fully random voting, the base probability
would be 0.2 for each candidate.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A5.7: Profession effect by gender dominance and candidate gender
Male voters Female voters
F. cand.*Female prof. -0.0372∗∗∗ 0.0953∗∗∗
(0.00915) (0.0126)
F.cand.*Male prof. 0.0165∗ 0.0240∗∗
(0.00999) (0.0117)
F.cand.*Neutral prof. -0.0309∗∗∗ 0.0440∗∗∗
(0.00886) (0.0110)
M. cand.*Male prof. 0.0576∗∗∗ 0.0296∗∗∗
(0.0103) (0.0112)
M. cand.*Female prof. -0.0317∗∗∗ 0.0455∗∗∗
(0.00924) (0.0113)
Rank effects ballot v. 2 0.213∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗
(0.0358) (0.0348)
Base M. cand.*Neutral prof. 0.203 0.163
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses
The coefficients show percentage point changes in the probability
of receiving the vote. Under fully random voting, the base probability
would be 0.2 for each candidate.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A5.8: Profession type effect - fixed effect model
Profession type by voter gender by candidate gender
Female prof. 0.0118∗∗
(0.00476)
Male prof. 0.0297∗∗∗
(0.00474)
Female prof.*M. vot. -0.0191∗∗∗
(0.00660)
Female prof.*F. vot. 0.0402∗∗∗
(0.00670)
Neutral prof.*F. vot. -0.00450
(0.00669)
Male prof.*M. vot. 0.0541∗∗∗
(0.00659)
Male prof.*F. vot. -0.000710
(0.00669)
M. cand.*Female. prof. 0.00263
(0.00684)
F. cand.*Female. prof. -0.0729∗∗∗
(0.0171)
F.cand.*Neutral prof. -0.0937∗∗∗
(0.0170)
M. cand.*Male prof. 0.0434∗∗∗
(0.00691)
F.cand.*Male prof. -0.0777∗∗∗
(0.0172)
Constant 0.186∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗
(0.00336) (0.00466) (0.0128)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses
The coefficients show percentage point changes in the probability of receiving the vote.
Under fully random voting, the base probability would be 0.2 for each candidate.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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